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I.  Introduction 
 
  For much of the past century, the minimum wage has been a controversial subject among 
policymakers and economists.  From even before its inception as a major element of the 1938 Fair Labor 
Standards Act (1938), the minimum wage was a politically contentious issue, with early attempts by the 
states to establish a wage floor declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s first attempt to legislate a federal minimum wage in 1933 similarly struck down.  Eventually, 
however, Roosevelt prevailed and Congress passed the FLSA, setting the minimum wage at 25 cents per 
hour. 
  For economists, the new minimum wage represented a means of testing alternative models of the 
labor market.  Indeed, during much of the following three decades, a fierce debate raged between 
economists who claimed that the labor market was best characterized as a competitive market (the 
“marginalists”) and those who claimed that it was not (the “institutionalists”), in which the implications 
of the minimum wage were a central focus (Leonard, 2000).  During the same period, other economists 
were beginning to accumulate research on the effects of the minimum wage, with much of this research 
suggesting that increases in the wage floor were having adverse effects on the employment opportunities 
of low-skilled workers (Goldfarb, 1974).   
Despite the unsettled debate within the economics profession, the Congress expanded coverage of 
the minimum wage significantly during the 1960s and 1970s, and by 1975, more than 90 percent of the 
workforce was effectively covered by the federal minimum wage, up from 63 percent in 1961 (Brown, 
1999).  Similarly, Congress steadily increased the minimum wage over this period from $1.00 per hour in 
1960 to $2.30 by 1979, with the 1977 FLSA amendments further raising the minimum to $3.35 by 1981.  
However, these changes were enacted in an environment of considerable discord among policymakers 
about the appropriateness of raising the minimum wage, and the ongoing political debate about the costs 
and benefits of a wage floor led the Congress in 1977 to create the Minimum Wage Study Commission to 
“help it resolve the many controversial issues that have surrounded the federal minimum wage and - 2 - 
overtime requirement since their origin in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938” (Minimum Wage Study 
Commission, vol. 1, p. xiii).   
In May 1981 the Commission published its report, calling it “the most exhaustive inquiry ever 
undertaken into the issues surrounding the Act since its inception” (Minimum Wage Study Commission, 
vol. 1, Letter of Transmittal).  Although not its only focus, the report included a lengthy chapter 
summarizing the existing research on the employment effects of the minimum wage.  This chapter was 
based on a review of the literature by Charles Brown, Curtis Gilroy, and Andrew Kohen (BGK), three of 
the senior economists on the Commission staff.  These authors subsequently published a revised version 
of their review in the June 1982 issue of the Journal of Economic Literature, in which they summarized 
the existing research as suggesting that “time-series studies typically find that a 10 percent increase in the 
minimum wage reduces teenage employment by one to three percent” (p. 524).  This range subsequently 
came to be thought of as the “consensus view” of economists on the employment effects of the minimum 
wage. 
Given this apparent consensus, economic research on the effects of the minimum wage came 
virtually to a halt following the report of the Minimum Wage Study Commission and the publication of 
BGK’s survey.  However, by the end of the 1980s interest in this topic began to return.  Two related 
circumstances, in particular, seem to have stimulated renewed attention to the effects of the minimum 
wage at that time.  First, the absence of any increase in the federal minimum wage from January 1981 
until April 1990 resulted in more than a 30 percent decline in its value in real terms and led to a growing 
political debate toward the end of the 1980s about the merits of raising the nominal minimum.  Second, 
legislators in an increasing number of states began to raise state-specific minimum wages above the 
federal level in response to the lack of action by the Congress.  These state-specific increases added to 
political debates about the merits of a mandated wage floor.  Moreover, these developments also 
increased the statistical variation in the policy variables traditionally used in minimum wage research, 
offering a means of reexamining the evidence on which the existing consensus had been based. - 3 - 
As a result of both the renewed prominence of the minimum wage in public policy debates and 
the additional evidence that could potentially be used to study the economic effects of wage floors, 
researchers in the early 1990s began to reexamine the effects of the minimum wage on employment.  One 
line of this research simply extended the earlier studies by adding more-recent time-series data to the 
sample period, employing, in some cases, new techniques developed by time-series econometricians to 
take account of criticisms leveled at the specifications used in the earlier literature.  However, a second, 
and arguably more important, line of research attempted to exploit state-level variation in both minimum 
wages and in economic conditions as a way of estimating the employment effects of the minimum wage.  
Indeed, despite improvements to the specifications of time-series models, the dearth of variation in the 
federal minimum wage and the use of aggregate U.S. data to look for its effects continued to be viewed as 
shortcomings of the existing body of research on the economics of the minimum wage (e.g., Kennan, 
1995), while other economists raised concerns about the lack of a well-defined counterfactual in the 
aggregate time-series studies, the potential endogeneity of changes in the federal minimum wage with 
respect to aggregate labor market conditions, and the difficulty in choosing an appropriate set of control 
variables in such studies (Card and Krueger, 1995a).  Moreover, even aside from the problems with the 
aggregate time-series studies discussed in the existing literature, the proliferation of state minimum wages 
set above the federal minimum wage was rendering the aggregate time-series approach increasingly 
obsolete, both from the perspective of correctly measuring the effective minimum wage and from the 
perspective of the relevant question facing policymakers, which had shifted toward the advisability of 
raising minimum wages at the state (or even local) level.  This is even more true currently, when a record 
number of states have minimum wages above the federal level, and these state minimum wages cover a 
large share of the population.    
  We focus our attention on this more-recent literature, which has become known as “the new 
minimum wage research.”  Because the earlier literature on the employment effects of the minimum wage 
was carefully and extensively summarized by BGK, it seems unnecessary to repeat that review in this 
paper.  In contrast, there is no comprehensive review of the extensive literature that has developed over - 4 - 
the past fifteen years, which, as documented in Tables 1-5, now comprises (to the best of our knowledge) 
more than 90 studies covering 15 countries.
1  We thus begin our review with the set of four papers that 
comprised the initial round of the new minimum wage research on the employment effects of the 
minimum wage.  We follow that review with a discussion of the major conceptual and empirical issues 
that arose out of that initial research, and extend our summary of the U.S. literature with a report on 
research that examines more recent increases in minimum wage laws or otherwise extends the literature.  
We then complete our review with a discussion of the empirical research on the employment effects of 
the minimum wage in other countries, an area of inquiry that has also grown markedly over the past 
decade. 
  Our intent in reviewing this literature is three-fold.  First, much of the political debate 
surrounding proposed changes in the minimum wage revolves around the potential effects of an increase 
in the wage floor on employment.  Although we do not view that focus as entirely appropriate, the fact 
that the “jobs” question takes on such importance suggests that the answers ought to be based on a 
comprehensive survey of the literature, recognizing that minimum wage effects may differ across 
different segments of the population and in different economic circumstances and contexts.  In this 
regard, where possible, we attempt to draw some general conclusions about the effects of the minimum 
wage on employment that are relevant to policymakers, pointing out, in particular, the predictions of the 
empirical research for when, how, and for whom raising the minimum wage will have consequences. 
  Second, we hope that our review will help the reader to assess the reasonableness of alternative 
models of the labor market.  In particular, much of the recent empirical research has been characterized as 
rejecting the competitive model of the labor market in favor of the monopsony model (or vice versa).  As 
we will note throughout the paper, economic theory often fails to make an unambiguous prediction about 
the direction or magnitude of the employment effects of minimum wages.  Even in the neoclassical 
model, the effect of the minimum wage on any given set of workers will depend on, among other things, 
                                                 
1 There are, however, papers offering critical summaries of some of the first wave of this literature.  See, for 
example, Card and Krueger (1995), Kennan (1995), and Brown (1999). - 5 - 
the elasticities of substitution across different types of workers and cross-elasticities of demand across 
different types of goods.  However, there are empirical tendencies that will tend to match up better with 
one model or the other, and we try to provide a sense of what these tendencies are.      
  Third, economists or policymakers perusing the existing literature might have a very hard time 
deciding what the evidence on minimum wages now says.  Over 100 studies have been published on the 
effects of minimum wage increases on employment since the 1990s.  And, of course, there are many 
discordant results.  Finally, the findings from the newer research on minimum wages are summarized 
differently in different places.  In some cases, the new research is described as failing to find evidence of 
disemployment effects.  For example, Bazen (2000) states that “(t)he latest studies of the experience of 
the USA and the UK in general find no evidence of negative effects on youth employment” (p. 64).  
Somewhat more cautiously, Flinn (2006) writes that “these recent studies have been particularly useful in 
indicating that the “textbook” competitive model of the labor market ... may have serious deficiencies in 
accounting for minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes ...” (pp. 1013-4).  In contrast, others 
summarize the findings as more ambiguous, suggesting that no conclusions can be drawn, and that 
positive effects may be as likely as negative effects.  Lemos (2004), for example, asserts that “there is no 
consensus on the direction and size of the effect on employment” (p. 219), while Stewart (2002) notes 
that some studies find employment effects to be “absent or positive” and that others find “significant 
negative effects” (p. 585).
2  In contrast, much of our own work tends to find negative employment effects 
for the lowest-skilled groups.  Given the differences in the conclusions one might draw depending on 
what one reads, and the difficulties of wading through the mass of recent studies, we thought it would be 
useful to try to present a comprehensive review of the more-recent minimum wage literature that both 
                                                 
2 In our view, groups advocating for minimum wage increases have—perhaps not surprisingly—made stronger 
statements.  For example, Chapman, in Economic Policy Institute report, asserts that “[T]here is no valid, 
research-based rationale for believing that state minimum wages cause measurable job losses” (p. 2).  This claim 
appears to be based on a highly selective reading of the minimum wage literature based mainly on the New 
Jersey-Pennsylvania fast-food study (Card and Krueger, 1994).  However, the literature on minimum wage effects 
in the United States is far broader than this one study, and clearly much of it does point to disemployment effects.  
Moreover, as discussed later, evidence on employment effects from a single sector is not necessarily informative 
about the employment effects of minimum wages more generally.  Of course, advocacy groups opposing 
minimum wage increases also cite the research literature selectively, although we have not come across the same 
kind of misleading summary statements about the literature as a whole. - 6 - 
provides an accurate accounting of the range of estimates in existing studies, and also attempts to assess 
these studies to see whether more firm conclusions can be drawn.   
  In putting together this review, we have intentionally foregone a formal meta-analysis in favor of 
a traditional “narrative” review that attempts to provide a sense of the quality of the research and tries to 
highlight and synthesize the findings that we regard as more credible.  Given the many different types of 
employment effects estimated in the literature, and the considerable variation in approaches and the 
variation in quality of the research, lumping the studies into one meta-analysis does not seem the best way 
to make sense of the literature.  And meta-analysis is even less useful when the underlying theory does 
not provide uniform predictions about the effects of the minimum wage in every study.  Thus, while we 
recognize that a narrative review introduces an element of subjectivity into the discussion, we felt that it 
would be more useful to present our arguments and assessments of the evidence, and invite readers to 
form their own opinions based on them.  To assist in digesting what is a very lengthy review of the 
evidence, we have collected nearly all of the studies we summarize into a set of five tables covering 
different types of studies, including a brief summary of the minimum wage change studied, the methods 
and data used, the results, and what we regard as important criticisms.   
II.  Origins of the New Minimum Wage Research  
The origins of the “new minimum wage research” date to November 1991, when the ILR-Cornell 
Institute for Labor Market Polices and Princeton University’s Industrial Relations Section sponsored the 
“New Minimum Wage Research Conference,” at which a new and innovative set of studies on the 
economic effects of the minimum wage were presented and discussed.
3  Subsequently, these papers, 
along with an additional paper contributed by David Card after the conference, were published together in 
a symposium in the October 1992 issue of the Industrial and Labor Relations Review.   
Even fifteen years later, the papers included in this symposium represent well both the range of 
analyses that have characterized the new minimum wage research and the mix of empirical estimates 
generated by this research.  In particular, the studies in the symposium included the use of both state and 
                                                 
3 The conference was organized by Ronald Ehrenberg and Alan Krueger. - 7 - 
time-series variation over relatively long sample periods (Neumark and Wascher, 1992), the use of 
regional variation in employment and wages surrounding a particular increase in the federal minimum 
wage (Card, 1992a), an analysis of an increase in a particular state’s minimum wage (Card, 1992b), and a 
survey of fast-food restaurants before and after an increase in the minimum wage (Katz and Krueger, 
1992).
4  The findings from this research ranged from disemployment effects similar to those comprising 
the earlier consensus (Neumark and Wascher) to no effect on employment (Card, 1992a) to a positive 
effect of the minimum wage on employment (Card, 1992b; Katz and Krueger).  Given the relative 
newness of the methods employed in the papers, all of these researchers were appropriately cautious 
about interpreting their results.  But Ron Ehrenberg correctly predicted that these papers would be “cited 
often in future policy debates over minimum wage legislation” (Ehrenberg, 1992; p. 5). 
III.  Findings on Employment Effects on Less-Skilled U.S. Workers from the First Wave of the New 
Minimum Wage Research 
We begin our review by summarizing the initial studies included in the ILRR symposium and a 
related series of follow-on studies that appeared soon afterwards and that employed methods similar to 
this initial round of studies.  To help set the stage for our subsequent discussion of this literature, we find 
it useful to separate these papers into two broad categories: (1) panel data studies that employed state-
specific data over time for the United States as a whole, and (2) case studies that focused on the effects of 
minimum wage changes in specific states.   
Panel Data Studies 
In response to the increasing willingness of state legislatures to raise state-specific minimum 
wages above the federal wage floor, two papers in the ILRR symposium—as well as a number of 
subsequent studies—attempted to exploit both time and state variation in minimum wages to identify the 
effects of the minimum wage on employment.  In a broad sense, this approach applies the traditional 
empirical specification used in the earlier time-series literature: 
                                                 
4 The symposium also included a paper by Bruce Smith and Wayne Vavrichek (1992).  However, this paper focused 
on the wage mobility of minimum wage workers rather than on employment effects and so is not included in this 
review. - 8 - 
(1)                                                      it it it it YM W R α βε =+ +  
to a dataset consisting of state-year observations on an outcome variable (Y) such as employment, hours, 
or wages; a minimum wage variable (MW); and a vector of control variables (R) that may include state (i) 
and time (t) effects.  The exact specification of the minimum wage variable varies across studies, as does 
the set of control variables included in the model and the method of estimation, issues to which we will 
return later.  However, as long as changes in the minimum wage are viewed as exogenous to the model, α 
can be interpreted as the effect of the minimum wage on the outcome variable.  This model is typically 
estimated using data for workers in demographic groups or industries for which the minimum wage is 
more likely to be binding.  In addition, this framework has sometimes been applied to time-series/cross-
section or longitudinal data on individuals. 
The first paper we consider is David Card’s (1992a) study of the employment effects of the April 
1990 increase in the federal minimum wage.  Card recognized that differences in the distribution of wages 
across states (in part due to differences in state minimum wage laws) meant that the effects of the federal 
increase should be more apparent in low-wage states than in high-wage states.  Taking advantage of this 
variation, Card first regressed the change in the mean log wage of teenagers between the final three 
quarters of 1989 and the final three quarters of 1990 on the fraction of teenagers in each state who earned 
between $3.35 per hour and $3.79 per hour in 1989 and thus were more likely to be directly affected by 
the federal minimum wage increase in 1990.  The results indicated that mean teen wages rose more in 
states where a greater fraction of teenagers were affected by the minimum wage increase, with the size of 
the wage increases similar to what would be expected if the affected workers’ wages moved up to the new 
minimum wage of $3.80 per hour; moreover, these results were robust to the inclusion of a control for 
overall labor market conditions.  In contrast, when Card regressed the change in state employment-
population ratios on the “fraction affected” variable (and a control for aggregate labor market conditions), 
the results indicated no effect of the 1990 minimum wage increase on teen employment. - 9 - 
The second such paper in the ILRR symposium is Neumark and Wascher (1992), in which we 
used specification (1) to estimate the effects of changes in the minimum wage on the employment-to-
population ratio of teenagers (16-19 year olds) and the broader youth population (16-24), using a 
relatively long sample period.  Specifically, we used an annual panel of state-specific observations from 
1973 to 1989 for large states and from 1977 to 1989 for smaller states.
5  The minimum wage variable 
used in this study was similar to the Kaitz index that had populated the earlier time-series literature, 
except that it incorporated state-specific minimum wages when they were above the federal level.  In 
particular, we constructed a coverage-adjusted minimum wage for each state-year observation as the 
higher of the federal or state minimum wage level, multiplied by federal coverage for the state, and 
divided by the average wage in the state.  In addition to state and year effects, the control variables 
included the unemployment rate for men aged 25-64, the proportion of the population in the relevant age 
group, and, in some specifications, a school enrollment rate for the age group. 
In contrast to Card’s paper, the results in our paper generally supported the earlier consensus that 
increases in the minimum wage reduce employment among youths.  In particular, we concluded that the 
employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage ranged from about −0.1 to −0.2 for teenagers 
and from −0.15 to −0.2 for the youth population as a whole.  In addition, we found that the presence of a 
youth subminimum in particular states tended to reduce the impact of the minimum wage in those states. 
The Case Study Approach 
  The other major line of inquiry that emerged as part of the new minimum wage research consisted 
of studies that focused on particular states.  Two papers in the ILRR symposium took this approach: 
Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger’s study of the effects of the 1991 increase in the federal minimum wage 
on fast-food restaurants in Texas, and David Card’s study of the 1989 increase in California’s minimum 
wage.  More broadly, the details of the empirical approach in this subset of the literature have varied, with 
some studies focused on specific increases in the federal minimum wage and others focused on minimum 
                                                 
5 Because of data limitations in the CPS prior to 1979, the data refer to May of each year.  In addition, the different 
time periods across states reflect the fact that the CPS state identifiers did not have distinct codes for smaller states 
prior to 1977. - 10 - 
wage increases in particular state, and some studies using published data and others based on data 
collected by the authors.  However, a unifying theme of this aspect of the literature was the authors’ view 
that limiting the analysis to a particular state afforded the opportunity to devise a “natural experiment” for 
studying the minimum wage increase because of the availability of valid control groups with which to 
compare the group directly affected by the minimum wage increase being studied.  Although we disagree 
with that motivation—we would instead argue that these studies are similar in principle to the panel data 
studies discussed above and differ primarily in the construction of the control group rather than in the 
overall experimental design—this strand of the literature has received considerable attention both within 
the economics profession and in the public discussion about the merits of raising the minimum wage. 
  We start by summarizing Katz and Krueger’s (1992) study of the effects of the 1991 increase in 
the federal minimum wage on employment in the fast-food industry in Texas.  These authors conducted 
telephone surveys of fast-food establishments in both December 1990 and August 1991 and asked the 
manager or assistant manager of each restaurant a series of questions about wages and employment.  
Exactly 100 restaurants provided sufficient information for the employment analysis—the number of full-
time employees, the number of part-time employees, and the average starting wage for non-management 
employees.  Katz and Krueger then defined the effective change in the minimum wage at each restaurant 
as the log difference between the firm’s average starting wage in December 1990 and the new federal 
minimum wage of $4.25 per hour in April 1991.  In this setup, the difference in employment changes 
between restaurants initially paying relatively higher wages and those paying relatively lower wages 
provides the identification used to measure the effect of the minimum wage on employment.  Estimating a 
regression that includes controls for city size, chain, and whether or not the restaurant was company 
owned (as opposed to a franchise), Katz and Krueger found a positive and statistically significant effect of 
the minimum wage on employment, with the estimated elasticities ranging from 1.70 to 2.65.  They noted 
that “a model in which the employers of low-wage workers are assumed to have market power and act as 
monopsonistic buyers of labor is potentially consistent with [their] findings” (p. 17), although they also 
write that “a potential problem with this monopsony interpretation of our employment findings is that a - 11 - 
large degree of monopsony power seems somewhat implausible in the high-turnover labor market of the 
fast-food industry” (p. 18). 
  Card (1992b) took a different approach, using data from the CPS to assess the effects on low-
skilled employment of California’s increase in the minimum wage to $4.25 per hour in July 1988.  In 
particular, Card compared employment changes from 1987 to 1989 in California with employment 
changes in a group of comparison locations in which the minimum wage did not change.  The comparison 
sample included Arizona, Florida, Georgia, New Mexico, and Dallas-Fort Worth, which were chosen 
because they had similar labor force participation rates, employment-to-population ratios, and 
unemployment rates to California in 1987.  Using a difference-in-difference estimator, Card found that 
teen employment in California increased more rapidly than teen employment in the set of control areas 
and that this difference was statistically significant; the implied elasticity from the estimates is about 0.15.  
Card also finds a relative increase in employment in the retail trade industry in California between 1987 
and 1989, and although he does find a small relative decline in the eating and drinking industry in 
California, he interprets it as more likely stemming from differences in longer-run trends than to the effect 
of the minimum wage increase.  As did Katz and Krueger, Card raises the possibility that these results 
might indicate the presence of monopsony power in the low-wage labor market. 
  Given these provocative findings and renewed interest in using the natural experiment approach 
to studying the effects of policy changes, similar studies of the minimum wage quickly followed.  For 
example, Spriggs and Klein (1994) took an approach similar to that of Katz and Krueger and conducted 
telephone surveys of fast-food restaurants in Jackson, Mississippi and Greensboro, North Carolina 
roughly one month before and one month after the April 1, 1991 increase in the federal minimum wage.  
More specifically, they asked respondents for information on employment levels, starting and average 
wages, prices, turnover rates, and their use of the subminimum wage.  Defining the wage gap as the 
average wage increase needed to raise the wages of workers earning below $4.25 per hour in March to the 
new minimum wage in April, estimates of the employment response were negative but not statistically 
significant.  Defining the minimum wage variable as the implicit change in the overall average wage - 12 - 
associated with boosting the wage of those initially paid below $4.25 per hour, the estimated employment 
effects were positive, although, again, the coefficient was not statistically significant.  The authors 
interpreted these results, which were similar to those found by Katz and Krueger, as inconsistent with the 
conventional view of minimum wage effects.
6    
  Of course, by far the best known and most influential study of a specific minimum wage increase 
is Card and Krueger’s (1994) investigation of the effects of the 1992 increase in New Jersey’s minimum 
wage.  These authors followed Katz and Krueger’s approach and conducted surveys of fast-food 
restaurants in February 1992, roughly two months before the April 1992 increase in the New Jersey 
minimum wage to $5.15 per hour, and then again in November of that year, about seven months after the 
minimum wage increase.  For stores in New Jersey, they constructed a wage gap variable equivalent to 
that used by Katz and Krueger in their study of fast-food restaurants in Texas.  But they also attempted to 
improve on the identification in this earlier research by including in the sample a control group of 
restaurants in eastern Pennsylvania, where the minimum wage did not change.  This allowed them to test 
for the effect of the increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage using three statistical experiments: a 
comparison of employment changes between New Jersey restaurants initially paying different starting 
wages; a comparison of employment changes between stores located in New Jersey and stores located in 
Pennsylvania; and a comparison that makes use of both types of information. 
Their results consistently implied that the increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage raised 
employment (as measured by full-time equivalents, or FTEs) in that state.
7  For example, stores that 
initially paid low starting wages showed significantly more employment growth between February and 
November than did stores that paid higher starting wages.  Similarly, employment in the New Jersey 
sample rose over this period, while employment in the Pennsylvania sample fell.  Putting this information 
                                                 
6 The authors also concluded that employers did not change their employment policies or practices.  The summary 
statistics they report indicate that 9 percent changed either the timing or amount of the first wage increase granted 
to new employees, 2 percent reduced the number of employees per shift or changed the number of shifts per day, 
and 2 percent reduced fringe benefits.  However, none of these effects were statistically significant. 
7 Full-time equivalent employment is calculated as the number of full-time employees plus one-half the number of 
part-time employees. - 13 - 
together, Card and Krueger constructed a wage gap measure equal to the difference between the initial 
starting wage and $5.25 per hour for stores in New Jersey and zero for stores in Pennsylvania.   Again, the 
results showed a positive and statistically significant effect of the minimum wage increase on 
employment growth, with an estimated elasticity of 0.73.  Various specification tests resulted in a wider 
range of estimates (both in magnitude and statistical significance), but none that were negative.  They 
interpreted their empirical results as “inconsistent with the predictions of a conventional competitive 
model of the fast-food industry” (p. 790).
8  
IV.  Issues Raised in Subsequent Research 
 The divergent findings of this initial round of research stimulated a number of additional lines of 
inquiry based on these methods.  In particular, the differences between the conclusions in our paper and 
those reported by Card and others involved in the symposium suggested that some important questions 
had remained unanswered.  Thus, much of the ensuing empirical literature attempted to uncover some of 
the reasons for the contrasting results reported in the first wave of the new minimum wage research, with 
an eye toward developing a more consistent view of the effects of minimum wages on employment.  
More specifically, this literature focused heavily on issues related to the appropriate specification of the 
underlying model, measurement of the appropriate variables, and the relevance of the comparison groups 
used in the studies.  We next summarize some of the key issues discussed in these follow-on papers. 
The Appropriate Measure of the Minimum Wage 
In their comment on our original paper, Card et al. (1994) raised important questions about the 
appropriate measure of the minimum wage.  As indicated earlier, we had followed the earlier literature in 
using a variant of the Kaitz index that included state minimum wages as our measure of the effective 
minimum wage, while Card (1992a) had used the percentage of teenagers earnings between the old and 
new minimum wage just prior to the implementation of the new minimum (the “fraction affected” 
variable).  Card et al. argued against our (and others’) use of the Kaitz index for two reasons.  First, they 
                                                 
8 Because they find no evidence that prices fell in response to the minimum wage increase, they also note that their 
results are inconsistent with monopsony or equilibrium search models. - 14 - 
asserted that if the minimum wage is intended to be a measure of the relative price of teen labor, the Kaitz 
index should be positively correlated with teen wages.  They then showed that this correlation is negative 
because the denominator of the index (the average wage of adults in the state) is positively correlated with 
teen wages (presumably due to general changes in wage levels associated with inflation, productivity 
growth, or changes in economic activity).  Second, they noted that measuring coverage of teenagers is 
difficult and imprecise, especially at the state level.  Instead, they seem to prefer to use the nominal 
minimum wage in their regressions, which they showed is positively correlated with both teen wages and 
employment. 
The concern about measuring the coverage of state minimum wages is difficult to address given 
the lack of available data, but it also seems less important, especially in the context of the recent 
literature.
9  We showed in our reply (Neumark and Wascher, 1994) that the employment elasticity with 
respect to changes in federal coverage was not significantly different from the employment elasticity with 
respect to changes in the level of the minimum wage for our relatively long sample period.  Moreover, at 
the federal level there have not been any major changes to coverage since the early 1970s, and the 
combined coverage of federal and state laws has been persistently high for some time.  Thus, for studies 
that begin in the late 1970s or later, which comprise the majority of the new minimum wage literature, 
changes in coverage are not likely to offer much in the way of identification, suggesting that it may be 
reasonable to ignore coverage altogether.  Indeed, much of the literature in the past decade or so has 
followed this approach.
 10
                                                 
9 Schiller (1994a) attempted to measure state coverage in 1980 by classifying state minimum wage laws into those 
that exempted youths, those that exempted students, those that exempted both students and youths, and those with 
no broad exemptions.  In a cross-state regression of youth employment rates on state-specific minimum wage 
levels and coverage dummies (and other controls) in 1980, Schiller finds that youth employment rates are 
significantly lower in states without any exemption than in other states. 
10 On the other hand, Schiller (1994b) argues that even at the federal level, coverage of teenagers is “far lower and 
less uniform than commonly assumed” (p. 132) and that the increase in the small business exemption (and its 
extension to construction, laundry, and dry cleaning businesses) that coincided with the April 1990 increase in the 
federal minimum may have mitigated the effects of the 1990-91 minimum wage increases on teenage 
employment.  More generally, he speculates that the failure of the minimum wage literature to adequately account 
for teenage employment in the uncovered sector has resulted in an underestimate of the disemployment effects of 
the minimum wage. - 15 - 
In contrast, their argument against the relative nature of the Kaitz index seems misguided to us.  
First, it is not the case that the Kaitz index should always be positively correlated with teen wages.  As we 
showed in our reply, the Kaitz index should be (and is) positively correlated with changes in the relative 
teen wage, indicating that the Kaitz index is correctly classifying an increase in the nominal minimum 
wage as an increase in the relative price of teen labor.  Moreover, in the absence of an increase in the 
nominal minimum wage, the negative correlation described by Card, Katz, and Krueger is, in fact, 
correctly picking up an erosion in the effective minimum wage associated with an increase in the general 
wage level; in particular, nominal wage increases will tend to reduce the proportion of the labor force 
whose wages are directly determined by the minimum wage and thus the “bite” of the minimum wage.  In 
addition, the use of a relative minimum wage measure provides a means of comparing the nominal value 
of the minimum wage with the market-determined wage for above-minimum wage workers who may be 
substitutes for minimum wage workers in the production function.  Because the principal response to a 
minimum wage is thought to be a substitution away from lower-skilled minimum wage workers toward 
higher-skilled, higher-wage workers, it seems particularly important to include a relative minimum wage 
variable to capture this effect.
11  Finally, in the absence of state-level data on prices, using the average 
wage in the denominator provides a way to measure differences in the real minimum wage in different 
parts of the country. 
The fraction affected variable used by Card (1992a), which is defined as the proportion of the 
teen population earning between the previous year’s and current year’s minimum wage, does adequately 
capture regional variation that is of use in identifying the effect of a minimum wage increase.  However, 
that variable is not well equipped to capture the effects on employment associated with a gradual erosion 
of the real minimum wage.  In this sense, such a variable is a reasonable proxy for effective changes in 
the minimum wage in studies of specific minimum wage increases, such as the 1990 federal increase 
                                                 
11 See Grant and Hamermesh (1981).   - 16 - 
studied by Card.  However, it is less informative in studies that use longer time periods because it 
excludes the variation in real minimum wages that results from inflation and other aggregate factors.
 12
Although it seems important to specify the minimum wage variable in real or relative terms in 
studies that use longer samples, a valid question that arises from the discussion of the appropriate choice 
of the minimum wage variable is whether the constraint embedded in the relative minimum wage 
variable—that changes in the adult wage should have the same size, but opposite-signed, effect on 
employment as changes in the nominal minimum wage
13—is appropriate.  From the standpoint of the 
effect of the minimum wage itself, this seems like a reasonable constraint—there is probably no reason to 
expect a decline in the relative value of the minimum wage to have a different effect on employment than 
would an increase in the relative minimum wage (although with the opposite sign).  However, as Card 
and Krueger (1995a) pointed out, a theoretical specification of the labor demand function for youths 
would include prices of other factor inputs (including the adult wage) as well as the price of output.  And, 
in this context, implementing the standard homogeneity assumption would lead to a model that includes 
both the relative minimum wage and the real adult wage (and perhaps the real interest rate or relative 
energy costs as well).  In Neumark and Wascher (1994), we showed that, with the data we used in our 
original paper, we could not reject the constraint implicit in specifications that included only the relative 
minimum wage and thus that the exclusion of the average adult wage as a separate variable in the 
equations did not bias the results.   
                                                 
12 Wessels (2006) argues that the fraction-affected specification used by Card (1992a) is an inappropriate measure of 
the minimum wage because it ignores some of the cross-state variation in the effective size of federal minimum 
wage increases.  In particular, if the distribution of wages differs across states, two states could have a different 
sized increase in the minimum wage but a similar fraction of workers affected by the change in the minimum.  To 
address this concern, he includes a control for the relative size of the low-wage population (the proportion paid 
between the minimum wage and 20 percent more than the minimum wage) along with the magnitude of each 
minimum wage increase and finds that employment fell relatively more in states with larger effective minimum 
wage increases in both 1990-91 and 1996-97 (although the results for the latter period are not significant).  
However, by focusing on the minimum wage increase and not the fraction near the minimum, this approach may 
also fail to fully capture the increased cost of low-wage labor generated by a minimum wage increase.  That is, a 
given minimum wage increase should have greater impact when there are more affected workers.   
13 This constraint is imposed in a log specification.  In levels, the constraint is simply that the two variables enter 
only as a ratio. - 17 - 
Nevertheless, subsequent research has frequently relaxed this constraint.  For example, 
Burkhauser et al. (2000a, 2000b) rewrite the relative minimum wage effect in an equation for log 
employment rates as: 
ln / ln ln MWW M W W β ββ 12 = +  
where W is the average wage for adults and β1 is interpreted as the minimum wage elasticity.
 14  For the 
reasons noted above, we are uncomfortable with including the wage variables in nominal terms in studies 
that use longer sample periods, both because such a specification would seem to violate standard 
homogeneity assumptions and because it does not allow for the possibility that an erosion in the real value 
of the minimum wage will reduce its effect on employment.
15  In contrast, Keil et al. (2001) rewrite the 
relative minimum wage effect as: 
ln / ln / ln / MWW M WW WP β ββ 12 = + , 
which seems more natural to us.  Again, the authors interpret β1 as the minimum wage elasticity and 
generally report negative estimates of that coefficient.   
Finally, a couple of studies have attempted to reduce the parameterization of the minimum wage 
effects even further by allowing the effects to be freely estimated for each change in the minimum wage.  
For example, Deere et al. (1995) introduce indicator variables for each level of the federal minimum wage 
in their sample period (1985-92), while Burkhauser et al. (2000a) extend this approach to also include a 
separate dummy variable for every value of a state minimum wage that exceeded the federal level.  
Strictly interpreted, the results in both studies tend to show that increases in the minimum wage 
significantly reduced teenage employment rates.  In general, however, these specifications seem 
problematic because the coefficients on the indicator variables may be capturing other influences as well. 
Lagged Effects of the Minimum Wage 
                                                 
14 We should note that, in an appendix table, Burkhauser et al. (2000b) do report estimates of minimum wage effects 
using a specification that includes the minimum wage and adult wage in real terms.  The estimated elasticities in 
these specifications are smaller in this specification (−0.25 vs. −0.30 in the equation for teenagers), albeit still 
statistically significant. 
15 The inclusion of state and year effects in the model would mitigate this concern to some extent (although not 
completely in the case of monthly data).  However, as we will discuss later, a central argument in the Burkhauser 
et al. study is that year effects should not be included in the employment equation. - 18 - 
  The new minimum wage literature also resurrected questions about the how long it should take 
for minimum wages to have their full effect on employment.  Many economists believed that any effects 
from changes in the minimum wage should be felt relatively quickly.  For example, Brown et al. (1982) 
argued that, from a theoretical standpoint, “lagged adjustments to minimum wage increases are probably 
less plausible than in most other contexts where such lags are routinely assumed” (p. 496), and they 
offered two reasons for this view.  First, minimum wage workers tend to have high turnover rates, 
suggesting that the desired adjustments in employment levels could be accomplished quite quickly 
through normal turnover.  Second, increases in minimum wages are typically announced several months 
in advance of when they became effective, so that employers would be well prepared to adjust quickly 
when (or even before) the new law took effect.  Card and Krueger (1995a) also argue that the industries 
that typically employ minimum wage workers (e.g., the fast-food industry) can “easily vary their staffing 
levels by cutting back on off-peak or store hours, and by allowing longer queues” (p. 67), so that any 
disemployment effects from the minimum wage should be evident shortly after the minimum wage is 
raised. 
  However, these considerations do not negate the possibility that the full adjustment to a higher 
minimum wage may take some time.  Although factors such as hiring, firing, or training costs may be less 
important for workers with normally high quit rates, Hamermesh (1995) points out that firms may adjust 
nonlabor inputs (e.g., capital) slowly, which will tend to slow the adjustment of other inputs (including 
labor) as well.  In this sense, the omission of lagged effects from the model may inappropriately exclude 
the possibility of a longer-run substitution between labor and capital, as well as the potential for scale 
effects associated with changes in expansion plans and establishment births and deaths.  
As a result, the presence of lagged effects seems to us to be primarily an empirical question.  In 
their survey of the earlier literature, Brown et al. (1982) found little difference in the overall estimated 
employment elasticities between time-series studies that included lagged minimum wage variables and 
those that did not.  However, the potential for lagged effects did seem to matter in interpreting the results 
from the papers in the 1992 ILRR symposium.  For example, in Neumark and Wascher (1992), we found - 19 - 
statistically significant employment effects from lagged values of the minimum wage with our time-series 
panel of state-level data.  Moreover, we hypothesized that the discrepancy between our results and those 
reported in Card’s (1992a) study of the 1991 federal increase was due to the importance of allowing for 
the possibility of a lag in the effects of the minimum wage.  We noted, in particular, that using our 
sample, a one-year first-difference estimator equivalent to that used by Card (1992a) produced minimum 
wage effects close to zero, similar to what was reported in his paper.  In contrast, adding a lagged 
minimum wage effect to the model resulted in a negative and statistically significant employment effect 
in both the levels and first-differenced versions of the basic model.
16   
Baker et al. (1999) take this analysis a step further in a study of the effects of the minimum wage 
on employment in Canada.
17  The authors begin by replicating some of the U.S. panel data estimates for 
teenagers with Canadian data.
18  They report that first-difference estimates of minimum wage effects in 
Canada are positive, whereas longer differences (from using the within-group estimate over a longer 
period) and specifications with lags of the minimum wage tend to show negative employment effects that 
are statistically significant—similar to what we found for the United States.  For example, in their 
preferred specification, the first-difference elasticity is 0.07, while the within-group elasticity is −0.27.  
With lagged minimum wages, the estimates are more similar (−0.23 and −0.47, respectively). 
Baker et al. then investigate more formally how the elasticity of employment with respect to the 
minimum wage differs depending on whether one looks at high-frequency or low-frequency variation in 
the data, explaining how the alternative differencing operators, as well as the inclusion of lagged 
minimum wages, can be interpreted as applying different filters to the data, with the longer differences or 
                                                 
16 In response to our finding, Card et al. (1994) re-estimated Card’s specification using a two-year difference (from 
1989 to 1991) rather than a one-year difference and still found positive effects of the 1991 minimum wage 
increase on employment.  As we showed in our reply, however, estimating a two-year difference is not the same 
as including a lagged minimum wage variable in the model because the two-year difference still omits a lagged 
effect from minimum wages. 
17 Although we assess most of the international evidence later in the paper, we include several papers from Canada 
in this and the subsequent section, both because of its relevance for the discussion of the U.S. results and because 
of the similarity of U.S. and Canadian labor markets. 
18 As the authors explain, data from Canada offer the possibility of using approaches similar to the panel data studies 
across states and years in the United States because the minimum wage varies across provinces.  However, an 
important advantage of the Canadian setting is the far greater frequency (at least until recently in the United 
States) of minimum wage changes. - 20 - 
inclusion of lags amounting to filters that emphasize more of the low-frequency variation in the data.  
After filtering the variables to separate their high-frequency and low-frequency movements, the authors 
estimate the minimum wage elasticities separately at high and low frequencies.
19  The results show a 
positive effect of the minimum wage on employment at high frequencies and a negative effect of the 
minimum wage on employment at low frequencies.  Overall, the authors report an employment elasticity 
of −0.25 in Canada, noting that “this result is driven by low-frequency variation in the data” (p. 345).  In 
addition, although they do not analyze U.S. data directly, they use the U.S. literature to demonstrate—
through equations that relate estimated coefficients for alternative estimators to the implied elasticities at 
different frequencies—that their conclusions explain the different findings for the United States equally 
well.   
Note that the importance of these findings are not so much to establish a particular answer 
(emphasizing high vs. low frequency) as “correct,” but rather to use this perspective to better understand 
why the estimates in the U.S. literature vary with the length of differences and the inclusion of lags.  
Nevertheless, the results indicate that the disemployment effects of minimum wages show up as longer-
run responses to more evolutionary changes in the level of the minimum wage, rather than as a short-term 
response to a particular change in the minimum wage.  Consistent with our earlier discussion, the authors 
suggest that this longer-run response can be understood in the context of capital adjustment and interfirm 
(rather than intrafirm) adjustment rather than as labor adjustment per se, which should be relatively quick 
in the low-skill labor market.  In any event, the Baker et al. analysis clearly suggests that claims of an 
absence of a minimum wage effect on employment should perhaps be discounted unless the evidence 
points to no effect at both high and low frequencies.   
Although the issue of lagged minimum wage effects was not the primary focus of subsequent 
studies, later research using state panels of time-series observations have also tended to find evidence of 
lags in the effects of the minimum wage on employment.  For example, Burkhauser et al. (2000a) re-
                                                 
19 The simplest filter they use is MWit = ½(MWit − MWit-1) + ½(MWit + MWit-1), where the first term captures high 
frequency changes in the minimum wage variable and the second term captures low-frequency changes.  They 
also employ a more precise finite Fourier transform with similar results. - 21 - 
estimated their specifications including lags and found that the coefficient on the lagged minimum wage 
variable was statistically significant even in specifications in which the contemporaneous coefficient was 
not significant.  Moreover, estimates of the elasticities including the lagged effects were considerably 
larger than those calculated from specifications that included only contemporaneous terms.
20  Keil et al. 
(2001) also allow for the effects of minimum wage to show through with a lag, although they accomplish 
this by estimating a dynamic version of the employment equation that includes a lag of the dependent 
variable rather than by entering a lagged minimum wage term directly.  In their preferred specification, 
which they estimate using a Factor-GLS procedure with instrumental variables, they report a short-run 
employment elasticity of −0.37 for youths and a long-run elasticity of −0.69.   
Thus, the overall conclusion from the panel data literature on minimum wage effects seems to be 
that lags do matter.  Firms evidently continue to adjust their employment levels well after an increase in 
the minimum wage, and thus studies that focus only on contemporaneous effects will miss some of this 
adjustment; as noted above, the existence of lags likely accounts for at least part of the variation in the 
results reported in the first wave of the new minimum wage research.  More broadly, it seems to us that 
estimates of the elasticities relevant both to the testing of alternative theories of labor demand and to the 
public policy debate should always at least consider both contemporaneous and lagged responses to a 
change in the minimum wage. 
Interactions between Employment and School Enrollment 
In their subsequent comment on our original ILRR paper, Card et al. (1994) also criticized both 
the inclusion of the school enrollment rate in the model and the specific measure of school enrollment that 
we used in the regressions.  From a measurement standpoint, they pointed out that the measure of school 
enrollment we used included only individuals who were enrolled in school and not employed, which they 
argued would lead to a negative bias in the estimated employment effects from the specification we used.  
More broadly, they argued that it was inappropriate to include school enrollment in the employment 
                                                 
20 Similarly, Partridge and Partridge (1999) found that the effects of minimum wages on employment occur with a 
lag, both in the retail sector and for employment more generally. - 22 - 
equation because that equation is essentially a labor demand function.  Because a statistically significant 
disemployment effect for teenagers was only evident in our specifications that included the school 
enrollment rate, these questions about the correct specification of the basic model and about possible 
biases associated with the potential endogeneity of the enrollment rate led some to conclude that our 
results were consistent with no effect of the minimum wage on teen employment.   
Turning first to the question of whether the enrollment rate should be in the regression at all, it is 
important to remember that the aggregate employment equation consists of observations for which the 
minimum wage is binding and observations for which it is not binding (or averages over such 
observations).  Although employment for the first group is determined solely by the labor demand curve 
in the standard competitive model, employment for the second group of observations is determined by 
both demand and supply.  As a result, the specification of a model for the employment of all teenagers 
should also include factors that reflect exogenous shifts in the labor supply curve, including exogenous 
changes in the school enrollment rate.     
Regarding the measurement of school enrollment, we agree that the definition of schooling used 
in our original paper was too narrow.  As it turned out, however, incorporating broader measures of 
enrollment that do not exclude employed teenagers led to only minor differences in the results.  For 
example, in our reply to Card et al. (Neumark and Wascher, 1994), we re-estimated the model using an 
alternative measure of the enrollment rate that counts individuals as enrolled if they report schooling as 
their major activity.  The resulting employment elasticity for teenagers fell to −0.11, toward the low end 
of the range we reported originally.  However, using an even broader definition of enrollment that is 
calculated independently of employment, we found a statistically significant employment elasticity of 
−0.22 (Neumark and Wascher, 1996a).
21  
                                                 
21 This finding was in response to a comment on our paper by Evans and Turner (1995), who argued that using this 
broader definition of school enrollment caused the estimated employment elasticity for teenagers to become small 
and insignificant.  However, this measure of enrollment is available only in the October CPS and Evans and 
Turners results were based on a specification that combined school enrollment data for October of each year with 
minimum wage information for May.  The results reported in the text are from Neumark and Wascher (1996a), 
which uses October observations for all of the variables in the model.  - 23 - 
Despite our reanalysis, there is still a potential problem with including the school enrollment rate 
in the standard employment regression.  Because the decision to enroll in school is likely not independent 
from the decision to work, the estimates from a version of equation (1) that includes the enrollment rate 
may be subject to endogeneity bias.  In particular, changes in minimum wages may influence the choice 
between school enrollment and employment for some youths, which may, in turn, have implications for 
the opportunities available to other teenagers. 
In other research, we approached this issue in two ways.  First, in Neumark and Wascher (1994) 
we computed instrumental variable estimates of equation (1), using school expenditures, student-teacher 
ratios, and compulsory schooling laws as instruments.  The resulting estimates, which should be largely 
free from endogeneity bias, showed employment elasticities for teenagers ranging from −0.14 to −0.39.  
Thus, although the point estimates of the effects were sensitive to which enrollment measure we used, in 
general the IV estimates supported the view that minimum wages reduced employment among teenagers. 
Second, and more fundamentally, in Neumark and Wascher (1995a) we extended equation (1) to 
include enrollment as an activity that is potentially influenced by changes in the minimum wage.  In 
particular, we respecified the model to relate four possible states of employment/enrollment status (j) to 
the minimum wage and other controls (X): 
(2)     , kj j j k UM W X α βε =+ +   j = 1,…,4. 
The assumption that εk follows an extreme value distribution gives rise to a conditional logit model, with 
four mutually exclusive categories of activities: enrolled and employed, enrolled and not employed, not 
enrolled and employed, and not enrolled and not employed (or idle).
22   
Estimating the model using state-year data from 1977-1989, we found that a higher minimum 
wage is associated with a net decline in employment, with the employment elasticity similar in size to our 
previous studies of employment alone.  However, we also found that a higher minimum wage leads to a 
significant decline in the proportion of teenagers who are both in school and employed and a significant 
increase in the proportion of teenagers who are neither in school nor employed.  Moreover, the 
                                                 
22 This approach was based on an earlier time-series study by Wachter and Kim (1982). - 24 - 
magnitudes of the estimates indicated that the effects of minimum wages on teenagers are more important 
and more complicated than is suggested by the employment elasticities alone. 
  We noted that the results were consistent with a hypothesis in which a higher minimum wage 
causes employers to substitute away from lower-skilled teenagers (who are less likely to be in school) 
toward higher-skilled teenagers (who are more likely to be in school), and that the resulting increase in 
the relative wages of higher-skilled teenagers induces some of them to leave school for employment.  
However, this hypothesis cannot be explicitly tested without information on the flows of teenagers across 
the different enrollment/employment states.  Thus, in Neumark and Wascher (1995b and 1996b), we 
turned to individual panel-level data from matched CPS surveys.
23  In particular, we applied the same 
basic modeling approach to the individual data as in the state-level analysis, but included in the model 
indicators for each individual’s school/work activity in the previous year in order to calculate the effect of 
the minimum wage on transitions between the four distinct enrollment/employment states. 
  Consistent with the above-mentioned hypothesis, the results suggested that the employment 
effects of the minimum wage fall largely on the least-skilled teenagers.  In particular, we found that a 
higher minimum wage increases the probability that a teenager leaves school, presumably to look for a 
job.  Moreover, the estimates indicated that increases in the minimum wage tend to raise the probability 
that non-enrolled teenage workers become both non-enrolled and non-employed and reduce the 
probability that already non-enrolled/non-employed teenagers find a job; these results were especially 
pronounced for blacks and Hispanics and for individuals who had a lower wage prior to the increase in 
the minimum wage.  In sum, the evidence from this analysis suggested that the teenage employment 
elasticities typically reported in the literature likely understate the size of the disemployment effects on 
the lowest-skilled workers, instead capturing net employment changes among a broader group of 
teenagers that mask labor-labor substitution.  
                                                 
23 The sample design of the CPS permits a match of some individuals for the same month across two consecutive 
years.  However, matches are not guaranteed, and for teenagers roughly 65 percent of the sample in each year 
could be matched to an observation in the following year. - 25 - 
  As far as we can tell, only a handful of papers in recent years have focused on the joint effects of 
the minimum wage on teenage employment/enrollment outcomes.  In Neumark and Wascher (2003), we 
updated our state-level analysis through 1998 and found positive and significant effects of the minimum 
wage on the proportions on teenagers employed but not enrolled and on the proportion of teenagers 
neither employed nor in school; these results are similar in nature to our earlier analysis, albeit a bit more 
muted.  Turner and Demiralp (2001) use an approach similar to Neumark and Wascher (1995b) but focus, 
à la Card (1992a), on the early 1990s increases in the federal minimum wage.  In particular, they examine 
employment-enrollment transitions between January-April 1991 and January-April 1992 in order to 
isolate the effects of the April 1991 increase in the federal minimum wage to $4.25 per hour.  Their 
results suggested that, overall, the higher minimum wage induced some teenagers to leave school for 
employment, but that teenagers initially neither employed nor in school also were more likely to find jobs.  
However, this result was driven entirely by movements among nonminority teenagers living outside of 
central cities.  In contrast, Turner and Demiralp found that black and Hispanic teenagers were more likely 
to become idle following the minimum wage increase, especially if they lived in a central city.  As in our 
earlier papers, this evidence points to labor-labor substitution as an important consequence of a higher 
minimum wage and suggests that the elasticities typically reported in the literature understate the effects 
of the minimum wage on the lowest-skilled subgroups.  Finally, Campolieti et al. (2005a) examined 
longitudinal data for Canada from 1993 to 1999 using a similar approach.  In contrast to the results for the 
United States, these authors found little evidence of an effect of the minimum wage on school enrollment.  
Instead, the net disemployment effect they report appears to reflect decreased employment opportunities 
for both the student and nonstudent populations in Canada.  
Other Specification Issues Relevant to the State-Level Panel Data Approach 
  Researchers also raised several other concerns about model specification in reaction to the first 
rounds of the new minimum wage research.  For example, in reviewing Card’s (1992a) analysis of the 
1991 federal minimum wage increase, Deere et al. (1995) highlighted the possibility that differences in 
underlying trends in employment growth across states might bias estimates of the effects in short state-- 26 - 
year panels like that used by Card.  In the case of the 1991 increase in the federal minimum wage, they 
noted that the low-wage states where Card’s fraction affected variable suggested that the effects of the 
minimum wage increase should be most pronounced also tended to be states where trend employment 
growth was faster.  In particular, they showed that rates of employment growth for well-educated adult 
men were also higher in low-wage states than in high-wage states between 1989 and 1992, and that 
controlling for the 1985-1992 trend in employment and for business cycle developments resulted in 
statistically significant negative effects of the 1990 and 1991 minimum wage increases on the 
employment rates of teenagers and high-school dropouts.  The implied elasticities from these regressions 
were relatively large—ranging from −0.27 to −0.36 for teenage men and from −0.42 to −0.49 for teenage 
women.  As noted above, the minimum wage effect is taken from year dummies for the 1990 and 1991 
minimum wage increases and thus should be interpreted somewhat cautiously.  More broadly, however, 
in a review of the natural experiment methodology, Meyer (1995) notes that “a[n] … underemphasized 
advantage of a long time series for outcome measures is that they may allow the researcher to examine if 
the treatment and control groups tend to move in parallel” (p. 158). 
  In a different vein, Burkhauser et al. (2000a) pointed out that the tendency for researchers to 
include year effects in empirical specifications based on time series of state-level observations effectively 
eliminates the identification associated with the variation in the federal minimum wage.  As a result, they 
assert that “the minimum wage effects can be identified only by using the relatively small number of 
observations in which the state minimum wage is higher than the federal minimum wage” (p. 655).  They 
then show that equations estimated without year effects consistently produce negative and statistically 
significant coefficients on the minimum wage variable, while specifications that include year effects 
consistently produce small and insignificant coefficients.  The one exception is when a lagged minimum 
wage variable is included, in which case the estimated minimum wage effect is statistically significant 
even with year effects included, although smaller in absolute value.  The elasticities from the equations 
estimated without year effects range from −0.4 to −0.6 for teenagers, somewhat larger than the earlier 
consensus, while the elasticity in the specification that includes both year effects and the lagged minimum - 27 - 
wage is −0.22.
24  In a broader sense, they interpret their results as suggesting that the exclusion of federal 
variation in the minimum wage in empirical analyses tends to lead to an understatement of the 
disemployment effects of the minimum wage. 
  Burkhauser et al. raise an important question—how to balance the loss of identification associated 
with including year effects with the potential bias associated with omitted macroeconomic effects that 
would be captured by the year dummies.  The authors recognize that the possibility of omitted 
macroeconomic or other aggregate effects is a potential criticism of their specification.  But, in response, 
they note that the model already includes the unemployment rate and the average adult wage, which they 
believe should effectively capture the influences of the business cycle, inflation, and aggregate 
productivity growth.  In addition, they report that when they add dummy variables corresponding to 
recessions to the specification, they find little difference in the estimated minimum wage elasticity. 
  Our own approach has been to include year effects in specifications using time-series panels of 
state observations, for several reasons.  First, including a relative minimum wage measure in the 
specification will permit some identification from variation in the federal minimum wage because of 
differential movements in state wages or prices.  Second, we believe that it is difficult to include all 
relevant macroeconomic or other aggregate-level variables and thus perhaps are more concerned than 
Burkhauser et al. that elasticities estimated without year effects will suffer from omitted variable bias.  
Third, it is not as obvious to us that the diminution of federal variation in the minimum wage is as much 
of a problem today than it might have been a decade ago.  Samples that include more recent data have 
significantly more variation in state minimum wages than did the samples that ended in the early 1990s, 
thus making the presence of federal variation relatively less important for identification of the minimum 
wage effect; indeed, with the additional variation in state minimum wages, even increases in the federal 
minimum will generate state variation in the effective minimum wage (the higher of the state and federal 
minimum wage levels for each state) typically used in minimum wage research.  In addition, with the 
                                                 
24 Burkhauser et al. (2000b) apply the same methodology to other demographic/education groups and find especially 
large negative effects for black youths and high-school dropouts aged 20-24. - 28 - 
policy question often focused on whether a particular state should raise the minimum wage, the greater 
reliance on state variation may, in many circumstances, be entirely appropriate. 
  In this regard, a recent paper by Bazen and Gallo (2006) attempts to separate the employment 
effects of federal increases in the minimum wage from those enacted at the state level.  Using the 
specification proposed by Burkhauser et al. (2000a), they first use quarterly state-level data from 1984-
1989, when the federal minimum wage was unchanged, and estimate the effect on teenage employment of 
changes in state-specific minimum wage increases over that period.  The coefficient on the minimum 
wage in these specifications is close to zero and insignificant, whether or not year effects are included.  
They then re-estimate the model through 1992 and find a negative and statistically significant effect, with 
an elasticity of −0.42; as in Burkhauser et al., however, the negative effect is only evident in 
specifications that exclude year dummies.  The authors perform a similar analysis for the 1992-96 period, 
when the federal minimum was again unchanged, and also find no negative effects of state minimum 
wage increases (although there were only four state increases during this period).  Again, however, adding 
in observations through 1997 leads to an estimated negative effect in models that exclude year dummies 
(although the effect disappears when 1998 is added as well).  
  The authors then specify a more general model that includes three separate minimum wage 
variables: the change in the federal minimum wage, the change in a state’s effective minimum wage due 
to an increase in the federal minimum wage (if the state’s minimum wage was originally higher than the 
federal level), and the change in a state’s own minimum wage (provided that the change results in a state 
minimum wage level that exceeds the federal level).  Consistent with their earlier results, for both time 
periods the only negative and significant increases are for the federal minimum wage increases.  Although 
the coefficients on the state-specific increases are also negative in both periods, they are imprecisely 
estimated and thus usually indistinguishable from both zero and the coefficient on the federal minimum 
wage.  The coefficient on the third component (the change in a state’s effective minimum due to an 
increase in the federal wage floor) varies considerably across minimum wage increases (both in 
magnitude and sign), although it is never statistically significant.  The authors interpret their results as - 29 - 
suggesting that small state-level increases may not have significant disemployment effects, although they 
admit that their tests are relatively weak.  
Reactions to the Initial Round of State Case Studies 
  The case studies that comprised the other strand of the new minimum wage literature were also 
quite controversial within the economics profession.  Some labor economists embraced the studies as 
praiseworthy examples of the usefulness of the natural experiment approach to studying the economic 
effects of policy changes.  For example, in a review piece on Card and Krueger’s book Myth and 
Measurement, Richard Freeman (1995) wrote that “their analysis is a model of how to do empirical 
economics” (p. 831).  Similarly, Paul Osterman (1995) asserted that Card and Krueger “make a powerful 
case that what they term ‘natural experiments’ are a more appropriate way to conduct policy analysis than 
cruder research based on time-series or broad cross-sections” (p. 839). 
  However, other labor economists were more critical of these studies.  In particular, Finis Welch 
(1995)—again referring to Myth and Measurement—states that: “I am convinced that the book’s long-run 
impact will instead be to spur, by negative example, a much-needed consideration of standards we should 
institute for the collection, analysis, and release of primary data” (p. 842).  Likewise, Hamermesh (1995) 
concludes that “even on its own grounds, CK’s strongest evidence is fatally flawed” (p. 838). 
  In general, the criticisms of the case study approach focused on four issues.  The first is the 
question of adequacy of the control groups used in the studies, a concern emphasized by both Hamermesh 
and Welch.  On its face, for example, it seems reasonable to question the use of Georgia, Florida, and 
Dallas/Ft. Worth as adequate control groups in Card’s study of the California minimum wage increase, 
given that these places are far from California and likely influenced by very different demand conditions.  
But even for states with geographic proximity, using one state as a control may be problematic.  For 
example, Deere et al. (1995) pointed out that teenage employment rates (as measured by the CPS) in New 
Jersey diverged significantly from those in Pennsylvania beginning in 1988, casting doubt on Card and 
Krueger’s claim that Pennsylvania represents a sensible control group with which to compare New Jersey.  
More broadly, Hamermesh questioned the practicality of this entire approach for studying the effects of - 30 - 
minimum wages, noting that the variance in employment seems to be dominated by demand shocks, 
which suggests that “any changes in the relative demand shocks” affecting two geographic areas will 
easily “swamp the effect of a higher minimum wage” (p. 837).   
  Hamermesh also questions whether the initial observation in each study was sufficiently prior to 
the effective date of the minimum wage change.  He notes that for both Katz and Krueger’s study of the 
effects in Texas of the federal minimum wage increase and Card and Krueger’s study of the New Jersey 
minimum wage increase, the initial survey took place just a few months prior to the effective date of each 
minimum wage increase.  Similarly, Card’s study of California uses data for 1987, only six months prior 
to the minimum wage increase in July 1988.  In each case, the law that led to the increase in the minimum 
wage was either already enacted or under discussion at the time of the initial observation, raising the 
possibility that some employers had already begun to adjust to the higher minimum wage.  If so, the 
difference-in-difference estimates would tend to understate any employment effects.  
  A third, and related, criticism relates to our earlier discussion of the possibility that the effects of 
the minimum wage on employment occur with a lag.  That is, not only may the initial observation be too 
close to the minimum wage change, but the post-treatment observation may be too close as well.  In all 
three studies mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the second data point comes less than a year after the 
relevant minimum wage increase.  As we noted earlier in this review, there is substantial empirical 
evidence that the disemployment effect of an increase in the minimum wage may occur with a lag one 
year or more, suggesting that these case studies may understate the full effect of a minimum wage hike.  
For the same reason, both Brown and Freeman, in their reviews of Myth and Measurement, speculate that 
these studies are more appropriate for examining the short-run effects of minimum wage changes than for 
estimating their long-run effects, a point made more significant by the findings of Baker et al. (1999). 
  Fourth, some observers have questioned the reliability of the data used in these case studies.  This 
obviously is less of a concern for Card (1992b), who used publicly available data from the Current 
Population Survey.  But Katz and Krueger (1992), Spriggs and Klein (1994), and Card and Krueger 
(1994) all conducted their own telephone surveys of fast-food restaurants, which were not subject to the - 31 - 
same rigorous standards as those used to develop the surveys used in government statistical programs.  
Indeed, Welch (1995) notes that these authors provide little documentation about the survey methodology 
or data collection process, and he expresses significant doubts about the quality of the data, noting in 
particular some puzzling features of the sample collected by Card and Krueger (1994).  Likewise, in 
Neumark and Wascher (2000), we document what seems to us to be an unusually high degree of volatility 
in the employment changes measured with Card and Krueger’s data. 
  In light of these concerns, a number of researchers subsequently reexamined the results reported 
in the initial round of state-specific studies.  Among the first of these reassessments was a paper by Taeil 
Kim and Lowell Taylor (1995), which revisited Card’s study of the effects of California’s 1988 minimum 
wage increase on employment in the low-wage retail sector.  Using data for the retail trade sector as a 
whole, Kim and Taylor first replicated Card’s finding that employment growth in California around the 
time of the minimum wage increase was not statistically different from retail employment growth for the 
United States as a whole.  However, they also pointed out that the volume of retail sales in California rose 
much more rapidly during that period than in the United States, raising questions about the validity of this 
experiment.  In response, Kim and Taylor turned to more detailed industry data within the retail sector 
and examined whether differences across industries in wage growth in California relative to that for the 
United States as a whole were negatively correlated with differences across industries in California-U.S. 
employment growth in various years.  The results showed a statistically significant and negative 
correlation for the changes from March 1988 to March 1989, the period that included the minimum wage 
increase, but not for the changes in earlier years.  The authors argued that because the relative wage 
changes over the 1988-89 period were more likely to be driven by the exogenous minimum wage increase 
in California in July 1988, the coefficient on the wage variable can be interpreted as a labor demand 
elasticity, which they estimated to −0.9.  The authors conduct a similar analysis that relates county-level - 32 - 
employment growth to county-level wage growth and again find a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on wage changes only for the 1988-89 period, with an estimated demand elasticity of −0.7.
25
  As Card and Krueger (1995)—and later Kennan (1995)—pointed out, the main shortcoming of 
the Kim and Taylor analysis is the absence of a direct wage measure in the County Business Pattern data 
they used.  In particular, wage rates have to be computed by dividing total payrolls for the first quarter of 
each year by total employment for a single pay period in March, which may induce measurement errors 
associated with differences in the timing of the numerator and denominator and with variations in the 
average number of hours included in the pay period.
26  Kim and Taylor were well aware of this data 
problem, but they argued that any associated biases were likely to be relatively unimportant; as evidence, 
they noted that, as expected, there is no indication of a negative correlation in years in which the 
minimum wage was constant, and that IV estimates that use lagged wages and average firm size in the 
industry produce similar results.  Card and Krueger address the first point by showing that there is a 
negative correlation as well in the 1989-90 change (although in our view, this could also be viewed as 
evidence of a lagged effect from the 1988 increase in the minimum wage).  In addition, they point out that 
the significant negative coefficient in the IV estimates relies on the inclusion of average firm size as an 
instrument, which they argue is inappropriate. 
  In Neumark and Wascher (2000), we revisited Card and Krueger’s analysis of the effects of New 
Jersey’s increase in the minimum wage.  In particular, we collected administrative payroll records from a 
sample of similar fast-food establishments with which to compare the properties of the survey data.  As 
suggested above, Card and Krueger’s survey data exhibited considerably more variability in employment 
change than did the payroll data, with the pattern of variability indicative of severe measurement error.  
The Card-Krueger data were elicited from a survey that asked managers or assistant managers “How 
                                                 
25 As the authors point out, because they use the change in average wages as the explanatory variable in their 
specification, the comparable elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage is considerably smaller. 
26 Although not especially relevant to the criticisms of the data discussed here, there seems to be some confusion in 
this literature about the reference period for employment.  Kim and Taylor claim that it is employment during the 
last week of the quarter, while Card and Krueger (and Kennan) claim that it refers to employment as of March 31.  
In fact, the employment figures are supposed to include all employees who are on an establishment’s payroll at 
any time during the pay period that includes March 12. - 33 - 
many full-time and part-time workers are employed in your restaurant, excluding managers and assistant 
managers?”  This question is highly ambiguous, as it could refer to the current shift, the day, or perhaps 
the payroll period.  In contrast, the payroll data referred unambiguously to the payroll period.  Reflecting 
this problem, the data collected by Card and Krueger indicated far greater variability across the two 
observations than did the payroll data, with changes that were sometimes implausible and suggested that, 
indeed, one measurement might sometimes be employment on a shift, with the subsequent measurement 
employment in a payroll period. 
We then replicated Card and Krueger’s difference-in-differences test after replacing their survey-
based data with observations based on the payroll records.  In contrast to Card and Kruegers’ results, the 
results from our replication indicated that the minimum wage increase in New Jersey led to a decline in 
employment (FTEs) in the New Jersey sample of restaurants relative to that in Pennsylvania sample.  The 
elasticities from our direct replication analysis were a little larger than −0.2, while additional sensitivity 
analyses suggested a range of elasticities from −0.1 to −0.25, with many (but not all) of the estimates 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
  In their reply, Card and Krueger (2000) presented several additional analyses of the effects of 
New Jersey’s minimum wage increase using both their original data and our payroll records.  In addition, 
they report results from a separate longitudinal sample of fast-food restaurants obtained from BLS 
records.  In contrast both to their original study and to our replication, their reanalysis generally finds 
small and statistically insignificant effects of the increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage on 
employment, and they conclude that “The increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage probably had no 
effect on total employment in New Jersey’s fast-food industry, and possibly had a small positive effect” 
(p. 1419).  Our own conclusion from this array of statistical results is that: 
the data presented in CK’s Reply … raise some questions about the validity of the assumptions 
needed to interpret the difference-in-differences estimates as a natural experiment.  Nonetheless, 
even under the premise that the geographic proximity of the samples renders all other things 
equal, we believe that, in the final analysis, the payroll data raise serious doubts about the 
conclusions CK drew from their data, and provide a reasonable basis for concluding that New 
Jersey’s minimum-wage increase reduced fast-food employment in these chains in New Jersey 
relative to the Pennsylvania control group.  Combined with the new evidence from the ES-202 - 34 - 
data that CK present in their Reply, we think we can be more decisive in concluding that New 
Jersey’s minimum-wage increase did not raise fast-food employment in that state (p. 1391). 
 
  In this regard, it is also worth noting that the neoclassical model of the labor market does not 
predict that employment in every sub-sector of the economy will decline in response to a minimum wage 
increase, and thus the absence of an employment decline for a narrow sample of establishments should 
not be viewed as a contradiction of that model.  As Welch (1995) emphasizes, the effect on employment 
for any particular subgroup depends on relative factor intensities.  For example, if fast-food restaurant 
chains are less intensive in low-wage labor than are their competitors (e.g., sandwich shops or other small 
privately-owned restaurants), the effect of the higher wage floor on prices at the low-wage intensive 
establishments could induce greater consumer demand for fast-food output—and thus an increase in fast-
food employment.  
Hours vs. Employment Effects 
Some authors have pointed out that the basic predictions of the various theoretical models of the 
minimum wage refer to labor input rather than to employment per se and suggest that one potential reason 
for a small employment effect is that employers can also adjust the number of hours worked by their 
employees.
27  Michl (1996, 2000) speculated that the difference between the results we and Card and 
Krueger report with respect to New Jersey’s minimum increase reflects the fact that Card and Krueger 
essentially measure employment, while we measure total hours.
28  To test this hypothesis, he compares 
the changes in employment and total hours in a subset of 52 observations from our payroll dataset in 
which the respondent reported both total hours and employment.  For this subset of observations, the 
difference-in-differences estimates indicate a negative effect of the minimum wage increase on both total 
and average hours and a small positive effect on employment, although only the coefficient on average 
hours per worker is statistically significant.  Michl also examines the ratio of full-time workers to total 
                                                 
27 As Couch and Wittenburg (2001) note, the use of employment rather than total hours could either understate or 
overstate the effect of the minimum wage of labor input, depending on whether employers increase average hours 
per worker to partially offset the reduction in employment or reduce both employment and average hours. 
28 As noted above, Card and Krueger attempt to transform their data into full-time equivalent employment by 
weighting the number of part-time workers by one half.  However, this is obviously an imperfect measure of total 
hours. - 35 - 
employment in Card and Krueger’s data, which should be positively correlated with average hours.  In 
this case, the results are suggestive of a positive effect of the minimum wage on the fraction of workers 
who work a full-time schedule.  However, Michl effectively dismisses this result as irrelevant on the 
grounds that most fast-food workers are part-time employees and that reductions in their average hours 
worked could more than offset the larger number of full-time employees. 
Both we and Card and Krueger (2000) also considered the possibility that the difference in our 
results might be associated with changes in average hours.  For example, we reported both that Card and 
Krueger’s data showed a shift toward full-time workers in response to New Jersey’s minimum wage 
increase and that the 52-restaurant subset of the payroll data showed a positive effect on employment and 
a negative effect on total hours, effectively the results cited by Michl.
29  However, because of the small 
number of restaurants reporting both employment and hours, both we and Card and Krueger cautioned 
against making much out of the estimates from the subsample.  Moreover, we are less inclined to ignore 
the above-mentioned increase in the ratio of full-time workers to part-time workers in New Jersey as 
evidence against the hypothesis that this difference in data definitions (employment vs. total hours) was 
the primary source of difference in the results.  In any case, it seems to us that the effect of minimum 
wages on total hours is likely most relevant both for testing the validity of the competitive model of labor 
demand and for the policy question of how minimum wages affect opportunities for work.         
The effect of the minimum wage on hours has also been examined using longer sample periods 
for the United States as a whole.  In particular, both Zavodny (2000) and Couch and Wittenburg (2001) 
investigate the effects of minimum wage changes on average hours in the state-level panel data 
framework described earlier.  Zavodny uses the standard specification described in equation (1) above 
and includes both state and year effects in her analysis, which uses data from 1979-1993.  When the 
minimum wage variable is specified in relative terms, her results show a negative effect of the minimum 
wage on teen employment, with an elasticity of −0.12, similar to that reported in Neumark and Wascher 
(1992).  However, using the real minimum wage, she finds a small and insignificant effect of the 
                                                 
29 The latter finding was also reported by Card and Krueger (2000). - 36 - 
minimum wage on employment.  Moreover, the estimated effects of the minimum wage on average hours 
per worker (conditional on employment) are either positive (with the real minimum wage) or close to zero 
(with the relative minimum wage), suggesting that firms did not adjust average hours of teenagers 
downward in response to the higher minimum wage.  The effect on total hours worked (e.g., 
unconditioned on employment) for all teenagers is 0.24 (and statistically significant) using the real 
minimum wage and −0.11 using the relative minimum wage.   
Zavodny augments these state-level results with an analysis of matched CPS individual-level data 
from 1979-80 to 1992-93.  In this analysis, she identifies affected teenagers as those with an initial wage 
between the old and new minimum wage (in real terms), and calculates the implicit wage gap as the 
amount needed to raise their wage to the new minimum (with the gap for those with higher wages set to 
zero).  Zavodny then regresses year t+1 employment status and weekly hours on the wage gap variable 
and other controls to estimate the effect of the minimum wage.  In this case, the results indicate that an 
increase in the minimum wage reduces the probability that an affected worker will remain employed.  
However, for those that do keep their jobs, the effect of the minimum wage is to increase their average 
hours.  On balance, the results suggest that total hours of initially employed teenagers do not fall in 
response to an increase in the minimum wage, a result that is confirmed by a positive and statistically 
insignificant effect of the minimum wage on hours using the entire sample (so that the hours effect is not 
conditional on employment).  Zavodny cautions that these estimates do not incorporate the effects of the 
minimum wage on transitions from nonemployment to employment.  Similarly, they do not capture 
whether the minimum wage affects the likelihood that those who make this transition work part-time or 
full-time.   
  In sharp contrast to Zavodny, Couch and Wittenburg (2001) find that minimum wages reduce 
both employment and total hours worked by teenagers.  These authors follow the model put forth by 
Burkhauser et al. (2000a), using monthly data from January 1979 through December 1992 and excluding 
time dummies from the analysis.  The estimated elasticity for hours ranges from −0.48 to −0.77 
depending on the exact specification used.  Moreover, the estimated elasticities are 25 percent to 30 - 37 - 
percent larger than those estimated for employment based on identical specifications.  The authors 
interpret these results as suggesting that employers respond to a minimum wage increase by reducing both 
teen employment and average hours of those teenagers who remain employed.  As we cautioned earlier, 
we are reluctant to place too much weight on estimates from specifications that exclude time effects.  
Nevertheless, the difference in the results reported by Zavodny and by Couch and Wittenburg indicates 
that the question of how employers adjust average hours in response to a minimum wage increase is not 
yet resolved.   
V.  More Recent Evidence on Employment Effects on Less-Skilled U.S. Workers 
  Most of the papers discussed thus far include minimum wage increases up to and including the 
1990 and 1991 increases in the federal minimum wage and a selected number of state minimum wage 
increases that were enacted in the late 1980s or early 1990s.  With the federal minimum wage boosted 
again in 1996 and 1997 and with a number of other states raising their minimum wages above the federal 
level, studying the effects of minimum wages on employment has continued to be an active area of 
research.  In addition, much of the recent literature on minimum wage effects has continued to look for 
ways to more effectively identify the economic consequences of minimum wage changes.  In some cases, 
this research has attempted to sharpen the focus on those individuals most likely to be affected by a 
change in the minimum wage, while another segment has examined new approaches for estimating 
minimum wage effects.   
In this section, we review the literature that has moved beyond the issues that arose out of the first 
round of the new minimum wage research; because this research has not been discussed much elsewhere, 
we also provide somewhat more detail on the procedures and results for these studies than we did for 
those discussed in the previous section.  
Studies Limited to the Most Recent (1996 and 1997) Federal Minimum Wage Increases 
We begin this section with a summary of research that has focused on the most recent federal 
minimum wage increases in 1996 and 1997.  Some of this literature has been produced by researchers at 
advocacy organizations and often concludes that these minimum wage increases did not reduce - 38 - 
employment.  A recent study by Bernstein and Schmitt (2000) provides a typical example.
30  These 
authors compute changes in the average employment rates for teenagers and adults with less than a high 
school education over three overlapping periods: 1995-1996, 1995-1997, and 1995-1998.  Following Card 
(1992a), they then regress these changes on the fraction of each group affected by the two federal 
minimum wage increases.
31  The increasingly longer differences are intended to capture more of the 
effects of the two federal increases, which took place in 1996 and 1997.  Bernstein and Schmitt also 
report results beginning in 1994, arguing that these estimates should be free of any effects of future 
anticipated minimum wage increases.   
For teenagers, a negative and significant disemployment effect is only evident for the 1995-1996 
period, which provides an estimate of the contemporaneous effect of the first minimum wage increase.  
When the sample period is extended to 1997 or 1998, or when it is extended back to 1994 (or both), the 
estimates are mostly negative, but not significant.  Nevertheless, some of the estimated elasticities are 
quite large.  For example, the estimated elasticity for teenagers is −1 (and statistically significant) for the 
1995-1996 period, and for the others it ranges from −0.1 to −0.4; these estimates fall by about half when 
the sample begins in 1994. 
32  As noted above, this study also examines evidence on adults aged 20-54 
with less than a high school education.  Here, although the estimates for the 1995-1996 change are 
positive, those computed through 1997 or 1998 are negative, small (in terms of the elasticity), and 
                                                 
30 These researchers are from the Economic Policy Institute, which supports minimum wage increases.  Despite the 
potential lack of objectivity from such organizations (including, as well, those opposing minimum wage 
increases), we discuss their research because it has sometimes been influential in the policy debate.  For example, 
a different EPI study by Bernstein and Schmitt (1998), which is discussed below, is cited indirectly in the 1999 
Economic Report of the President (p. 112), and such studies are frequently cited in Congressional hearings and in 
hearings in state legislatures (see, e.g., Sabia, 2006).  For papers that are either circulating or published based on 
work that appeared earlier under the cover of advocacy organizations, we refer to the former, as these are the 
versions that either underwent or are likely to undergo peer review.     
31 Although not specified, we assume that this fraction is computed from the 1995 wage distribution and is measured 
as the fraction of workers below the new minimum wage.   
32 These results are consistent with those reported by Wessels (2006).  In particular, Wessels regresses the log 
change in teenage employment in each state from the twelve-month period just prior to the October 1996 increase 
to the twelve-month period immediately following the September 1997 increase on the fraction of workers in each 
state that were affected by these increases.  The results indicate that states with a greater fraction of affected 
workers had relatively larger employment declines.  Although Wessels does not report minimum wage elasticities 
or estimates for wages that could be used to compute such elasticities,  the estimated coefficient on the fraction 
affected variable is −0.30 (significant at the ten-percent level), somewhat larger than that reported by Bernstein 
and Schmitt.  - 39 - 
insignificant.  The authors also present results for different periods—e.g., beginning in 1996—and find 
further non-robustness, with strong negative employment effects for low-skilled adults but the opposite 
for teens.  One contributing factor to the lack of robustness of the results may be that limiting the sample 
to this period results in a sample that is too small to reliably detect employment effects of minimum 
wages.       
  In an earlier paper, Bernstein and Schmitt (1998) also report results from two other analyses.  
The first is a difference-in-differences analysis of changes in employment rates for various groups of 
teens and young adult high school dropouts relative to changes from the period prior to the minimum 
wage increase; this study also controls for aggregate employment changes by including employment rates 
for men and women aged 25-54 (separately) in the regression.  However, the analysis does not account 
for state-level variation in minimum wages.  This is a problem because many states had higher minimums 
prior to the 1996 and 1997 federal increases, so that the federal increases induced different minimum 
wage changes in different states (see Neumark, 2001).  Moreover, while the estimates across many groups 
are centered on zero, the point estimates are often extremely large.  For example, the minimum wage 
increases are estimated to have induced a 4.8 percentage point drop in the employment rate for black men 
and a 7.8 percentage point increase for Hispanic women.  Although these estimates are not statistically 
significant, they imply huge elasticities and make us reluctant to put a great deal of store in these 
estimates, especially given the problem of omitted variation in state minimum wages.   
Bernstein and Schmitt also present results from an analysis covering a longer period (1991-1997).  
This specification, which follows Deere et al. (1995), regresses age-sex-specific employment changes on 
an aggregate employment measure and dummy variables for federal minimum wage increases.  These 
models reveal disemployment effects for teenage males that are statistically significant in some 
specifications, but the estimated employment effects are positive and not significant for teenage females 
and teenage blacks.  Again, paralleling the earlier estimates, some of the implied elasticities are fairly 
large.  For example, for teenage males, the regression estimates for the 1996-1997 federal minimum wage - 40 - 
increases imply an elasticity of approximately −0.45.
33  For the first-year increase, the implied elasticity 
is about −0.61.
34  For females, the estimated positive employment effect is nearly twice as large (in 
absolute value).
35  Again, this approach does not use information on state minimum wages, and the large 
estimates (both positive and negative) are troublesome.  Moreover, these results are largely inconsistent 
with those reported in Deere et al. (1995), who found negative and significant effects for teenage males, 
teenage females, and teenage blacks (although those estimates were also quite large).  Given this, it is not 
entirely clear what to conclude, other than that tests of the effects of isolated minimum wage increases 
may not be very reliable.     
A related paper is Neumark’s (2001) “pre-specified research design” study of the effects of the 
federal increases in 1996 and 1997.  This study resulted from an effort by David Levine, as editor of 
Industrial Relations, to get various researchers who had studied minimum wages to pre-specify a research 
design for studying this federal minimum wage increase.  The journal would review the design and accept 
it (with revisions) or not, after which the authors, when the data were released, would simply follow their 
“recipe” and report the results.  The motivation for this project was to try to cut through an apparent 
relationship between who had written previous minimum wage studies and the answers they found (or 
“author effects”).  As documented in Table 1 of the paper, perhaps the most pronounced tendency was for 
research by us to find negative employment effects (although not always) and for research by David Card 
and Alan Krueger to find positive (or zero) effects.  Such a pattern could be an indication that prior biases 
had affected the reported results, an issue discussed in greater detail below.  Although the journal’s 
project would have been more valuable had more researchers involved in the minimum wage debate 
decided to participate, only one pre-specified research design was submitted and published.
36, 37   
                                                 
33 This is computed from the summed effects in Table 7, column 1 (which are individually insignificant although 
their joint significance is not reported), and the approximate 44% employment rate for teenage males reported in 
Table 4. 
34 This calculation instead uses the estimate in Table 6, column 1. 
35 It is unclear why the authors do not report results for teenagers as a whole using this approach, as they did for 
their other analyses.   
36 Despite his submission of a paper, Neumark expressed initial reservations about the usefulness of this approach 
because it requires throwing away lots of information on previous minimum wage increases (2001, p. 124), 
paralleling some of the concerns we have about the Bernstein and Schmitt studies.    - 41 - 
In this analysis, standard panel data models are estimated with two different minimum wage 
variables—the minimum wage relative to the average wage in the state, and the fraction below variable 
described earlier.  These variables are entered both contemporaneously and lagged, and the models 
include state and year fixed effects and a control for the employment rate of adults with more than a high-
school education.  The dataset spans the period from October 1995 to December 1998, roughly one year 
before the first to one year after the second of the federal minimum wage increases in October 1996 and 
September 1997.  The minimum wage variables account for the variation in state minimum wages, so that 
the identifying information is the state-specific change in the effective minimum wage associated with the 
federal increases.  Even so, a general lack of variation during this period makes it far from ideal for 
studying the effects of minimum wages.      
The estimates of the employment effects for teenagers are generally imprecise, but near zero.  For 
example, in a specification that includes current and lagged relative minimum wages, the estimated 
elasticity is 0.06.  For young adults (aged 16-24) the estimates are frequently negative, although they are 
again insignificant.  In this case, the estimates are sometimes larger in absolute value, with elasticities of 
approximately −0.15.  However, similar to what Bernstein and Schmitt found, the results are not 
particularly robust for either teenagers or 16-24 year olds as a whole.  For example, for 16-24 year olds, 
the estimates change sign when the data are restricted to observations from the CPS Outgoing Rotation 
Group (ORG) files.  In contrast, evidence of disemployment effects is stronger when the sample is 
restricted to the less-skilled workers in these age groups.  For non-enrolled 16-24 year-olds with no more 
than a high school education, the estimated elasticities are around −0.3, and for non-enrolled 20-24 year-
olds with no more than a high school education the elasticities are around −0.15; these estimates are often 
significant, but not always.  Negative employment effects for these groups are also evident in 
                                                                                                                                                             
37 A recent paper for Canada (Campolieti et al., 2006) has a similar flavor.  These authors did not pre-commit to a 
research design before obtaining and studying data on minimum wage increases in Canada, and hence avoided 
discarding much useful data.  Instead, they simply apply the specifications proposed in the Neumark (2001) paper, 
as well as other modifications proposed by others, to the Canadian data, in this manner avoiding specification 
search that could introduce biases.  They find quite uniform evidence of disemployment effects of minimum 
wages from standard reduced-form specifications, with elasticities ranging from about −.14 to −.44, and centered 
on about −.3.     - 42 - 
specifications that use the “fraction below” minimum wage variable, and they are often statistically 
significant as well.  The point estimates in these specifications are somewhat variable, but for the main 
ones, the elasticities range from −0.11 to −0.21.  Thus, we read the evidence in this paper as pointing to 
disemployment effects of minimum wage for young, unskilled workers, with the exception of teenagers; 
the absence of disemployment effects for teenagers parallels some of the research we discussed earlier, 
which suggested that the absence of an overall effect (or a relatively weak effect) may nonetheless mask 
compositional shifts.   
Finally, although Burkhauser et al. (2000a) focus most of their attention on the 1979-1992 period 
used in the first round of the new minimum wage research, they also present results using an extended 
sample period that includes the federal minimum wage increases in 1996 and 1997.  In their baseline 
model, which includes the nominal minimum wage and nominal adult wage separately, they continue to 
find a negative effect of the minimum wage on teenage employment when year effects are excluded, 
although the elasticities are smaller than for the 1979-1992 period; moreover, the estimated elasticity is 
close to zero when year dummies are included in the specification.  To isolate the effects of the 1996 and 
1997 increases, they also include a specification that uses indicator variables to identify the effects of 
each of these minimum wage increases.  In these specifications, the estimated elasticities are −.27 for the 
1996 minimum wage increase and −.17 or the 1997 increase (in specifications excluding year dummies), 
roughly half the size of the estimated elasticities for the 1990 and 1991 minimum wage hikes.  As noted 
in the previous section, though, we have reservations about estimates based on this type of specification. 
Studies Focused on Recent State Minimum Wage Increases 
The last decade has witnessed an unprecedented number of states raising their minimum wages, 
generating substantial variation in state minimum wages.  Although the federal minimum wage has 
remained at $5.15 per hour since 1997, as of August 2006, eighteen  states and the District of Columbia 
had minimum wages that exceeded the federal wage floor, and more than a half dozen other states are 
currently considering increases or will implement them in 2007.  Moreover, state minimum wages have 
recently been raised above the federal level in some large states (such as Wisconsin, Florida, Illinois, and - 43 - 
New York), whereas—with the exception of California—the states with high minimum wages had 
previously often been relatively small.
38  As a result, the share of the population aged 16-64 residing in 
states with a minimum wage higher than the federal level rose from 15.6 percent in 1998 to 38.4 percent 
in 2005, and will climb above 50 percent with additional minimum wages set to take effect by January 
2007 (based on CPS data).
39  Finally, many state minimum wages are currently quite high, including six 
states and the District of Columbia with minimum wages of at least $7.  From a research perspective, this 
proliferation of and variation in state minimum wages provides an unparalleled opportunity.   
Advocacy groups have circulated a few papers that examine the employment effects of some of 
these recent state increases in minimum wages.  For example, another Economic Policy Institute study, by 
Chapman (2004), estimates a cross-section regression of state-level employment growth between 2000 
and 2003 on the share of each state’s workforce earning between 100 percent and 120 percent of the state 
minimum wage in 2003.
40  Although the results suggest no relationship, it is unclear from the study why 
the proportion of the workforce earning near the minimum wage in 2003 would be expected to affect 
aggregate employment growth from an earlier year to 2003.  For example, if the overall gains in 
employment disproportionately reflected growth in low-wage employment, or if the rise in employment 
was due in part to an increase in labor supply among less-skilled workers, we would expect a positive 
relationship between the low-wage share in 2003 and employment growth from 2000 to 2003.  Moreover, 
most economists have focused on the effects of the minimum wage on the employment opportunities of 
the low-skilled workers who are most affected by minimum wages, rather than on its effects on aggregate 
employment.  On the other hand, as Chapman points out, some organizations opposing minimum wages, 
such as the Employment Policies Institute, have suggested a link between minimum wages and state 
unemployment rates.
41  
                                                 
38 For details on state minimum wages, see http://www.epinet.org/issueguides/minwage/table5.pdf. 
39 In addition, although we ignore them here, living wages, which typically set a higher minimum wage for a subset 
of workers in an area, have spread to scores of cities, while city-wide minimum wages have recently been enacted 
in Madison, San Francisco, and Santa Fe.  For an up-to-date review of living wages and research on their effects, 
see Adams and Neumark (2005).   
40 This paper also discusses trends in specific states; we focus only on the regression analysis.   
41 See, e.g., www.epionline.org/oped_detail.cfm?oid=18. - 44 - 
Separately, a study of state minimum wages by the Fiscal Policy Institute (2004)—another group 
advocating minimum wage increases—shows that employment rose faster between 1998 and 2001 in 
states with a minimum wage higher than the federal level than in states where the federal minimum was 
binding.  For overall employment, the authors report that the states with a relatively high minimum wage 
(11 states plus the District of Columbia) had faster employment growth from 1998 to 2001 than the other 
states and about the same employment growth from 2001 to 2004.  In retail trade, employment also rose 
more in the high minimum wage states, but this difference was most evident in the latter period.  This 
study also examines growth in employment at small businesses (fewer than 50 employees) and at small 
retail businesses.  This analysis, which can only be done with County Business Patterns data through 
2001, showed greater employment growth in the high minimum wage states both at small businesses and 
among small retail businesses.   
However, this study suffers from two serious shortcomings.  First, it makes no effort to exploit 
differences in the timing of state minimum wage increases.  Although many of these states raised their 
minimum wage in 1999 or later, so that the minimum wage variable captures increases in the effective 
wage floor in a general sense, differentiating the timing of those increases would improve the 
identification of the estimates.  Second, the analysis does not control for other factors that might have 
influenced employment growth.  In this sense, a better strategy might have been to compare the difference 
between retail employment growth and overall employment growth in the two sets of states, on the 
assumption that minimum wage effects would be more evident in the retail sector, while other state-
specific factors had a similar effect on both aggregate and retail employment.  Thus, we are skeptical that 
much can be learned from this study despite the authors’ claims of relatively large positive effects.
42   
                                                 
42 An updated version of this study was released in 2006 and included data through January 2006 for the analysis of 
total and retail employment.  However, even though five additional large states had increased their minimum 
wages by 2004 (Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin), the “treatment group” of states is 
still the 11 states that had raised their minimum by 2003.  We therefore focus on the earlier study.     - 45 - 
Another example is a recent study by Sabia (2006), which was circulated by the Employment 
Policies Institute (which opposes minimum wages).
43  The main advantage of this study relative to that of 
the Fiscal Policy Institute is that it controls for other potential influences on employment, including the 
demographic characteristics of states’ populations, aggregate state-level economic activity, and other 
factors.  This study also uses a longer sample period (1979-2004).  More specifically, Sabia uses a 
relatively standard panel data analysis along the lines of Burkhauser et al. (2000a and 2000b).  Following 
the specifications in these papers, he includes contemporaneous and lagged values of the minimum wage 
variable, which is the log of the higher of the federal or state minimum wage.  Sabia focuses on 
employment in retail trade and at small businesses, and aggregates the data to the state-by-month cell for 
each of these sectors.    
For overall employment (as a share of the population) in retail, the results indicate statistically 
significant employment declines, with estimated elasticities of about −0.10.  Sabia reports a larger range, 
up to −0.3, but this larger elasticity only results when the year effects are omitted.  For overall 
employment in small businesses (defined as firms with 100 or fewer employees), the evidence also 
consistently points to significant negative effects of minimum wages, and in this case the results are less 
sensitive to whether year effects are included; the elasticities range from −0.08 to −0.12. 
In addition to reporting results for total employment in these sectors, Sabia also presents results 
for teen employment in retail trade and in small businesses as a share of the teen population, arguing that 
the use of overall employment in these sectors may understate the effects of the minimum wage on low-
skilled labor.
44  This is a reasonable criticism, although one reason for focusing on low-wage sectors to 
begin with is that conventional theory predicts that employment in such sectors will decline in response to 
                                                 
43 Reflecting the contentious debate between those partisan “think tanks” that support minimum wage increases and 
those that oppose minimum wage increases, Sabia’s study is presented as a rebuttal of the Fiscal Policy Institute 
study.  However, because it presents a more serious empirical analysis than many such analyses, we discuss it in 
more detail.   
44 Sabia also present some results for overall teen employment.  However, these findings are very similar to those in 
Burkhauser et al. (2000a and 2000b) and thus are not discussed here.     - 46 - 
a minimum wage increase (keeping in mind the reservations we noted above about focusing on too 
narrow a sector).   
The estimated disemployment effects for teens in retail trade are large and statistically significant, 
with elasticities in the range of −0.27 to −0.43.  The elasticities for hours worked by teenagers in this 
sector are a bit above the upper end of this range, and lower when computed only for working teenagers.  
For teen employment and hours in small business, the elasticities are uniformly negative and about twice 
as large.  However, it is not entirely clear what to make of the findings that the minimum wage reduces 
the share of teens employed in retail businesses or small businesses.  These results neither imply 
employment declines in the retail sector (as firms could substitute towards other workers), nor 
employment declines for teenagers overall (as teens could shift to other sectors), although it seems 
unlikely that either of these other channels could fully absorb the teens “displaced” from the retail and 
small business sectors.  As a result, Sabia’s estimated effects of minimum wages on overall employment 
in the retail and small business sector seem more relevant to the traditional policy question.
45     
Additional Case Studies 
A couple of additional studies have adopted the case study approach pioneered by Card, Krueger, 
and others.  Orazem and Mattila (2002) examined the effects of a series of minimum wage increases that 
took place in Iowa beginning in 1990.
46  The authors begin with a county-level analysis of low-wage 
industries in the state using data from the QCEW program, the same dataset used by Kim and Taylor in 
their study of California’s minimum wage increase.  However, in order to circumvent the lack of hourly 
wage information in this dataset, the authors supplement these data with information on average hourly 
                                                 
45 Of course, we are sometimes more interested in whether minimum wages reduce employment of the least-skilled 
workers.  However, in this case, we might learn more about the implications of an increase in the minimum wage 
on their employment prospects by focusing on their overall employment rates.  Indeed, there is no reason to 
necessarily expect that teenagers in these sectors will be more adversely affected by minimum wage increases 
than teenagers in other sectors, because the production technology that leads to the greater use of teen labor in 
these sectors may also entail few substitution possibilities. 
46 Iowa first established a minimum wage of $3.85 per hour in January 1990 and subsequently raised the minimum 
to $4.25 in January 1991 and to $4.65 in January 1992.  The federal minimum in this period went from $3.35 to 
$3.80 in April of 1990 and to $4.25 in April of 1991.   - 47 - 
earnings by industry from the BLS’s Current Employment Survey.
47  The minimum wage variable is the 
level of the minimum wage relative to the lagged average wage for each county-industry cell; the authors 
also include controls for changes in national employment and wages, county per capita income, the 
proportion of firms in each cell that are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, and whether a county is 
urban or rural.  The results indicate a negative effect of the minimum wage on employment, with an 
estimated elasticity of between −0.06 and −0.12.  The estimates are mostly statistically significant, with 
the larger estimates evident for four-quarter changes in employment (as opposed to one-quarter changes).  
Recognizing that these estimates combine the effects on both workers directly affected by the 
minimum wage increases and other employees, the authors supplement these results by collecting the 
unemployment insurance tax filings for a subset of the firms.  These records include quarterly information 
on employment and earnings for individual employees, which were then merged with driver license 
records to obtain the gender and age of each worker.  Using this information, Orazem and Mattila 
estimate predicted wages by age and sex and, using the demographic profile of the workforce for each 
firm, calculate the predicted proportion of workers at each firm who were initially paid less than the new 
minimum wage.  The authors then regress this percentage on the level of the minimum wage relative to 
the predicted average wage of the subminimum wage group to obtain an estimate of the employment 
elasticity for affected workers.  They emphasize that because they do not use actual wage data in this 
regression, the minimum wage effect is effectively identified by changes in the demographic makeup of 
each firm’s employees.  In particular, a shift away from employees in traditionally low-wage 
demographic groups (e.g. teenagers) would be evidence of a negative employment effect from the 
minimum wage. 
Indeed, the estimates show exactly this result.  For changes measured over four-quarter periods, 
the estimated employment elasticities range from −0.22 to −0.54 when no industry controls are included 
and from −0.31 to −0.85 when such controls are included; moreover, the estimates are statistically 
                                                 
47 These data, as well as the unemployment insurance tax forms that are the basis for the QCEW data, are collected 
by state employment agencies—in this case, the Iowa Department of Workforce Development. - 48 - 
significant in all cases.  As the authors note, the larger elasticities relative to their county-level analysis 
likely reflect their efforts to identify those individuals most likely affected by the minimum wage 
increases, an issue to which we return below.   However, the size of the elasticities is somewhat surprising 
given that the demographic characteristics used to identify the minimum wage effects (age and sex) are 
the same groups on which previous studies have focused.  
Singell and Terborg (2006) examine the effects of minimum wages on the eating and drinking 
sector, and the hotel and lodging industry in Oregon and Washington.  In particular, they use data from 
1994-2001, a period that includes three increases in the minimum wage in Oregon (in 1997, 1998, and 
1999) and three increases in the minimum wage in Washington (in 1999, 2000, and 2001).  Thus, this 
sample provides two different “experiments” for evaluating the effects of minimum wage increases in 
distinct labor markets that, according to the authors, faced similar economic conditions.   
Singell and Terborg first use BLS wage survey data to explore the extent to which minimum 
wages are binding in these two sectors.  For eating and drinking sector, the 10
th percentile of the wage 
distribution tracks the minimum wage in each state quite closely, with the exception of 1997 and 1998, 
when the minimum wage was only $4.90 in Washington; even so, the 10
th percentile clearly increases to 
the later minimum wages of $6.50 (in 2000) and $6.72 (in 2001).  This pattern holds for three of the four 
jobs in this sector—hosts and hostesses, waiters and waitresses, and fast food cooks—but is less evident 
for restaurant cooks, whose wages tend to be somewhat higher.  Indeed, for the first three jobs, even the 
median wage rates seem to move closely with changes in the minimum wage.  Wages are higher in the 
hotel and lodging sector, and a systematic pattern relating minimum wages to the 10
th percentile of the 
wage distribution is harder to discern; the one exception is for maids and housekeeping, which is the 
lowest-wage category.
48  These wage distributions suggest that minimum wages are binding in the eating 
and drinking sector, but less so in the hotel and lodging sector.  
The authors next turn to the monthly BLS employment data for these two sectors.  They regress 
the change in employment on a minimum wage variable, controls for which state the observation comes 
                                                 
48 The other two jobs surveyed are desk clerks and managers. - 49 - 
from, population and per capita income growth, calendar month dummies and interactions between these 
and a dummy variable for Oregon (to allow for different seasonal patterns in each state), and a cubic time 
trend.  They identify the minimum wage effect from the annual first difference in the log of the real 
minimum wage, and in some specifications include the lag of this variable as well.  The authors also do a 
good deal to establish the robustness of their results.  The results for the eating and drinking sector 
consistently indicate that the minimum wage increases reduced employment.  The estimates are 
statistically significant whether or not lagged effects are included, although they are stronger in the latter 
case.  For the specification that includes both contemporaneous and lagged effects, the employment 
elasticity is −0.2.   
In contrast, the estimates for hotel and lodging are positive and significant, with elasticities of 
about 0.15.  The authors speculate that the absence of negative effects for this sector may be because 
minimum wages are considerably less binding, although of course that fact does not explain a positive 
employment effect.  They also suggest that voters may pass minimum wage legislation when “times are 
good”—the endogeneity problem we discussed earlier—but offer no explanation as to why this 
endogeneity would be particularly relevant with regard to economic conditions in the hotel and lodging 
sector, nor any evidence that the timing of minimum wage increases fits this explanation.  One avenue 
worth exploring is whether tourism spending changed differently in the two states over this period; we 
would imagine that hotel and lodging employment is much more sensitive to this than is eating and 
drinking employment.  In any event, their analysis suggests that minimum wage effects may vary 
substantially across industries.   
Finally, Singell and Terborg report on an analysis of the number of help-wanted ads for the 
different types of jobs in these two industries.  The help-wanted data are a valuable addition to the study 
because the BLS employment data do not provide the breakdown into the specific jobs for which the 
wage results were reported.  By classifying the help-wanted data by the jobs for which wage distributions 
are reported, it is possible to focus on those jobs for which minimum wages were binding (most 
importantly, maids and housekeepers in the hotel and lodging industry).   - 50 - 
The dependent variable in the want-ad regressions is the ratio of want-ads to industry 
employment, because a given level of want-ads generates a particular flow of applicants.  That is, the level 
of want-ads and changes in employment should be affected in the same way by minimum wages.  
However, by the same logic, it seems that the form of the minimum wage variable should be the same as 
in the employment analysis, although the authors also switch to a levels specification for the minimum 
wage variable.  Their rationale for this specification is that, in equilibrium, different levels of want-ads 
will be needed to maintain the desired level and quality of employment; for example, if the desired level 
of employment is lower with a higher minimum wage, then fewer want-ads will be needed to maintain 
that level.
49  Nonetheless, given that the want-ad regressions are interpreted as complementary evidence, 
it would have been useful to see the results for the same specifications used in the analysis of 
employment, perhaps coupled with some more-detailed, independent analysis of how minimum wages 
affect want-ads.   
The want-ad regressions are presented for five jobs in eating and drinking—wait staff, buss staff, 
dishwasher staff, hosts, and cooks—and one job in hotels and lodging—housekeepers.
50  In five out of six 
cases—including housekeepers—the estimated effect of the minimum wage on the number of want-ads is 
negative and significant, with a 10 percent increase in the minimum reducing the number of ads by 10 to 
47 percent (the number of monthly ads ranges from about two to 48, depending on the period and job).  
Among the restaurant jobs, the only insignificant result is for cooks, which is the highest paying job in the 
eating and drinking industry and thus less likely to be affected by minimum wage changes.  Thus, the 
general conclusion from this study is that the minimum wage increases in Oregon and Washington had an 
                                                 
49 Personal communication with Larry Singell, July 6, 2006.   
50 Of course, these jobs are not necessary specific to an industry.  For example, we presume that a want-ad may be 
advertising for waitpersons in a hotel restaurant.   - 51 - 
adverse effect on employment in the low-wage eating and drinking sector and on low-wage workers in the 
somewhat higher-wage hotel and lodging sector.
 51
Revisiting Aggregate Time-Series Estimates of the Effects of the Federal Minimum Wage 
  Although most of the “new minimum wage research” has moved away from aggregate time-
series studies of the effects of the federal minimum wage, there is a small body of time-series research 
over the past fifteen years that warrants a brief summary.  This segment of the literature has its genesis 
with Wellington (1991), who updated the basic time-series specification in Brown et al. (1983): 
(2)                                                      tt t EM W R t α βε =+ + . 
In this specification, E represents the employment-to-population ratio for a particular demographic group 
(16-19 or 20-24 year olds), MW is the minimum wage variable, and R is a set of control variables that 
includes a cyclical control, supply side variables, linear and quadratic time trends, and seasonal 
dummies.
52  The minimum wage variable is typically the Kaitz index, which was the most widely used 
measure in the earlier time-series literature.  Brown et al. estimated the model with quarterly data from 
1954 to 1979, while Wellington extended the data through 1986.  Using the longer sample period, 
Wellington’s results showed employment elasticities ranging from −.05 to −.09 for teenagers and from 
zero to −.02 for 20-24 year olds, estimates that fall below the lower end of the range found in the BGK 
survey.  In addition, only a minority of the estimates for teenagers—and none of the estimates for young 
adults—were statistically significant at conventional levels.   
  Subsequent studies also found that estimating a standard time-series model with a dataset that 
included more recent observations produced a smaller elasticity of teen employment with respect to the 
minimum wage.  For example, Card and Krueger (1995a) estimated variants of the Solon model using 
                                                 
51 In a similar vein, Skedinger (2006) uses firm-level survey data to study the effects of minimum wage changes on 
hotel and restaurant workers in Sweden.  The evidence indicates that minimum wage increases led to higher 
separations of affected workers aged 20 and over, but there is only weak evidence of an effect on teenagers.  
There is also evidence paralleling the results on separations that minimum wage decreases raise the job accession 
rate of affected workers, although this evidence is not as robust as the evidence on separations.  The context of 
this study is also quite different from the U.S. case studies, as the minimum wages used in the analysis consist of 
an extensive set of wage floors that vary by job, age, tenure, and location, and that are negotiated via centralized 
bargaining.  Thus, the implications of the results for more traditional uniform minimum wage floors are not clear. 
52 More precisely, Wellington updated the specification suggested by Solon (1985), which also includes interactions 
between the quarterly seasonal dummies and a linear and quadratic trend, along with a standard AR(1) correction. - 52 - 
data through 1993 and reported elasticities for the Kaitz index that center on about −0.07 and that are 
generally not statistically significant.
53  Likewise, Bernstein and Schmitt (2000) report results from time-
series analyses that extend the data through 2000:Q1.  These results provide additional evidence of a 
downward “drift” in the disemployment effect of the minimum wage, with estimates for the full sample 
period indicating an elasticity of −.061 and a t-statistic (1.63) just below the ten-percent level of 
significance.  These authors also report estimates that augment the earlier modeling by differencing the 
data to account for nonstationarity and treating the seasonality differently than simply seasonal dummy 
variables; in addition, they report results using annual data.  The elasticities from these alternative 
analyses range from −.001 to −.052, with four of the five estimates reported nowhere near statistically 
significant.   
The likely reasons for a decline over time in the estimated minimum wage effect from such 
models have been the subject of some debate.  Card and Krueger (1995b) argued that this decline suggests 
that the published time-series studies reflected “publication bias.”  Using meta-analysis techniques, Card 
and Krueger found that the reported t-ratios in such studies were clustered around two, and that estimated 
effects declined (toward zero) over time.  Because smaller estimated effects would become significant as 
the sample size grew longer, Card and Krueger argued that the declining estimates constituted evidence 
that researchers were more likely to choose and report specifications that produced statistically significant 
estimates that corresponded to their theoretical priors, and that reviewers and editors were more likely to 
publish such studies, concluding that the earlier literature was “biased in the direction of finding 
statistically significant results” (p. 194).   
However, in Neumark and Wascher (1998), we showed that successive estimates from a 
benchmark specification that is arguably uncontaminated by publication bias produce a pattern of results 
not materially different from those generated by the studies included in Card and Krueger’s meta-
                                                 
53 However, Bazen and Marimoutou (2002) note that Wellington and Card and Krueger enter some variables in 
levels that BGK and Solon entered in logs.  When they estimate the same specification as Solon with data through 
1993, they find an elasticity of −.083 that is significant at the five-percent level, although this estimate is still 
below those based on data through 1979. - 53 - 
analysis.  This finding points to parameter instability rather than publication bias as a likely reason for the 
decline in the estimated effects of minimum wages.  We offered two possible reasons for the decline in 
the coefficient on the Kaitz index.  First, if changes in coverage, which dominate movements in the Kaitz 
index early in the sample period, have a larger effect on employment than changes in the relative value of 
the minimum wage, the fact that coverage has been essentially unchanged since the early 1970s would 
lead to a lower estimated effect over time.  Second, given the widening in the wage distribution during the 
1980s, the Kaitz index, which uses the average wage in the denominator, may overstate the decline in the 
bite of the minimum wage that took place during the 1980s (if the close substitutes for minimum wage 
workers earn below-median wages), leading to a growing downward bias in estimates of the minimum 
wage effect on employment.  One other possibility, which we highlighted earlier, is that mismeasurement 
of the minimum wage variable in such studies has increased over time because of the proliferation of state 
minimum wages.     
  We should also note, however, that some of the most recent studies in this genre find no evidence 
of a declining minimum wage effect in the aggregate time-series data.  In particular, Williams and Mills 
(2001) argue that previous time-series studies of the effects of the minimum wage on employment did not 
adequately account for serial correlation and nonstationarity in the data.  As evidence, they revisit the 
Card and Krueger time-series analysis of minimum wage effects and note that, using the standard 
specifications, the estimated minimum wage effects are quite sensitive to the method used to estimate the 
AR(1) error process and that the AR(1) coefficient rises to close to unity as the sample length is 
increased, suggesting the possibility of a unit root in the error term.  They then use Augmented Dickey-
Fuller procedures to test for the presence of unit roots in the data and find that the teenage employment-
population ratio is I(0) but that the Kaitz index is I(1), suggesting that the estimates from the standard 
specifications are not consistent. 
  To address this issue, Williams and Mills estimated a vector autoregression model with separate 
equations for employment, the change in the Kaitz index, and each of the control variables (transformed 
as needed to ensure stationarity).  The results indicate that changes in the minimum wage “Granger - 54 - 
cause” teenage employment and can account for between 7 and 10 percent of the variation in teen 
employment rates over the 1954-93 sample period.  In addition, impulse response functions from the 
VAR suggest that raising the minimum wage has an immediate negative effect on employment and that 
the employment elasticity rises to roughly −0.4 over a two-year period. 
Finally, Bazen and Marimoutou (2002) present what we believe is the most recent time-series 
study of minimum wage effects in the United States.  They also argue that the specifications used in the 
earlier time-series literature were dynamically misspecified, but they address this issue in a different 
manner than did Williams and Mills.  In particular, they extend the standard Solon model by 
implementing an approach that specifies stochastic structures for the trend, seasonal, and cyclical 
components rather than the deterministic components used in past time-series models, but that nests those 
models as well.
54  In addition, they include the minimum wage and average manufacturing earnings in the 
model along with the Kaitz index to relax the constraint imposed in the Kaitz index that the effects of 
changes in the minimum wage and the average wage should be equal but of opposite sign.  In general, the 
data reject the deterministic specification in favor of the stochastic specification: the estimates indicate 
that many of the unobserved components have stochastic elements (a key exception is the cyclical 
component) and that the stochastic model exhibits greater parameter stability and better forecasting 
performance than does the Solon model.
55  In addition, although the coefficient on the Kaitz index is not 
statistically significant, the coefficients on both the minimum wage and average manufacturing wage are 
significant, and the restriction that the minimum wage and average wage enter with equal but opposite-
signed effects is rejected.  They also find that the effect of the minimum wage on employment has been 
fairly constant over time and, extending the sample through the second quarter of 1999, report statistically 
significant negative effects of the minimum wage on teenage employment, with an elasticity of −.12 in 
the short-run and −.27 in the long-run.   
                                                 
54 Bernstein and Schmitt (2000) also report estimates from this “structural” time-series approach, although they give 
no details. 
55 The authors show that the forecast performance of the other models, estimated through 1979, deteriorates badly. - 55 - 
We are not time-series econometricians, and thus we leave it to those with more expertise to fully 
assess the contributions of Williams and Mills and Bazen and Marimoutou to the time-series literature on 
minimum wage effects.  And, we reiterate our earlier concern that time-series studies are less relevant to 
the present context given the proliferation of state minimum wages.  Nonetheless, these papers pose a 
clear challenge to claims that the time-series evidence for the United States does not show a detectable 
adverse effect of minimum wages on teenage employment.
56
Efforts to Identify the Effects of the Minimum Wage on the Lowest-Wage Workers 
  Much of the literature discussed thus far has focused on the effects of the minimum wage on the 
aggregate employment rates of teenagers.  As noted earlier, the choice of teenagers in these studies 
reflects the fact that they make up a disproportionate share of the minimum wage workforce, so that the 
effects of minimum wages are more likely to be evident for this group than for other broad demographic 
groups.  However, from a policy perspective, the effect of a minimum wage increase on teenagers is 
arguably of less interest than the effect on low-wage adult workers, both because teenagers are less likely 
than adults to be permanently low-wage workers and because many teenagers are secondary earners from 
non-poor families.  Moreover, even among teenagers many workers earn significantly more than the 
minimum wage, and because the proportion not directly influenced by a change in the minimum wage can 
be substantial, it is often quite difficult to distinguish minimum wage effects from the myriad of other 
factors influencing the supply of and demand for teenage labor, as well as from noise in the data. 
                                                 
56 Two papers (Wolfson and Belman, 2001 and 2004) study time-series data at the industry level.  We focus on the 
most recent paper.  These studies are included in the table along with other time-series studies because the authors 
present their results as a general test for disemployment effects.  We have two major criticisms of this work.  First, 
as noted earlier, we do not know how to interpret evidence on minimum wages for narrow industries—the same 
issue we discussed earlier with respect to studying minimum wages for the fast-food industry only.  Conventional 
theory does not predict that employment should fall in every industry in response to a minimum wage increase.  
Second, the authors report that there was no stronger evidence of disemployment effects for the subset of 
industries for which the minimum wage has a larger effect on average industry wages, which they suggest further 
undermines the view that minimum wage increases reduce employment.  However, industries where wages 
increase the most may be those where it was least possible to substitute away from the low-wage labor whose 
price was increased, so that average wages went up relatively more because of the legislated minimum wage 
hikes.  Alternatively, they may be industries in which there was rather strong substitution toward more-skilled 
labor, as opposed to other inputs, also raising average wages.  In either case, the authors’ test would not be 
informative.   
 - 56 - 
For the same reason, the reported elasticities from studies of aggregate groups will tend to 
understate both the effects of the minimum wage on the minimum wage workforce and the elasticity of 
demand for such workers.  For example, one can think of the minimum wage elasticity for the teenage 
group as a whole as a weighted average of the effect on workers directly affected by a change in the 
minimum wage and the effect on workers currently earning above the minimum wage.  If we assume that 
the latter elasticity is zero, then the minimum wage elasticity for affected workers (e
A) can be written as 
, where e is the estimated elasticity for the group as a whole and p
A is the proportion of the 
group directly affected by the change in the minimum wage.  Moreover, it is incorrect to interpret the 
minimum wage effect as a demand elasticity in these studies because the size of the average wage 
increase associated with a minimum wage increase will typically be less than the minimum wage increase 
itself because some affected workers are already earning more than the old minimum wage (but less than 
the new minimum wage).  In this case, the demand elasticity can be written as: 
/
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A
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where ΔW
A is the average wage change of those workers whose wages were directly affected by the 
change in the minimum wage. 
As indicated by our summary thus far, one approach researchers have used to estimate minimum 
wage elasticities for individuals most likely to be affected by the minimum wage has been to try to narrow 
down the sample to groups more likely to work at minimum wage jobs.
57  However, even samples of 
narrow demographic groups or specific low-wage industries will include both minimum wage workers 
and higher-wage workers.  Thus, some researchers have taken an alternative approach to estimating 
elasticities for minimum wage workers by attempting to identify observations for which the minimum 
wage increase is binding.  At the aggregate level, in Neumark and Wascher (2002) we attempted to 
classify state-year observations (in a probability sense) into one of three categories: observations for 
which the minimum wage was binding, so that teenage employment was determined by the labor demand 
 
57 In addition to the research reviewed earlier, see also Pabilonia (2002), who focuses on the effects of minimum 
wages on employment of 14-16 year olds. - 57 - 
curve; observations for which the minimum wage was not binding, so that teenage employment was 
determined by both supply and demand; and observations for which the monopsony model was relevant, 
so that employment was determined by movements along the supply curve.  To do this, we estimated a 
switching regression model with the switch points defined as the intersection of the labor demand and 
labor supply curves (to differentiate the binding and nonbinding regimes) and the point at which the labor 
demand curve intersects the marginal cost of labor curve (to differentiate a monopsony regime).  As 
might be expected, this approach yields few observations in the monopsony regime.  However, there are a 
substantial number of observations in the nonbinding regime, allowing us to estimate minimum wage 
effects for those observations for which the minimum wage is more likely to be binding.   The model is 
estimated using employment data on 16-24 year olds and points to negative and significant effects of the 
minimum wage for observations in the binding regime.  In particular, the estimated elasticities in the 
binding regime range from about −0.2 to −0.33, somewhat larger then the estimates from reduced-form 
models of youth employment.  Perhaps more importantly, the results suggest that minimum wage effects 
from single-equation reduced-form regressions will be sensitive to the sample used for the estimation.       
Other researchers have turned to cross-sections or panels of individual-level data to identify 
individuals likely to be directly affected by changes in the minimum wage.  One of the first papers in the 
new minimum wage literature to take this approach was Currie and Fallick (1996), who used longitudinal 
data from the NLSY to study the employment effects of the increases in the federal minimum wage in 
1980 and 1981.
58  In particular, these authors calculate a “wage gap” for each employed individual as the 
difference between the individual’s wage in year t-1 and the minimum wage in year t for workers whose 
wage in year t-1 was between the old and new minimum wage, and zero otherwise.  They then use a 
fixed-effects linear probability model to compare subsequent employment rates for individuals who were 
directly affected by the increases in the nominal minimum wage with individuals who were not directly 
affected by those increases.  The results show clear signs of a negative and statistically significant 
disemployment effect even after controlling for other unobservable individual differences.  Their 
                                                 
58 An earlier paper by Linneman (1982) also used this general approach.   - 58 - 
preferred estimate suggests that individuals directly affected by the minimum wage increases in 1980 and 
1981 were 3 percent less likely than other workers to be employed one year later.  Given that the 
minimum wage rose about 15 percent over those two years, this estimate is consistent with an 
employment elasticity of about −0.2, although it does not take into account the possible decline in 
employment probabilities in year t for individuals who were not employed prior to the minimum wage 
hikes.
59
Card and Krueger (1995a) criticize this study on a number of grounds.  One of their primary 
concerns seems to be Currie and Fallick’s estimate of a large negative minimum wage effect for workers 
classified as not covered by the minimum wage.  However, Currie and Fallick clearly believe that their 
attempt to identify uncovered workers was unsuccessful because the wage distribution for “uncovered” 
workers also exhibits a large spike at the nominal minimum wage in both 1980 and 1981.
60  Another 
concern, which seems more relevant to us, is Currie and Fallick’s use of above-minimum wage workers 
as the control group in their study. 
In a series of papers, Abowd et al. (1999, 2000a, 2000b) attempt to improve on this approach by 
respecifying the variable in real terms and attempting to identify individuals who were “freed” by a 
decline in the real minimum wage as well as those who were newly bound by a nominal increase in the 
wage floor.  In particular, when the nominal minimum wage rises, they count an observation as “affected” 
if the individual’s real wage in year t is between the real value of the minimum wage in year t and the real 
value of the minimum wage in year t+1.  This variable is conceptually similar to the minimum wage 
variables used by Currie and Fallick (as well as Cards’ “fraction affected” variable) except that it is 
expressed in real terms.  In contrast, when the nominal minimum wage is unchanged between year t and 
year t+1, they count an observation as “affected” if the individual’s real wage in year t+1 is above the 
                                                 
59 The authors report that they attempted to identify nonemployed workers likely to be affected by the minimum 
wage by imputing their wage rates from a hedonic regression of wages on a set of observed demographic 
variables.  Although they found sizable negative employment effects for this group, they expressed skepticism 
about their identification scheme and did not report any point estimates. 
60 Currie and Fallick identify uncovered workers as those with a wage between the old and new minimum wage but 
who work in a sector in which coverage by the federal minimum wage is low. - 59 - 
real value of the minimum wage in year t+1 but below the real value of the minimum wage in year t.  
This concept captures individuals who are no longer bound by the erosion of the minimum wage in real 
terms. 
Using longitudinal data for both France and the United States, Abowd et al. use this minimum 
wage measure to examine transitions into and out of employment.  For the United States, which exhibits 
both increases and decreases in the real minimum wage, their results are mixed.
61  Abowd et al. (1999, 
2000a) use data from the 1980s, and find that the gradual decline in the real value of the minimum wage 
raised transition rates from non-employment to employment, which is consistent with negative elasticity 
of employment with respect to increases in the minimum wage.  However, Abowd et al. (2000b) use data 
from 1981-1991, thus including both decreases and increases in the real value of the federal minimum 
wage, and found little evidence of statistically significant effects of the minimum wage on either exit rates 
from or entry rates into employment.  
In Neumark et al. (2004), we use individual-level matched observations from the Current 
Population Survey ORG files for the years 1979-1997 and extend the analysis to include state-specific 
increases in minimum wages.  Our approach is similar to that used by Currie and Fallick, as well as by 
Abowd et al., but is more general in that it estimates the effects of minimum wages at various points 
throughout the wage distribution.  However, our incorporation of state changes in minimum wages allows 
us to address a criticism of the difference-in-differences studies that use higher-wage workers as a control 
group (e.g., Currie and Fallick; Abowd et al.)—that the experience and behavior of higher-wage workers 
may not provide a good counterfactual for what would happen to low-wage workers absent the minimum 
wage.  In particular, analyses that condition on initial employment—which is needed to classify workers 
based on their initial wage—identify the effect of minimum wages on the probability of a transition from 
employment to non-employment, not on the probability of employment overall.  If lower-wage workers 
are less stable, and regardless of the minimum wage are more likely to leave employment, then 
comparisons to higher-wage workers may not be picking up minimum wage effects.   
                                                 
61 The results for France are discussed in Section VI. - 60 - 
In particular, we specify a model that interacts the change in the effective minimum wage for 
each state-month observation with a set of indicator variables that describe where each individual’s wage 
stands in relation to the minimum wage so that the minimum wage effect can differ across the wage 
distribution.  The model also includes interactions that capture differential changes in the dependent 
variable at different points in the wage distribution that are unrelated to minimum wage changes, as well 
as a set of demographic and skill-type variables and state-year interactions; in this sense, the minimum 
wage effects are identified from differential changes in the effective minimum wage for workers at 
similar points in the wage distribution.  In addition, we adapt the econometric procedure to capture any 
lagged effects of changes in the minimum wage and estimate the equation for wages, employment, hours 
(conditional on employment), and weekly labor income.
62  As in Currie and Fallick, we restrict the 
analysis to individuals employed in year t because we do not have an initial wage for those initially 
nonemployed.  The model is estimated for several outcome variables—wages, employment, hours 
(conditional on employment), and weekly labor income.   
Not surprisingly, the results indicate that workers whose wage is initially close to the minimum 
wage are most likely to be affected by changes in the wage floor.  Wages rise for those who remain 
employed, but employment and hours decline, resulting in a net negative overall effect of the minimum 
wage on labor income among these individuals.  For workers initially earning the minimum wage or 
slightly more, the estimated employment elasticities range from about −0.07 to −0.15 and are often 
statistically significant.  The effect on hours is even more noticeable at the low end of the wage 
distribution, suggesting that employers also respond to minimum wages by shortening the workweeks of 
their lowest-paid employees.  Our results, which are based on samples that include both teenagers and 
adults (but are similar for adults only), are consistent with the findings for teenagers reported by Couch 
and Wittenburg (2001) discussed above and contrary to those reported by Zavodny (2000).   
                                                 
62 Including lagged effects complicates the estimation procedure because each individual is observed for only two 
years in the CPS. - 61 - 
There has also been research along these lines using Canadian data.  For example, Yuen (2003) 
looks for evidence of minimum wage effects using the Canadian Labor Market Activity Survey, which 
contains weekly longitudinal labor market data.  However, since many important variables, such as 
consumer price index and provincial unemployment rates are recorded less frequently, Yuen creates a 
quarterly panel, and records individuals’ employment status as of mid-quarter.  He excludes individuals 
from the Yukon or Northwest Territories due to missing control variables.  Yuen estimates employment 
effects for 16-24 year-olds over the period 1988-1990.  As Baker et al. noted, provincial variation in the 
minimum wage in Canada is extensive.  Reflecting this, in the three-year period Yuen studies, there were 
19 minimum wage changes.  
The paper focuses on the definition of a control group for estimating minimum wage effects to try 
to address some of the ambiguity regarding estimated employment effects in the recent literature.  Yuen 
estimates models for the employment effects of minimum wages in two ways—first, by using high-wage 
workers from the same province as well as all workers in provinces without minimum wage changes as a 
control group, and then again using only low-wage workers from other provinces with no minimum wage 
change as a control group.  In the second method, workers in a province where there is no change in the 
minimum wage are considered a low-wage control if their wage rate falls between the minimum wage of 
their province and $0.25 above.  
Like the papers just discussed, Yuen limits his sample to those who are initially employed and 
therefore only addresses a possible transition from employment to non-employment.  The author 
identifies and uses “at-risk” individuals whose wage is between the old and new minimum wage.  
Dummy variables are also included for province, quarter, and year.  He finds that estimates using the 
control group that includes high-wage workers are consistent with previous work, finding large significant 
negative employment effects for the “at-risk” group.  Employment elasticities can be calculated as - 62 - 
roughly −0.75 to −0.84 for teens and −1.23 to −1.77 for young adults.
63  These are large elasticities, but 
they are based on a very narrow group of workers, and hence are not necessarily inconsistent with overall 
estimated elasticities for teens or young adults that are smaller in absolute value.  Estimates using only the 
low-wage control group, however, lead to employment effects that are insignificant and near zero for both 
teens and young adults.  These finding contrast with those in Neumark et al. (2004), which also uses 
workers in other areas (in this case states) but in the same position in the wage distribution as controls.   
However, Yuen illustrates that low-wage workers are not a homogenous group by breaking the 
low-wage group into two subgroups: “transitory” low-wage workers, who worked fewer than three 
quarters at low wages over the study period; and “permanent” low wage workers, who had three or more 
quarters of low-wage employment over the study.  The author motivates this distinction by arguing that 
“transitory” low-wage workers more likely consist of those whose marginal productivity is higher than 
their current wage—for example, a student with a summer job.  Yuen reports estimates with implied 
elasticities of employment of 1.18 (significant) for “transitory” low-wage working teens and 0.31 
(insignificant) for “transitory” low-wage working young adults.  For “permanent” teen workers (which is 
a bit of a misnomer, since no teenager can accumulate a long history of minimum wage work) the 
elasticity of employment is approximately −0.86 (significant), and for “permanent” young adults the 
estimated elasticity is −1.15 (significant).  Furthermore, for the permanent low-wage workers, the 
estimates are not sensitive to the choice of control group.  Yuen concludes that “when the treatment group 
is defined appropriately, the standard ‘textbook prediction’ of a negative employment effect can still be 
retrieved” (p.671).  It is not immediately obvious that the “textbook prediction” should apply to what 
Yuen classifies as permanent low-wage workers, but not transitory ones.  His argument, however, is that 
it is more likely that permanent low-wage workers are the intended beneficiaries of minimum wage laws, 
                                                 
63 The authors provide an average minimum wage increase (8.4%), which is used to calculate the elasticities. This 
average is calculated as  the average percentage increase across all 19 provinces weighted by the number of at-risk 
individuals at the time of each provincial increase. - 63 - 
and in that sense the negative employment results for the permanent low-wage workers are potentially 
significant from a policy perspective.
64
Campolieti et al. (2005b) apply a similar methodology to a different data set for the period 1993-
1999 and find results more consistent with negative employment effects.  In particular, these authors use 
longitudinal data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics to examine the effect of 
provincial changes in minimum wage on the transitions from employment to nonemployment among low-
wage youths.  As in Yuen (2003) and the earlier U.S. studies, the paper defines an “at risk” group as 
consisting of those youths who resided in a province in which the minimum wage changes between year 
t-1 and year t and whose initial wage was between the old and new minimum wage.  They then compare 
transition probabilities for these individuals with a control group consisting of young workers who 
resided in provinces in which the minimum wage did not change during that year.  The study presents 
estimates from comparisons with a variety of control groups, ranging from workers with a wage between 
the minimum wage and 25 cents above the minimum to all workers in the control set of province-year 
observations.  In addition, they present evidence from both the standard “affected” indicator minimum 
wage variable and the “wage gap” variable used in previous analyses, as well as a variant that attempts to 
control for within-group heterogeneity by including as an addition control variable, the gap between an 
individual’s wage and the upper bound of the control group wage for individuals in the control group.     
Similar to Yuen, Campolieti et al. find large negative effects from the minimum wage (ranging 
from elasticities of −1.61 to −1.24) when they use all youth workers from other provinces as the control 
group.  However, they also report significant negative effects using low-wage control groups (MW+0.25 
to MW+0.75), with elasticities ranging from −0.83 to −1.68.  Converting these to an overall employment 
elasticity for youths by adjusting for the relative sizes of the “at risk” group and low-wage control groups 
yields elasticity estimates between −0.33 and −0.54.  The authors speculate that their finding of 
                                                 
64 Moreover, the different results for more permanent low-wage workers, if they hold for the United States, could 
help explain the adverse effects of minimum wages on low-income families reported in Neumark et al. (2005), 
since it seems likely that more permanent low-wage workers are likely to be in low-income families. - 64 - 
significant disemployment effects reflects the greater bite of the minimum wage in the 1990s than in 
Yuen’s sample, although they present no direct evidence in support of this potential nonlinearity.   
The question of the impact of the minimum wage on the least-skilled is sometimes framed in 
terms of “labor-labor” substitution—the hypothesis that a rise in the minimum wage prompts employers 
to hire a more-skilled workforce and hence impacts the least-skilled more adversely than might be 
indicated by a standard employment study.  Connolly (2005) focuses on this issue directly.
65  Using SIPP 
data, she finds that the probability that a minimum wage worker (defined as below 130 percent of the 
minimum prior to an increase) has less than a high school degree increases in states where the minimum 
wage increases, but is unchanged in states without increases.  She concludes that “the low-educated 
minimum wage workers benefit proportionally more than the high-educated” (p. 17)  But when the 
minimum wage increases, there is likely to be reduced demand for less-skilled workers, and increased 
demand for more-skilled workers.  In this case, the relative reduction in the share of minimum wage 
workers with higher education does not necessarily mean they are being displaced, but instead that they 
are now earning higher wages, as demand for more-skilled workers increase and their wages are bid up.  
Indeed her difference-in-difference estimates (Tables 6 and 7) are consistent with this.  For males, 
minimum wage increases are associated with a higher rate of transition out of minimum wage jobs and 
into higher-wage jobs for those with more education, while transitions from above-minimum wage jobs 
into minimum wage jobs occur at a higher rate for those with less education.  For females, the differences 
are much smaller or non-existent, implying that the qualitative results for males hold for the whole 
sample.  Thus, her findings could arise simply from increased demand for more-educated workers in 
above minimum wage jobs.
66
                                                 
65 Lang and Kahn (1998) study the effect of the minimum wage on the distribution of employment between 
teenagers/students and adults working at the minimum wage.  Their model predicts shifts in employment toward 
the more-skilled.  They find some evidence that employment shifts towards teenagers and students, who may well 
be more skilled than adults at minimum wage jobs.   
66 The analysis is also potentially flawed because it focuses only on out-of-school individuals, and as noted earlier 
there are important flows of teenagers between schooling and employment induced by minimum wage increases. - 65 - 
Other Issues and Approaches  
 
We close by highlighting a few new avenues for research on the employment effects of minimum 
wages.  First, relatively recent changes in the low-wage labor market may have complicated the analysis 
of the minimum wage.  In particular, the expansion of the earned-income tax credit during the 1990s 
provided many workers from low-income families with additional monetary incentives to work, while the 
welfare reforms enacted in the mid-1990s included a number of work-requirement provisions.  Because 
these developments often coincided with minimum wage increases, disentangling their effects can be 
difficult.   Moreover, such policy-related changes in the low-wage work environment may have changed 
the way in which minimum wages influence employment of low-wage workers with particular 
characteristics.  That is, there may be important policy interactions between minimum wages and other 
policies affecting the low-wage labor market.  We view this as a promising research agenda that has, as of 
yet, received little attention.
67
  Second, there is a budding literature on the effects of minimum wages in structural equilibrium 
search models; prominent examples include van den Berg and Ridder (1998), Flinn (2006), and Ahn et al. 
(2005).
68  These types of studies can provide answers about both employment effects and welfare effects, 
although the answers are highly dependent on the underlying assumptions.  For example, the Flinn paper 
yields very different results depending on whether the “contact rate” (i.e., the arrival rate of contacts to 
job searchers) is endogenous or not.  When it is exogenous, employment (of 16-24 year-olds) is 
increasing in the minimum wage up to about $8 (in data from the period when the federal minimum went 
from $4.25 to $5.15), and minimum wages increase welfare.  But when the contact rate is treated as 
endogenous, the minimum wage reduces employment sharply, even at a minimum wage of $5, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Also, although not the focus of her paper, Connolly also reports results that she claims are consistent with minimum 
wages increasing employment.  In particular, she reports that there was a larger increase in minimum wage 
employment following a minimum wage increase in affected states than in control states.  But if the minimum 
wage increases, more workers are “caught” below the new minimum wage (or in her case, the new minimum 
wage plus 30 percent).  This says nothing about what happens to overall employment.  Nor does the result that 
among high school dropouts minimum wage employment increased more in states raising the minimum than did 
minimum wage employment among more-educated groups imply that the less-educated gained.  More of the less-
educated are caught by any increase in the minimum. 
67 See Neumark and Wascher (in progress).   
68 Arcidiacono and Ahn (2004) present a simplified discussion of such a model. - 66 - 
welfare is decreasing in the minimum wage for a minimum above $3.33.  Furthermore, the data have 
difficultly distinguishing between these two cases.   
  As should be obvious by now, we do not focus on this literature in our review.  Rather, we focus 
on research that, as Flinn accurately states it, pursues “the more limited objective of carefully describing 
the observed effects of recent minimum wage changes using quasi-experimental methods” (2006, p. 
1013).  We do this in part because most of the debate about minimum wages focuses on the latter types of 
studies, and it is a sufficiently daunting challenge to summarize and synthesize this literature, and in part 
because we find the results from this approach more defensible, while recognizing the limitations of what 
this approach can tell us.  We also feel that, given the types of results described above, the search 
approach to minimum wages is as yet highly dependent on unsettled theoretical questions regarding 
model specification, and we do not know how to discern the validity of alternative estimates.  Finally, to 
be honest, we know our comparative advantage and disadvantage.  Clearly researchers better versed in 
these methods can provide a much more informative discussion of the alternative types of results one gets 
from these models, the key assumptions underlying the results, and the evidence—to the extent that it 
exists—on their validity.   
  We are struck, however, by the extent to which at least some of this work appears to be primarily 
motivated by a sense that the new minimum wage research establishes positive employment effects of 
minimum wages and that this evidence seriously undermines the standard competitive model (which is 
not based on an equilibrium search framework).  For example, Flinn describes the recent evidence as 
“indicating that the “textbook” competitive model of the labor market, which has been used as an 
interpretive framework for the bulk of the empirical work performed using aggregated time series data, 
may have serious deficiencies in accounting for minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes when 
confronted with disaggregated information” (2006, pp. 1013-4).  Based on the evidence reviewed thus far 
(and the international evidence that follows), we are much less convinced that the textbook model cannot 
account for the existing findings, although the equilibrium search approach may still turn out to provide 
valuable insights and a better accounting of the evidence.   - 67 - 
Third, some very recent research has focused on testing for monopsony via evidence on prices, 
which is an indirect approach to exploring whether minimum wages could lead to employment increases.  
In particular, Aaronson et al. (2005) and Aaronson and French (forthcoming) consider such evidence for 
the restaurant industry, for which some evidence suggesting positive employment effects has prompted 
some researchers to suggest monopsony explanations.  Aaronson et al. (2005) present evidence that 
minimum wage increases lead to price increases.  In the standard competitive model, minimum wage 
increases cause prices to rise and employment to fall.  The authors consider alternative monopsony 
models as well as efficiency wage models that have a similar flavor (e.g., Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995), and 
show that these models generally imply that prices either fall or do not change in response to a minimum 
wage increase, if employment rises.  One exception is in monopsony models where there is a good deal of 
firm exit in response to a minimum wage increase, in which case prices and employment can rise.  
However, they discount this possibility based on what they claim are small observed exit rates in this 
sector, although they do not present direct evidence on exit or on how much would be needed to overturn 
their result.
69   
Based on their findings, Aaronson and French (forthcoming) calculate employment effects in the 
restaurant industry via a calibrated competitive model of the labor market.  They find that with their 
calibrated substitution elasticities, the benchmark competitive model that is consistent with the price 
increases found in the earlier paper predicts an employment elasticity for low-skilled workers with respect 
to the minimum wage of around −0.35.  They then augment the model so that employers have some 
monopsony power in the labor market, but—based on the earlier paper on price responses—few 
employers increase employment in response to the minimum wage.  This results in only slightly smaller 
employment elasticities.  Together, they suggest that their results provide evidence against the view that 
                                                 
69 Another exception, which they do not address, is Wessels (1997), who presents a model of monopsony 
in the restaurant industry based on the notion that with tipped workers, tip income is inversely related to 
the number of servers, so that base wages have to be raised for all workers when employment increases.  
This model implies that a minimum wage increase for tipped workers will raise their employment over 
some range, but because average wage costs also increase, cause prices to rise as well.  Although 
Wessels does not analyze price effects directly, he does find that the ratio of employment to sales in the 
restaurant industry (which he views as a proxy for total hours of servers) is positively related to state-
specific tipped minimum wage for relatively low levels of the minimum wage. - 68 - 
monopsony power can explain findings of employment effects near zero in studies of the restaurant 
industry.  This, in turn, either casts further doubt on such findings, or, if such findings are correct, 
suggests that the model is incorrect.   
Of course, the standard monopsony model implies that if the minimum wage is set high enough 
we will see higher prices and reduced employment, just like in the competitive model.  In this case, 
however, the monopsony model cannot be used to explain apparent evidence of zero or positive 
employment effects of minimum wages, so those arguing for a monopsony-based explanation must 
implicitly believe that the minimum wage is in the range where employment will increase, in which case 
prices should not rise.  Aaronson et al. therefore regard their results for prices as rejecting arguments that 
monopsony power in the restaurant industry can explain zero or positive effects of minimum wages on 
employment.  Of course, as the earlier discussion suggest, the evidence for the restaurant industry is, on 
balance, more consistent with negative effects of minimum wages on employment.     
VI. International Evidence 
The international evidence on minimum wages is large and growing, and covers industrialized 
and developing countries.  We cannot cover the international evidence as extensively as we do the 
evidence for the United States, if for no other reason than that some of the studies are written in languages 
other than English.
70  Our review of the international evidence may therefore provide a less reliable 
description of the “distribution” of estimated employment effects of minimum wages across studies.  In 
this section, we begin with a review of the evidence for the industrialized countries, and then turn to 
studies of developing countries.
71  As we have already discussed the available evidence for Canada and 
Sweden, we do not repeat that material here, although we do include the findings in the summary table.   
Industrialized Countries 
                                                 
70 The language barrier is not necessarily innocuous.  For example, in our study of minimum wage effects in the 
OECD countries (Neumark and Wascher, 2004, discussed below), we find that three of the four countries with 
institutional settings most likely to lead to negative effects of minimum wages on employment are English-
speaking countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada), and that the two other English-speaking 
countries (Australia and New Zealand) are in the set of countries with institutions that are also relatively 
conducive to disemployment effects.     
71 There is also some emerging work on the effects of the minimum wage in transition economies (e.g., Eriksson and 
Pytlikova, 2004), which we do not cover in this survey.     - 69 - 
Panel Studies     
  Two studies estimate minimum wage effects using data from a panel of industrialized countries, 
essentially paralleling the state-level panel data studies for the United States.  The first such study is a 
report written by economists at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 
1998), who motivate their use of international comparisons to study the employment effects of minimum 
wages by noting that national wage floors vary considerably more across countries than across time 
within a country.
72  The study begins by summarizing minimum wage setting and levels in OECD 
countries that have a national minimum wage.
73  The authors then construct a measure of the relative 
minimum wage by dividing the nominal minimum wage by median earnings of full-time workers.
74  This 
ratio, which varied in 1997 from 0.36 in Spain to 0.69 in France, is used as the minimum wage variable in 
a set of pooled regressions using data for seven or nine countries from 1975 to 1996.
75  In particular, the 
authors regress the employment-population ratio on the relative minimum wage; a business cycle control 
(either the prime-age male unemployment rate or the output gap); institutional factors such as union 
density, the unemployment benefit replacement rate, and the payroll tax rate; and fixed country and year 
effects.   The authors’ preferred specifications, which also control for country-specific serial correlation 
and heteroscedasticity, generally show negative and statistically significant disemployment effects for 
teenagers, and negative but only marginally significant or insignificant effects for 20-24 year-olds.  The 
estimated employment elasticities for teenagers range from −0.07 to −0.41, with the larger estimates 
evident in the sample that excludes Portugal and Spain.  For 20-24 year-olds, the elasticities range from 
−0.03 to −0.10, with only the latter estimate statistically significant at conventional levels.  The study also 
reports results for adults showing no effect of the minimum wage on their employment. 
                                                 
72 See also Hamermesh (2002). 
73 Bazen (2000) also provides details on minimum wage setting in various OECD countries.   
74 For a few countries, median earnings are not available 
75 The countries included in the regression are Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and the United States.  A lack of data for Portugal and Spain limited some of the analyses to the other 
seven countries.  - 70 - 
Although the OECD study includes a few variables to account for institutional differences across 
countries, critics of the cross-country approach stress the difficulty of distinguishing the impact of 
minimum wages from other labor market policies and institutions and stress the importance of 
considering how the latter may influence the impact of the minimum wage.  In a general sense, a large 
literature has explored the variation across the industrialized countries in other labor market policies and 
institutions, with Scarpetta (1996) and Nickell and Layard (1999), among others, presenting cross-country 
evidence on the effects of a variety of labor market institutions on employment and unemployment, and 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Belot and Van Ours (2001) emphasizing potential interactions 
between institutions and economic shocks, and between different types of labor market institutions.  From 
a theoretical standpoint, Coe and Snower (1997) develop a model in which various labor market 
policies—including the minimum wage—can have complementary effects on labor market outcomes.     
To address these criticisms, we studied the effects of minimum wages across a larger number 
(seventeen) of the OECD countries (Neumark and Wascher, 2004), taking account of variation in a 
variety of labor market policies and institutions.  The inclusion of additional countries in the analysis 
increases the variation in the minimum wage variable; for example, in the last year of data for each 
country the relative minimum wage ranges from 0.32 to 0.71, and changes within countries over the 
sample period range from −0.18 to 0.08, with five countries exhibiting declines of 0.1 or greater.  But it 
also increases the variation in the institutional variables included in the model, thus increasing 
identification along that dimension as well. 
The study begins with the standard panel data specification for the employment model, including 
a one-year lag of the minimum wage relative to the average wage, aggregate labor market and 
demographic controls, fixed country and year effects, and country-specific time trends.  However, we also 
estimate a dynamic specification that includes a lagged employment rate.  The models are estimated for 
teenagers (aged 15-19) and youths (aged 15-24), with data extending from the mid-1970’s through about - 71 - 
2000.
76  The results consistently point to negative effects of the minimum wage on employment.  For the 
standard model, the estimated short-run elasticities range from −0.18 to −0.24 for teenagers and from 
−0.13 to −0.16 for youths, with all of these estimates statistically significant.  The estimated long-run 
elasticities from the dynamic specification are somewhat larger: roughly −0.40 for teenagers and −0.23 
for youths. 
  The models are then augmented to control for institutional differences in other characteristics of 
minimum wage policies in each country, as well as for cross-country differences in other labor market 
policies.  Following the theoretical argument of Coe and Snower, we also include interactions of the 
minimum wage with indicators for these institutional and policy differences.  With regard to minimum 
wage systems, the strongest evidence is that the negative effect of the minimum wage on teenage or youth 
employment appears only in countries without a youth subminimum, consistent with the possibility that a 
higher minimum wage might actually induce substitution toward young workers in such cases.  There is 
also evidence, although somewhat weaker, that minimum wages do not result in employment losses in 
countries in which minimum wages are set by some type of national collective bargaining process.  This 
evidence is consistent with the argument that collective bargaining takes more explicit account of (and 
hence avoids) potential disemployment effects in setting minimum wages.   
We also interact the minimum wage variable with country-specific measures of the rigidity of 
labor standards (e.g., legislated working time rules, worker representation rights, and restrictions on the 
use of contract workers), the strength of employment protection regulations, the use of active labor 
market policies by the government, union density, and the generosity of unemployment insurance.  In 
accordance with expectations, minimum wages have more adverse effects when labor standards are more 
restrictive, presumably because in the presence of rigidities more adjustment comes through employment 
(although the differences are typically not significant).  Conversely, there is quite strong evidence that 
                                                 
76 The precise years as well as the age ranges vary slightly across countries.   - 72 - 
when employment protection is high, the disemployment effects of minimum wages are muted.
77  The 
same is true when active labor market policies are more prevalent, presumably because some of those 
who would otherwise be considered non-employed are instead participating in these programs.  Finally, 
minimum wages are estimated to have more adverse employment effects when union density is high, 
possibly reflecting greater power of incumbent workers (Coe and Snower, 1997); in contrast, Dolado et 
al. (1996) suggest that sources of wage compression—such as unions—can make the minimum wage less 
relevant because they reduce the share of workers at or near the minimum.
78   
Finally, we use these characteristics of labor market policies to classify countries along two 
dimensions: high versus low labor standards, and high versus low employment protection or active labor 
market policies.  For example, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada fall into the 
quadrant with low standards and low protection, while Germany, Italy, Sweden, Spain, and France fall 
into the quadrant where both are high.  The estimates implied by the interactive specifications and by 
models fit for the separate sets of countries indicate that negative employment effects are the strongest for 
the least regulated economies, although the disemployment effects also show up to some extent in 
countries with high labor standards but low employment protection/active labor market policies.  For the 
other countries in the sample, the estimated effects are zero or positive.  These results clearly indicate that 
the effects of minimum wages can vary considerably depending on the presence of other labor market 
institutions, and they suggest—perhaps not surprisingly—that the neoclassical prediction about 
disemployment effects of minimum wages holds most strongly for the economies in which labor markets 
are less regulated.  
Studies of Individual Industrialized Countries  
  Although the country panel studies yield some interesting findings, it is difficult to effectively 
capture the institutional and policy environment of any particular country with a few regressors and their 
                                                 
77 Dolado et al. (1996) also discuss some of these issues, pointing out, for example, that with higher firing costs, 
adjustments of employment to minimum wages may be smaller or slower.   
78 Of course, a “fraction below” the minimum measure would capture this phenomenon, so in this case the findings 
for the interactive effects may depend on the specification of the minimum wage variable, an issue we have not 
explored.   - 73 - 
interactions, making these studies less informative about the effects of the minimum wage on 
employment in a given country.  To provide this evidence, which is of greater relevance to policymakers, 
researchers have conducted studies of minimum wage effects for a number of specific European 
countries.  Because most European countries have a uniform minimum wage that varies only over time, 
the challenge is to identify an appropriate control group, similar to the issues that confronted U.S. 
researchers prior to the proliferation of state-specific minimum wages.  However, there a few countries in 
which the minimum wage varies by age or industry.   
Many of the first-generation country-specific studies are reviewed and discussed in Dolado et al. 
(1996), so we do not repeat that material here.  Instead, we focus on the more recent evidence of 
minimum wage effects in Europe, including new evidence that Dolado et al. report.
79  We review most 
extensively the evidence for the United Kingdom, for which there has been a large number of interesting 
studies.  Some of the U.K. studies found no negative effects of minimum wages or even positive effects, 
and these results seem to have played an important role in undermining the earlier consensus among 
economists that minimum wages reduced employment.  Moreover, the authors of these papers have been 
influential in promoting monopsony explanations of their findings (see especially Manning, 2003)—not 
in the context of the company town of labor economics textbooks, but in dynamic monopsony models 
along the lines of those developed by Burdett and Mortensen (1998).     
 United  Kingdom.  The United Kingdom experienced two policy changes that provide potentially 
useful variation for identifying the effects of minimum wages.  Prior to the early 1990’s the United 
Kingdom had a system of Wages Councils, which consisted of equal numbers of employer and worker 
representatives as well as independent members appointed by the government, and which set minimum 
wages in low-wage sectors.  However, the Wages Councils were abolished in 1993, and from 1993 to 
1998 there was no minimum wage in the U.K.  Subsequently, in 1999, a national minimum wage was 
introduced.   
                                                 
79 The paper appears to present analyses for a number of countries each conducted by a subset of the paper’s eight 
authors. - 74 - 
In their 1994 paper and a later paper co-authored with Richard Dickens (Dickens et al., 1999), 
Stephen Machin and Alan Manning study the period from 1979-1992, during which minimum wages 
declined relative to average wages in the eighteen industries covered by the Wages Councils.
80  These 
authors first establish that minimum wages were binding by verifying that an increase in the minimum 
wage in each Council-year observation raised wages at the bottom of that sector’s wage distribution.  This 
result is particularly important because the authors include all workers in an industry in their study rather 
than just teenagers or young adults.  In addition, earlier research had raised questions about the Wages 
Councils’ ability to enforce minimum wage rates, which these results appear to put to rest.  The papers 
then report one-year first difference regressions of the change in log employment on the change in the log 
of the minimum wage relative to the average wage in each sector.  For the low-wage sector as a whole, 
these models consistently yield positive estimated employment effects, which are in some cases 
statistically significant, and often quite large, with elasticities as high as 0.43.  Moreover, the estimates 
remain positive when lags are included.  
There are legitimate questions about the source of minimum wage variation in these data.  
Committees of workers and owners may set minimum wages in such a way that boosts the pay of low-
wage workers when conditions in the industry are (or are projected to be) good and not when conditions 
are bad, which would impart a positive bias to estimates of the employment effects.  On the other hand, 
the authors’ minimum wage variable is a relative wage measure, so the story would have to be more 
complicated than just raising the minimum wage in response to a general increase in demand.  Of course 
the potential problem of the endogeneity of minimum wage increases is not unique to this study, and is 
one that we regard as an important unanswered question more generally.  However, we suspect that this 
problem is more likely to be arise in the context of the U.K. Wages Councils than in cases where 
minimum wages are enacted by legislatures (for which there often seems to be more regard for political 
than economic timing).    
                                                 
80 The empirical analyses in these two papers are very similar, and the qualitative conclusions are the same.  Our 
discussion focuses on the more recent paper, which is based on a slightly longer time period and, in some 
specifications, includes lags.  - 75 - 
The Dickens et al. paper acknowledges the endogeneity problem.  The authors cite discussions 
with independent members of Wages Councils (although in a footnote they only mention one) as 
indicating that “the method of minimum-wage fixing was generally rather crude, using only recent pay 
settlements and inflation figures and making no attempt to forecast future market conditions” (p. 8).  That 
anecdote provides some reassurance, although more systematic evidence on what influenced the 
minimum pay rates set by Wages Councils—admittedly, no simple task—would be preferable.  In any 
event, while the potential for endogeneity bias in these studies is of some concern, it does not follow that 
such a bias would be large enough to overturn Machin and Manning’s finding that the minimum wages 
set by Wages Councils in the United Kingdom had positive employment effects.  At the same time, one 
should be cautious in presuming that these results carry over to the effects of legislated minimum wage 
changes, especially when they are nationwide. 
Although Dickens et al. are inclined towards a monopsony interpretation of their findings, 
presumably based on their significant positive estimates, the specifications that show the largest positive 
effects are also arguably the least defensible.  In particular, many of the specifications estimated by the 
authors include a control for sales in the industry covered by the Wages Council.  However, conditioning 
the results on sales is problematic because the main channel through which the minimum wage is thought 
to influence employment is by raising labor costs and prices, which reduces product and labor demand.  
The authors do instrument for sales with lags in order to remove the contemporaneous endogeneity 
between sales and employment.
81  However, their reduced-form estimates, which are generally smaller 
and not statistically significant, strike us as more meaningful.    
Moreover, even taking their positive estimates at face value, it is not apparent to us that the 
evidence favors the monopsony model.  As we have documented, a number of papers that report zero or 
                                                 
81 We are skeptical of this approach in dynamic panel data models because the identifying assumptions are 
conditional on the exclusion of lagged values from the equation of interest, yet theory provides little guidance in 
specifying the appropriate lag length of the underlying model.  The same issue arises when they instrument for 
minimum wages with lags.  They note that there is reason—as discussed above—to believe that minimum wages 
are driven by past minimum wages.  However, that does not imply that lagged minimum wages can be excluded 
from the employment equation.   - 76 - 
positive effects of minimum wages appeal to monopsony in a general way.  However, putting aside 
questions about the empirical methods used in some of these papers, non-negative estimates can arise by 
statistical chance, and even in a competitive setting, an increase in the minimum wage can raise 
employment in a specific industry.  As a result, we think that more convincing evidence in favor of the 
monopsony model requires the researcher to tie more explicitly the variation in minimum wage effects to 
monopsony power—i.e., to show that the positive effects predicted over some range of the minimum 
wage actually arise over that range—or to provide additional evidence that confirms or contradicts other 
explicit predictions of the monopsony model (as, for example, in Aaronson and French, forthcoming).  
Dickens et al. take a small step in this direction.  They develop a stylized theoretical model that predicts, 
as does the textbook monopsony model, that below some level a higher minimum wage will increase 
employment, while above this level a higher minimum wage will reduce employment.  They then report 
evidence that the positive effects of the minimum wage on employment are stronger at low values of the 
minimum wage, while the effect of the minimum wage on employment is essentially zero at higher levels 
of the minimum.  However, this is not really what the model predicts, and so, in the end, the 
correspondence between the empirical findings in the paper and the theoretical implications of the 
monopsony model is not particularly compelling.  Regardless, we think this is at least a step in what we 
consider a useful direction of inquiry.
82   
  Moving chronologically through the changes in minimum wage policy in the United Kingdom, 
Dolado et al. (1996) present evidence stemming from the abolition of the Wages Councils in 1993.  The 
authors find that eliminating the minimum wage did not result in sharp declines in wages in these sectors, 
or (in the retail sector, which they examine more closely) to the disappearance of a spike in the wage 
distribution at the minimum wage, although the spike became less pronounced.  As the authors point out, 
however, employers may have been reluctant to cut nominal wages for their current employees, and 
                                                 
82 As noted above, we presented some related evidence in Neumark and Wascher (2002) suggesting that some state-
year observations could be characterized as being on the upward-sloping portion of the labor supply curve, but 
that the monopsony model, in general, does not fit the data significantly better than a competitive model.  - 77 - 
relative wage concerns may have limited the willingness of employers to bring in new workers at wage 
rates below the minimums previously set by the Wages Councils.   
Turning to employment effects, the authors present data on the share of total employment 
accounted for by the Wages Councils industries before and after the abolition of the Councils and 
compare hiring rates and exit rates in industries covered by Wages Councils with the equivalent rates in 
industries not covered by the Councils.  Using data three quarters prior to the abolition of the Wages 
Councils and two quarters afterwards, they conclude that “There is no noticeable change in the behaviour 
of the Wages Council sector relative to the rest of the economy” (1996, p. 355).  However, we do not read 
the evidence this way.  Using average employment totals for the three quarters before and two quarters 
after the abolition of the Wages Councils, it is clear that employment grew more rapidly in the Wages 
Councils industries following the elimination of the minimum wage; employment in this sector grew by 
1.29 percent, while falling trivially (by 0.04 percent) in the non-Wages Councils sector (Table 10).  
Moreover, a similar conclusion is evident from the data on hiring and exit rates.  The average hiring rate 
in the Wages Council sector during the three quarters preceding abolition exceeded the hiring rate in other 
industries by 2.69 percentage points, while the average exit rate in the Wages Councils sector exceeded 
the exit rate in the other sectors by 2.58 percentage points; that is, hiring and turnover were both higher by 
roughly the same amount—not surprising for low-wage industries.  But in the post-Councils period, the 
difference between hiring rates in the two sectors rose sharply to 3.67 percentage points, while the 
difference in exit rates rose only negligibly to 2.88 percentage points (Table 11).  Because the difference 
in hiring rates increased by more than the difference in exit rates, a simple difference-in-difference 
estimate suggests that the abolition of the Wages Councils led to a relative increase in employment in the 
Wages Council sector, consistent with disemployment effects of minimum wages (as well as the  
employment data by industry).   
Finally, a number of recent studies have examined the effects of minimum wages using the 
variation associated with the introduction of a national minimum wage in April 1999.  Machin et al. 
(2003) focus on the low-wage residential care home (nursing home) sector in the period from nine months - 78 - 
before to nine months after the minimum wage was implemented.  Although not central to their paper, the 
authors first describe the behavior of aggregate employment in this sector, which trended up rather 
strongly from 1994 through 1999 and then flattened out; this pattern is evident in the data even after 
controlling for the aggregate unemployment rate and despite the fact that demand, in the form of the 
number of people aged 75 and over, likely kept rising.
83  Although suggestive of a negative effect of the 
minimum wage on employment, this simple analysis ignores other changes that may have influenced the 
nursing home sector during this time period and does not establish that employment fell at the 
establishments that were more strongly impacted by the minimum wage.   
To study the latter question, the authors conducted a survey of nursing homes and collected data 
on employment, hours, and wages at each establishment.  The authors then measure the extent to which 
the minimum wage was binding at each establishment by calculating both the share of workers initially 
paid less than the minimum and the average wage gap (hours weighted).  Although the response rate to 
the survey was low (20 percent), the data suggest that the introduction of the minimum wage boosted 
wages in this sector.  In addition, the evidence on employment and hours points to adverse effects of the 
minimum wage on both.  The estimated employment effects are mostly statistically significant and range 
from −0.08 to −0.39.
84  Reiterating the point we made about other studies of specific industries, these 
estimates are not necessarily informative about the overall employment effects of minimum wages on 
low-skill individuals.  However, they do seem to establish that conventional effects of minimum wages 
can be found in the low-wage sector in the United Kingdom.  Exactly why these findings differ from 
those reported in the studies of the Wages Councils is unclear, although the focus of this study on a single 
sector limits its comparability to the earlier research.  Arguably, though, this is a better research design for 
                                                 
83 They do not report the aggregate regression with this control as well, which we suspect would suggest even more 
of a downturn.   
84 The authors also speculate that the effects might be larger over the longer term.  In this context, they report 
evidence suggesting that the minimum wage boosted closures, although these estimates were not statistically 
significant.  Machin and Wilson (2004) extend this analysis to include the 2001 increase in the minimum wage 
and report similar results for both employment and closures. - 79 - 
a policy change that the authors describe as a “very good testing ground for evaluating the economic 
effects of minimum wages” (p. 155).   
In a series of papers, Stewart (2002, 2004a, and 2004b) and Stewart and Swaffield (2006) provide 
a broader investigation of the effects of introducing the national minimum wage in the United Kingdom.  
For example, Stewart (2002) follows the approach taken by Card (1992a) to test whether employment 
changes differed across 140 geographic areas in which the introduction of the national minimum wage 
had a varying impact on wages.  He first uses information from the New Earnings Survey to document 
that wages at the bottom of the wage distribution increased more following the introduction of the 
minimum wage in areas that had a larger share of workers paid below the new minimum.
85  Stewart then 
uses a “fraction affected” variable to test for the presence of employment effects.  He also presents results 
from a difference-in-difference estimator that compares employment changes in high wage areas with 
employment changes in low wage areas.   
For workers covered by the minimum wage (ages 18 and over), Stewart’s estimates of the effect 
of the minimum wage on employment are generally negative, but not statistically significant.  However, 
his point estimates are suggestive of potentially sizable effects.  For example, the estimate in the first row 
of Table 3 indicates that the difference-in-difference employment effect between high- and low-impact 
areas is a 0.02 reduction in the employment rate, while the wage estimates indicate that wages at the 5
th 
and 10
th percentile rose about five percent following the introduction of the minimum wage.  If we treat 
this wage increase as the effective increase in the minimum, then the implied elasticity is −0.4.
86  The fact 
that an estimate this large is not detectable as statistically significant suggests that the data Stewart uses, 
coupled with his research design, is uninformative.   
                                                 
85 Because there are relatively small samples of workers in some areas, this finding might also reflect regression to 
the mean.  This possibility could have been explored by examining evidence on wage declines among the highest 
wage areas, or by showing that the same result at the lower end of the wage distribution did not emerge in years 
prior to the imposition of the national minimum wage.  For example, Machin et al. (2003) do the latter exercise 
for nursing home workers, and find some relationship, albeit a weaker one, in the period prior to the national 
minimum wage being imposed. 
86 Stewart also reports estimates for youths, and finds either weak positive or weak negative effects.  But the 1999 
legislation included a youth subminimum, which may have induced substitution towards young workers. - 80 - 
Stewart also estimates employment models for a variety of low-wage groups of workers (women, 
those with less tenure, less-skilled occupations, etc.), to see if the impact of the minimum wage is more 
apparent for workers more likely to be affected by it.  In general, the estimated effects are smaller, more 
often positive than negative, and never significant.  However, the samples are considerably smaller for 
these subgroups, and the paper does not present any evidence on the effects of the new minimum on 
wages for these groups.  Finally, most of the employment models are estimated only over the one-year 
window surrounding the introduction of the new minimum wage, which may not be long enough to 
observe an effect on employment.
87  This short-term focus is not different from many other studies, but 
given the evidence for lagged effects in other studies, it would have been preferable for the employment 
analysis to cover a period at least as long as the wage analysis, if not longer.   
Stewart (2004a) looks at the effects for workers in different parts of the wage distribution prior to 
the minimum wage’s introduction, building on the framework used in Abowd et al. (1999), Neumark et 
al. (2004), and Yuen (2003).  In particular, he uses a standard difference-in-differences approach, 
comparing the change in the probability of a transition from employment to non-employment for those 
initially paid less than the new minimum wage with the change in transition probabilities for workers who 
were initially paid just above the new minimum wage; the analysis of multiple periods is needed because 
lower-wage workers may generally have higher transitions to non-employment for reasons unrelated to 
the minimum wage.  One potential drawback to this identification strategy is the possibility that aggregate 
influences on transition probabilities may differ across the groups.  However, because the minimum wage 
variation is national, there is no way to control for these with year effects, in contrast to what one can do 
when there is regional minimum wage variation.   
The empirical analysis uses three different data sources.  Stewart first establishes, using the same 
empirical framework, that the introduction of the minimum wage boosted wages of those whose wages 
were initially below the minimum.  Turning to the results for employment, he consistently finds small and 
                                                 
87 The exception is the analysis of data from the New Earnings Survey (NES), for which the analysis focuses only on 
employment changes among those individuals who were initially employed. - 81 - 
insignificant effects that are generally positive for men and more mixed for women, and he presents a 
variety of robustness checks that yield the same answer.  However, Stewart does not consider the 
possibility that minimum wage effects on employment may occur with a lag.  Of the three data sets, one 
(the NES) ends in the same month as the imposition of the minimum, one extends eight months beyond 
this month, and the third extends eleven months beyond it, raising questions about whether the sample 
period is too short to adequately pick up the full impact of the minimum wage.
88  Of course, as we 
emphasized earlier, the papers that use this approach fail to provide evidence on the effects of minimum 
wages on transitions into employment, and hence on the overall employment effects of the minimum 
wage. 
Stewart and Swaffield (2006) extend the analysis to an investigation of the effects of the 
minimum wage on hours worked by workers who remained employed, appealing both to the U.S. studies 
suggesting that the minimum wage reduced hours worked and to reports by the Low Pay Commission that 
many U.K. employers responded to the introduction of the minimum wage by reducing hours.  This paper 
uses the same empirical framework as in Stewart (2004a), but includes a lagged effect of the minimum 
wage on hours.  The estimates show a small and insignificant contemporaneous effect of the minimum 
wage on hours, paralleling the employment results in the earlier papers.  However, the evidence also 
suggests that the longer-run effects of the minimum wage are more adverse.  In particular, the lagged 
effect on hours is always negative, larger in absolute value, and generally, although not always, 
statistically significant.  Summarizing the results, Stewart and Swaffield conclude that the minimum wage 
led to reductions of one to two hours per week for affected workers.
89  However, the evidence of lagged 
minimum wage effects on hours raises the question of whether there might also be lagged effects on 
                                                 
88 In a brief note, Stewart (2004b) extends this analysis to include the 2000 and 2001 increases in the minimum 
wage.  However, this analysis also focuses only on the short-run effects of minimum wages.  This paper also 
attempts to account for the possibility that macroeconomic influences may had different effects on the transition 
rates of affected and non-affected workers.  However, the identification strategy used for this purpose requires 
rather strong assumptions, and, of course, this is not the only source of potential differences in changes for higher-
wage and lower-wage workers.  
89 The authors do not report the mean level of hours in their sample, but if we assume that the average workweek is 
30 hours, then the decline in hours is on the order of three to seven percent.  Using our earlier calculation that 
places the effective minimum wage increase at about five percent, we get implied elasticities ranging from about 
−0.6 to roughly −1.4.   - 82 - 
employment, and, in this regard, it is surprising that this paper did not consider this possibility, especially 
given that the contemporaneous effects on hours were similar to what Stewart’s earlier papers showed for 
employment.   
Connolly and Gregory (2002) also study the effects of the introduction of the national minimum 
wage on hours, although they limit their analysis to women.  The authors employ a very similar empirical 
approach to Stewart (and Swaffield) and use many of the same datasets (although they include a slightly 
longer time frame).  Their results are mixed.  The difference-in-differences estimates using the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) are positive but not statistically significant.  In contrast, the estimates 
based on the NES show essentially no effect in the year in which the minimum wage introduced, but 
negative effects two and three years after the minimum wage was introduced; these results more closely 
resemble those reported by Stewart and Swaffield.  The source of the differences between the estimates 
from the two datasets is not readily apparent, as the second-year NES estimates should roughly 
correspond to the BHPS estimates.  However, the authors note that the NES has the advantage of much 
larger sample size (60,000 women per year versus 3,000 in the BHPS).     
Aside from the United States, the effect of minimum wages on employment has probably been 
studied more extensively in the United Kingdom than in any other country.  The research for the United 
Kingdom is particularly significant, in our view, because it seems to be widely cited as providing 
evidence that an increase in the minimum wage either has no effect on, or raises, employment.  What 
conclusions do we take away from our review of the evidence for the United Kingdom?  There is clearly a 
lot of variation in the estimated effects across studies, and, in general, the evidence for significant 
disemployment effects appears to be weaker for the United Kingdom than for the United States.  
However, we see two reasons to be cautious about concluding that minimum wages have not had adverse 
consequences for employment in the United Kingdom, especially with regard to the national minimum.  
First, the evidence based solely on the Wages Councils era, which tends to indicate zero or positive 
effects, would seem to be of only limited relevance to the current policy environment, both because of the 
potential endogeneity bias in those estimates and because of the focus of this research on narrow - 83 - 
industries.  And even then, the evidence from the abolition of the Wages Councils is more consistent with 
disemployment effects.  Second, most of the existing research on the United Kingdom has been limited to 
estimating short-run effects, and, in our view, the question of the longer-run influences of the national 
minimum wage on employment has yet to be adequately addressed; indeed, the research tends to find 
negative effects on hours (of the employed) when lagged effects are allowed.  Thus, we do not think one 
can yet state definitively that the evidence for the United Kingdom points unambiguously in one direction 
or the other, and we would regard it as incorrect to point to the evidence from the United Kingdom as 
making a strong case that the minimum wage does not reduce labor demand. 
Australia.  Although Australia’s labor market is similar in many respects to labor markets in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, it has a relatively complicated set of rules and 
institutions governing wage setting.  Prior to 2005, federal minimum wages were set by the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC), consisting of employer, union, and government representatives 
who determined minimum wage rates based on economic conditions.
90  In particular, the minimum wage 
set in any given industry consisted of a national statutory minimum wage applicable to all industries and 
an additional amount that was dependent on worker productivity.  In addition, state governments were 
permitted to, and often did, set their own minimum wages, although these typically did not apply to all 
workers.  Leigh (2003) studies a series of statutory minimum wage increases enacted by the state 
government in Western Australia between 1994 and 2001.  This minimum wage covered workers not 
covered by the federal minimum wage or other wage agreements or industrial commission awards.  The 
level of the minimum wage in Western Australia was initially below the national minimum, but gradually 
caught up to it over this period.  While the setting is complicated, Leigh argues that the minimum wage 
increases in Western Australia provide exogenous variation that can be used to assess the effects of the 
minimum wage on employment.  Indeed, his discussion of the economic and political conditions 
surrounding these minimum wage increases is a nice example of the type of consideration that should be 
                                                 
90 In 2005, the wage-setting functions of the AIRC were replaced by the Australian Fair Pay Commission, which 
sets a single federal minimum wage for all adult workers.   - 84 - 
given to the potential endogeneity of such increases, absent a more complete solution to the endogeneity 
problem.   
Leigh reports a variety of estimates.  He first constructs short (seven-month) first differences for 
total employment for the periods surrounding each of six minimum wage increases in Western Australia 
and compares these changes to similarly-constructed employment changes outside of Western Australia.  
The difference-in-differences estimates are mostly negative, with elasticities ranging from 0.014 to 
−0.805; in addition, the four largest estimates (ranging from −.381 to −.805) are statistically significant.
91   
Leigh also estimates a pooled model that combines these observations and finds an overall employment 
elasticity of −0.29, which is again statistically significant.  He also estimates models that disaggregate by 
age and sex, to try to isolate those more bound by the minimum wage.  When he disaggregates by age, the 
estimated elasticity is −1.01 for 15-24 year-olds and ranges from −.032 to −.141 for the other age groups; 
however, the estimated effect is significant only for 15-24 year-olds.  In addition, the estimated elasticity 
is larger for young women (−1.426) than for young men (−0.681), although both are statistically 
significant.  The estimated elasticity for 25-34 year-old men is also sizable (−0.238) and significant, while 
the estimates for older ages are generally not significant or positive.  The elasticities that Leigh reports for 
aggregate employment are quite large relative to those found for other industrialized countries, especially 
given his estimate that only about four percent of workers were affected by these changes in the minimum 
wage.  Unfortunately, he does not offer a potential explanation for the size of his estimates, and in the 
absence of such an explanation, the magnitudes of these estimates, at least, might be regarded skeptically.   
A report by Harding and Harding (2004) estimates the effects of states’ increase of their 
minimum wage in 2003, based on surveys of employers with minimum wage workers who report their 
change in employment in a relatively short period following the minimum wage increases, as well as the 
counterfactual regarding how much employment would have changed absent the increases.  They arrive at 
                                                 
91 There have been a series of papers fixing problems in the original paper (Leigh, 2004a), criticizing his work 
(Watson, 2004), and responding to that criticism (Leigh, 2004b).  The paper by Watson speculates about potential 
problems with the study, but he does not present any evidence, and Leigh’s reply suggests that Watson’s 
criticisms have little merit.  Here, we present the corrected estimates in Leigh (2004a).   - 85 - 
a short-run elasticity for minimum wage workers of −0.2.  However, it is unclear whether we should view 
employers’ responses regarding the employment change due to minimum wage increases as reliable.
92   
New Zealand.  New Zealand, like Australia, has a relatively complicated history of minimum 
wages interacting with industry specific mandated wage floors (“awards”).  Prior to 1991, workers in 
many industries were covered by Arbitration Court awards, which fixed a minimum wage for the industry 
that applied to all workers, whether unionized or not.  In 1983, a national minimum wage was enacted for 
workers aged 20 and over.  Initially, given the industry awards, the minimum may not have been relevant 
for many workers.  However, Chapple (1997) cites evidence suggesting that by 1985 the minimum wage 
was high enough to be binding in a number of industries.  In 1991, the industry awards system was 
eliminated, leaving New Zealand with only the national minimum wage.  In March 1994 a subminimum 
wage for teenagers was introduced, initially at 60 percent of the adult minimum.  Finally, in March 2001, 
the minimum wage for 18-19 year-olds was raised to the adult minimum in one step, and the minimum 
wage for 16-17 year-olds was raised to 80 percent of the adult minimum wage in two steps.   
Maloney (1995) reports estimates from relatively standard time-series specifications for teens and 
young adults.  He uses time-series data from the quarterly Household Labour Force Survey, a CPS-style 
dataset, for the period 1985 through 1993.  This short sample period is necessitated by the differences in 
minimum wage setting in earlier years, although it may limit the confidence with which we can infer the 
effects of minimum wages, even aside from the usual problems of time-series analysis of this question.  
                                                 
92 Two other papers for Australia report evidence on minimum wage effects, although both have rather serious 
limitations and thus warrant only a brief mention.  Mangan and Johnston (1999) present panel data evidence 
across states as well as evidence from individual-level census data, on the effects of minimum wages on 15-19 
year-olds.  The first analysis leads to negative but insignificant estimates of employment effects of minimum 
wages, while the second analysis indicates that the minimum wage reduces the probability that of employment, 
with estimates that are generally significant.  However, this study is quite sketchy on the details, with little or no 
detail provided on the source of the minimum wage variation, such as the relationship between minimum wage 
and industrial commission awards, the source of cross-state variation, and the teen minimum (“junior award 
wage”) relative to the minimum wage for other workers.  In addition, a study by Junankar et al. (2000) estimates 
separate time-series regressions on quarterly data for a ten-year period covering 1987-1997, using teen minimum 
wages relative to average weekly earnings for the industry.  The specifications should include minimum wages for 
non-teenagers as well, since it is the spread between the various minimum wages that may drive teen employment 
(the same comment applies to the first paper).  The authors report negative effects of minimum wages on total 
hours worked by some groups of teenagers in retail, but little other evidence of either positive or negative 
employment effects.  However, the elasticities they report are sometimes extraordinarily large, exceeding 5 or 
even 10 in absolute value for the retail sector.     - 86 - 
Because the minimum wage in effect in this period only covered workers aged 20 and over, it provides an 
opportunity to test whether the minimum wage induced employers to substitute away from young adults 
and towards teenagers.  Indeed, Maloney finds evidence of a significant negative effect of the minimum 
wage on employment of young adults, with an elasticity of −0.35, and a significant positive effect on 
teens, with an elasticity of 0.69.  Weighted by the employment rates of the two groups, these elasticities 
imply that the employment declines among young adults were closely balanced by the employment gains 
among teens, suggesting that workers in these age groups are close substitutes.  Furthermore, when 
Maloney restricts the sample to less-educated young adults, he finds a much larger disemployment 
elasticity (−0.57) than for young adults as a whole, suggesting that the adverse employment effect of the 
minimum wage falls mainly on them (although he never presents comparable results for the more-
educated young adults).   
Although these results are quite consistent with expectations from the standard competitive 
model, results in a subsequent paper (Maloney, 1997) are somewhat less so.  In this paper, Maloney 
extends the dataset to 1996, enabling him to examine the effects of the introduction of the subminimum 
wage for teenagers in March 1994, which he does by adding to the teen equation a dummy variable for 
the introduction of the teenage minimum wage.  His specifications yield similar evidence of negative 
minimum wage effects for young adults, but somewhat weaker evidence of a positive effect of the adult 
minimum wage on teen employment.  From a variety of specifications, he reports estimated elasticities 
for young adults ranging from −0.1 to −0.4, with the smaller (absolute value) estimates not significant.  
For teens, the estimated effects of the adult minimum range from −0.1 to 0.4, and are never significant.   
Finally, the estimated coefficient on the introduction of the teen minimum in the equation for teen 
employment is near zero and insignificant, in contrast to the negative effect we might expect.  Maloney 
speculates that this may be because the teen minimum was non-binding, although he does not present any 
evidence to support this claim.  He also suggests that the teen minimum may not have been in effect long 
enough.  Given that his data extend nine quarters beyond its introduction, this argument does not seem 
very compelling, although evidence differentiating shorter- and longer-run effects of the teen minimum - 87 - 
might have made this case more strongly.  Finally, given the evidence from Maloney’s first paper, one 
might have expected the introduction of the teen minimum to have had a positive effect on young adult 
employment, given the compression in the wage differential between young adults and teenagers.  But 
Maloney inexplicably omits this variable from his young adult employment regression, and given that he 
uses a systems estimator, the bias from this omission would also affect estimates of the teen employment 
regression.  With a positive correlation between the errors of the two equations, the bias in the estimated 
coefficient of the teen minimum wage variable in the teen employment equation is positive, which could 
potentially explain the absence of a negative estimate for this coefficient.
93  It also is not clear why 
Maloney does not use the value of the teen minimum wage, paralleling the treatment of the adult 
minimum wage, rather than just a dummy variable for its introduction.   
Chapple (1997) revisits Maloney’s time-series analysis, using somewhat different specifications.  
For some reason he focuses only on young adults, ignoring both the question of how the adult minimum 
affected teen employment before the teen minimum was introduced, and how the introduction of the teen 
minimum itself affected teen and young adult employment.  He generally confirms Maloney’s results for 
young adults, obtaining time-series estimates of elasticities ranging from −0.17 to −0.34, again with the 
smaller estimates insignificant.  He offers some reasons why the specifications with the smaller estimates 
should be preferred, although we do not find these particularly compelling.  Regardless, the time-series 
estimates are all negative, and the lower estimates—even if insignificant for the relatively short time-
series available—are in the consensus range from the earlier U.S. literature.   
Chapple then estimates panel data models across industries for the period 1980-1997, using the 
national minimum wage divided by industry price deflators.  Unfortunately, because the minimum wage 
varies nominally only at the national level, he chooses to omit the year fixed effects and instead includes 
aggregate controls (for the inflation rate, GDP, and the exchange rate).  We have already raised concerns 
about the reliability of specifications that omit year effects and identify the effects of minimum wages 
                                                 
93 When the teen minimum is implemented, the residual in the young adult equation is too high.  Given the positive 
error correlation, this is transmitted to the residual in the teen equation, which is therefore positively correlated 
with the dummy variable for the teen minimum wage.   - 88 - 
from aggregate minimum wage changes.  Finally, in the context of research on Puerto Rico, discussed 
below, Krueger (1995) points out that cross-industry estimates are reliant on the assumption that the 
elasticity of labor demand is the same across industries.  Otherwise, it is possible that minimum-wage-
induced employment losses in a low-wage industry with less elastic labor demand could be of similar 
magnitude to employment declines in a higher-wage industry with more elastic labor demand, leading to 
the erroneous conclusion that there is no effect of the minimum wage on employment.   
Regardless of these problems, the estimates indicate significant negative employment effects, 
with elasticities of −0.06 to −0.10, which seem rather large given that these are for the entire industry 
rather than for just unskilled workers.  The estimates become a bit smaller and insignificant, although still 
negative, in specifications that include the (log) minimum wage and price index separately, rather than in 
ratio form.  As it turns out, though, in this case the estimated coefficients of the minimum wage and the 
price deflator are both negative, rather than the equal and opposite-signed effects we might expect if the 
minimum wage and an average wage were entered into the equation.  In addition, the estimates are 
extremely sensitive to splitting the sample into two periods.  For example, for the latter half of the sample, 
the elasticity of industry employment to the minimum wage is −0.48 in one specification and 0.66 in 
another.  Finally, Chapple also estimates time-series models industry by industry.  In these specifications, 
the elasticities are roughly centered on zero; but with only 10 degrees of freedom per industry, we do not 
regard these as meaningful.   
All told, the time-series evidence parallels Maloney’s, as Chapple acknowledges, and the 
industry-level estimates are not robust, although in the basic pooled model he does obtain negative 
estimates.  Given the potential problems with the industry analysis, we view this set of papers as pointing 
more in the direction of negative employment effects of minimum wages in New Zealand. 
A more recent paper by Hyslop and Stillman (2004) challenges this conclusion.  These authors 
study the effects of large increases in teen minimum wages beginning in 2001—a 69 percent increase in 
the minimum wage for 18-19 year-olds in 2001 and 19 percent increases for 16-17 year-olds in both 2001 
and 2002 (the adult minimum wage increased by two and four percent, respectively, in these two years).  - 89 - 
They also use the Household Labour Force survey, with data covering the 1997-2003 period, and 
conclude that the minimum wage had no effect or a positive effect on teen employment.   
They begin their analysis by computing, for 16-17, 18-19, and 20-25 year-olds, the change in the 
average level of employment from 1997-2001:Q1 to 2001:Q2-2003:Q3.  The simple difference-in-
differences one can compute from these averages indicates that employment of the two younger groups 
rose slightly relative to employment of 20-25 year-olds, in contrast to what one would expect if the 
minimum wage reduces employment.
94  However, it is not clear why one would necessarily want to 
average over these relatively long periods.  First, the minimum wage increase took place in March 2001, 
but was announced nearly a year in advance.  Thus, at a minimum, one might want to cut off the “pre” 
period somewhat earlier.  Second, if disemployment effects occur with a lag, a comparison based on data 
further beyond the implementation date might be more informative. 
The authors do provide a figure (Figure 4) that provides quarter-by-quarter employment rates for 
each age group.  They describe this figure as providing little “to suggest that employment … by teenage 
workers was affected by the minimum wage increases” (p. 15).  However, although short-terms responses 
may be misleading, this figure shows that in the first quarter of 2001, when the minimum wage jumped 
sharply for 18-19 year olds, employment for this age group fell while employment of the other two 
groups rose.  Similarly, in the first quarter of 2002, when the minimum wage jumped for 16-17 year-olds, 
their employment fell, employment of 18-19 year-olds rose, and employment of 20-25 year-olds was little 
changed.  The dynamics may tell a different story, but the short-term differences are suggestive of some 
disemployment effect.  
Finally, Hyslop and Stillman present regression estimates in which they allow separate 
employment changes for each of the three age groups in 2001, 2002, and 2003.  Although the estimated 
coefficients for 16-17 and 18-19 year-olds are positive in almost every case, the estimated changes for 20-
21 year-olds are almost always larger, and sometimes considerably so.  For example, in 2001, the 
                                                 
94 They also report results for hours conditional on working, as well as for other outcomes less related to 
employment.  - 90 - 
regression estimates indicate that employment rose (net of the controls) by 0.042 for 20-21 year-olds, 
0.007 for 18-19 year-olds, and 0.022 for 16-17 year-olds.  That is, employment of 18-19 year-olds—for 
whom the minimum wage increase was by far the largest—fell relative to both groups, and employment 
of 16-17 year-olds, who experienced the second-largest minimum wage increase, fell relative to 20-21 
year-olds.  Thus, if overall employment of young workers (aged 16-21) rose for reasons unrelated to the 
minimum wage (the type of thing researchers allow for in a triple-differenced estimate), these results are 
perfectly consistent with what the standard model would predict.  Of course, part of the increase in 
employment for 20-21 year-olds may have reflected substitution by employers toward them, but that 
effect is also predicted by the competitive model.  Thus, in the end, we view the evidence for New 
Zealand as more consistent with negative employment effects of minimum wages.   
 France.  The minimum wage in France is set by the federal government and is generally increased 
each year in line with prices and average wages for blue-collar workers.  The level of the minimum wage 
tends to be high relative to the average wage in France and is often blamed for the high level of youth 
unemployment in that country.  Dolado et al. present evidence from two analyses.  First, they compare 
wage and employment changes over two periods—1981-1985 (when minimum wages rose sharply) and 
1985-1989 (when it did not).  In particular, they estimate the changes over these periods in hourly wages 
and employment and unemployment rates for 48 age-sex-education groups, and then regress these 
changes (by sex) on the proportion of each group at or below the minimum wage.  Contrary to 
expectations, they find little evidence that the minimum wage increases in 1981-1985 raised the wages of 
low-wage workers or that wage increases for low-wage workers were held down by the absence of an 
increase in the relative minimum wage in the second half of the 1980s.  Despite this outcome, they then 
estimate similar regressions for the change in employment.  Perhaps surprisingly given the wage results, 
the results suggest that the unemployment rate rose more for groups with a greater proportion of workers 
paid at or below the SMIC in the early period (when the relative minimum wage was rising) and fell more 
for these groups in the later period (when the relative minimum wage did not change); the patterns of 
change in employment rates are less convincing, but go in the same direction.  As the authors note, - 91 - 
however, the two periods are less comparable than one would like, in that the first—when the minimum 
wage rose more quickly—included a recession, while the second—when the relative minimum wage was 
about unchanged—was characterized by an economic recovery.  This lack of comparability makes it 
difficult to distinguish minimum wage effects from the differential impact of the business cycle on the 
employment and unemployment rates of different skill groups.   
The authors then take a different approach and focus on regional differences in employment 
change from 1967-1992.
95  Their rationale is that in the earlier part of this period the national minimum 
wage rose sharply, but because initial wage levels were very different across regions, the impact of the 
national minimum wage increase should have been greater in the lower-wage areas.  The authors find a 
positive relationship between regional wage growth and the level of the initial wage during the period in 
which the relative minimum wage was rising, consistent with the rise in the SMIC boosting wages more 
in low-wage regions.  However, a regression of the change in employment on the initial wage yields a 
negative estimate, in contrast to what would be expected if the minimum wage reduced employment more 
in low-wage areas.  Although the authors seem to find this evidence more compelling, there are problems 
with this analysis.  First, they do not control for differences in aggregate economic conditions across 
regions.  If wages in the initially low-wage regions were held down at the beginning of the sample by 
cyclically weak labor market conditions, these areas would also have tended to exhibit initially low 
employment rates.  In this case, a regression of the change in employment on the initial wage could yield 
a negative coefficient simply because labor demand returned to normal in subsequent years.  Second, this 
part of the analysis does not focus on low-skill workers along any particular dimension, and as for the 
United States, the effects of the minimum wage may be difficult to detect with respect to aggregate 
employment.   
  In contrast, Bazen and Skourias (1997) study the effects of the 1981-1984 increases in the French 
minimum wage on youth employment (15-24 year-olds).  In particular, they split their sample into 32 
sectors, and calculate the ratio of youth employment to total employment in each sector and the 
                                                 
95 This analysis is also reported in Machin and Manning (1997), who are co-authors of the Dolado et al. paper. - 92 - 
proportion of workers in the sector who were below the new level of the minimum wage set in June 1981.  
Using a difference-in-differences approach, they find that, conditional on overall employment growth in 
the sector, the share of youth employment fell in relative terms in the sectors for which the minimum 
wage increase was more binding.  The estimates are negative and statistically significant for the first-
differences estimates (for October 1980 to October 1981 and March 1981 to March 1982) and become 
somewhat larger when a longer difference is used. 
We have two concerns about their specification.  First, the authors estimate an equation for the 
change in the youth employment share, using as a control the percentage change in total sector 
employment.  Since the percentage change is sensitive to the base, and employment levels can differ 
sharply across sectors, it would have been preferable to define the dependent and independent variables 
consistently.  Second, their longer-differenced specifications regress changes in youth employment from 
March 1980 to March 1984 on the proportion of workers directly affected by the June 1981 increase in 
the minimum wage, whereas it would seem more natural to use a measure of workers affected by the 
entire set of minimum wage increases from 1980 to 1984 (17 percent of which occurred, in relative terms, 
prior to June 1981).  Otherwise, sectors that adjusted employment more slowly to the increase in 1980 
and early 1981 would have had more minimum wage workers in June 1981, and possibly sharper 
employment declines subsequently, even if their employment declines over this period were no larger 
than those with fewer minimum wage workers prior to entire set of increases.   
The final set of studies we consider are those by Abowd et al. (1999, 2000a, 2000b), whose 
results for the United States were summarized in the previous section.  As we described earlier, these 
authors use individual-level panel data and test for disemployment effects among initially-employed 
workers who are “caught” by an increase in the minimum wage.  For France, which generally had a rising 
nominal minimum wage over the period they study (1982-89), they consistently find considerably higher 
transitions to non-employment for workers newly bound by the minimum wage than for workers with 
marginally higher wages, especially among those just above age 24 who were not protected by 
employment promotion contracts.  For example, for men aged 25-29 caught by the minimum, the - 93 - 
elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage is −4.6, relative to similar men just above the 
minimum.  For women the results are weaker and not significant, but the elasticity is still large at −1.38.  
For those aged 20-24, the elasticities are smaller and not significant, and the elasticities are smaller still, 
and insignificant, for males and females aged 16-19.  The elasticities for those above 25 are large, but as 
the authors point out, these are elasticities that apply to a very small share of the population in the age 
group.  Thus, echoing issues we raised earlier, the “answer” about the effects of minimum wages is quite 
different when one focuses on directly-affected workers rather than on a broader group.   
The evidence for France regarding overall employment effects of minimum wages on young, 
less-skilled workers is mixed.  Our paper on European and other OECD countries, discussed above, 
suggests that France may have a combination of labor market institutions that make it less likely that 
minimum wages will have detectable disemployment effects on young workers, and the results in the 
Abowd et al. paper, on those under age 25, appear to confirm this.  At the same, however, the results 
reported by Abowd et al, point to disemployment effects of the minimum wage among low-skilled 
workers less protected by these institutions, and the evidence from France, on balance, is consistent with 
disemployment effects.
 96  
The Netherlands.  The minimum wage is also set by statute in the Netherlands.  However, this 
country represents an interesting case because the government instituted reductions in the youth 
subminimum wage in 1981 and 1983 and a reduction in the nominal adult minimum wage in 1984.  
Dolado et al. (1996) study the effects of the declines in youth subminimums, which, for example, fell 
from 77.5 percent to 61.5 percent of the adult minimum wage for 20 year-olds and from 47.5 percent to 
34.5 percent of the adult minimum wage for 16 year-olds).
97  The authors first verify that relative wages 
of young workers declined following this change, indicating that the youth subminimum wages were a 
                                                 
96 Kramarz and Philippon (2001) extend this analysis to study the effects of the combination of minimum wages and 
other labor costs, with a focus on payroll taxes and exemptions.  Laroque and Salanié (2002) present estimates of 
a relatively simple structural model intended to capture the effects of the minimum wage and the welfare system 
on the employment of married women in France, based in part on the Meyer-Wise approach to estimating the 
employment effects of minimum wages (discussed below).     
97 One problem they note, which also applies to Spain and Brazil (discussed below), is that in the Netherlands the 
minimum wage also influences benefit levels—in this case unemployment benefits—making it more difficult to 
separately identify the effects of legislated minimum wage changes.   - 94 - 
binding constraint on the wages of these workers.  They then note that the ratio of youth employment to 
total employment fell by 3 percentage points from 1979 to 1985, contrary to what would be expected 
from an exogenous reduction in wages for younger workers.  However, they also recognize that the severe 
recession in the Netherlands at that time may have adversely affected youth employment 
disproportionately, making it difficult to distinguish the effects of the minimum wage reduction from 
cyclical influences.  As a result, the authors examine changes in the shares of youth employment in four 
low-skilled occupations relative to changes in the shares of youth employment in somewhat higher-skilled 
occupations.  Among the low-skilled occupations, the youth share of total employment fell by two 
percentage points in one, remained constant in one, and rose by two and four percentage points in the 
other two.  They summarize by suggesting that the evidence from the Netherlands about adverse 
employment effects of the minimum wage is “scarcely compelling.”  However, in all four industries the 
youth share in employment rose both relative to the overall youth share of employment (which fell by 
three percentage points over the period) and relative to the youth share of employment in the higher-
skilled occupations, consistent with the response we would expect if minimum wages reduce employment 
among less-skilled workers.
98   
Spain.  The final country for which Dolado et al. (1996) present evidence is Spain.  The national 
minimum wage in Spain is also set by statute, but is determined the Council of Ministers after 
consultation with trade unions and employer organizations.  As in the United States, the ratio of the 
national minimum wage to the average wage has gradually declined over time, limiting the extent to 
which the time variation can be used to identify the effects of minimum wages on employment.  In an 
attempt to increase the exploitable variation in the data, the authors use a panel-data approach to 
investigate the effects of minimum wage changes on six low-wage sectors.  In particular, they regress 
                                                 
98 There are also some papers studying the effects of the minimum wage on employment in the Netherlands using 
either structural search models (Koning et al., 1994) or the Meyer and Wise (1983) approach of inferring 
minimum wage effects from “missing” workers in the wage distribution (van Soest, 1994).  The Meyer-Wise 
approach has seldom been used in recent research on minimum wages and hence is not covered in this review.  
One exception is a paper by Dickens et al. (1998), who present evidence using this method for the United 
Kingdom and find that the employment estimates resulting from this approach are quite sensitive to assumptions 
about the distribution of wages and the wage above which the minimum has no effect.  - 95 - 
sector-specific changes in employment and youth employment (16-19 year-olds) on changes in the 
relative minimum wage, cyclical controls, and fixed sector effects.
99  The results show a positive and 
statistically significant elasticity of 0.08 for total employment, but a negative elasticity of −0.154 for 
youths (significant at the ten-percent level).  They also find stronger disemployment effects for 16-19 
year-olds in the set of industries for which the minimum wage is most binding.   
Dolado et al. also report on what is likely a cleaner experiment—an 83 percent increase in 1990 
in the minimum wage for 16 year-olds; there was also a more modest increase of 15 percent for 17-year-
olds.  In this case, they use regional data and regress region-specific changes in youth employment 
between 1990 and 1994 on the fraction of workers in each region that were low paid prior to the 
implementation of the higher minimum wage.  The results provide strong evidence that employers 
substituted away from 16-19 year-old workers after the increase in the minimum wage for 16-17 year-
olds.  The same relationship does not appear for 20-24 year-olds (indeed it is positive), which suggests 
that the results reflect the change in the minimum wage, rather than other changes in labor demand.  The 
authors conclude from their study that minimum wage increases in Spain reduced youth employment.
100         
Portugal.  A similar “quasi experiment” took place in Portugal in January 1987.  In this case, the 
government eliminated the 75 percent subminimum wage for 18-19 year-old workers, making them 
eligible instead for the adult minimum wage.  In effect, this legislative change resulted in a 49.3 percent 
increase in the nominal minimum wage for this age group, as compared with a minimum wage increase of 
only 12 percent for workers aged 20 and over.  Pereira (2003) uses this event to study the effects of the 
                                                 
99 The authors exclude fixed year effects from their panel data specifications, which hampers comparability with 
other studies that typically include such effects to sweep out the effects of aggregate changes.  They report that 
they could not reject the exclusion of these year effects, but with small samples (168 in the pooled analysis, and 
28 in the analysis of each industry), the statistical power of these tests may be weak.  Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to determine the effect on the results of omitting fixed year effects from the information provided in the 
paper. 
100 At the same time, they interpret the evidence of positive effects on aggregate employment as consistent with a 
“monopsony effect” (p. 352).  However, we question whether the apparent positive effect of minimum wages on 
overall employment should be taken seriously.  Few economists would expect any detectable effect of minimum 
wages on aggregate employment in modern industrialized economies.  And even if we were inclined to the 
monopsony view in which positive effects are possible, we would presumably expect such effects to show up 
most strongly for workers directly affected by the minimum wage.  In contrast, the evidence for Spain points to 
negative employment effects for the most affected workers. - 96 - 
minimum wage on teenage employment in Portugal in 1987.
101  In particular, she uses a firm-level panel 
dataset for the period 1986-1989, with observations pertaining to March of each year.  From this dataset, 
Pereira extracts firm-specific information on employment, hours, and wages for three age groups: 18-19 
year-olds, 20-25 year-olds, and 30-35 year-olds.  She then uses two related research designs to test for the 
effects of minimum wages on employment.  First, she compares changes in employment (and wages) 
across the three age groups for intervals of one, two, and three years after the minimum wage increase.  
Second, she estimates models that separate out the differences in changes in employment by age for firms 
whose average wage for teenagers in March 1986 was between the old and the new minimum; this 
approach identifies the minimum wage effect from those firms that were most likely to be directly 
affected by the minimum wage increase.  All of the models include controls for initial firm size, industry, 
and region.
102  
Pereira seems able to rule out any anticipatory effects, arguing that news of this impending 
change in the minimum wage first surfaced in August of 1986, well after the March 1986 measurement of 
initial employment levels (and wages).  In addition, she finds that the minimum wage increase pushed up 
wages of teenagers in both absolute and relative terms, and that the spike at the subminimum prior to the 
increase disappeared soon after the minimum wage increase for teenagers took effect.   
The evidence indicates that teen employment fell relative to employment for 30-35 year-olds, 
with the difference statistically significant, and an implied elasticity from her preferred estimates ranging 
from −0.2 to −0.4.  In contrast, employment of 20-25 year-olds increased relative to the older group, 
consistent with substitution away from teenagers and toward this group.  This substitution is exactly what 
would be expected if the minimum wage increased the price of teen workers relative to their close 
substitutes.  In addition, the estimates imply that overall youth employment (ages 18-25) declined 
slightly.  The evidence is particularly strong for the specifications that identify the minimum wage effects 
                                                 
101 The subminimum wage was also increased for 17 year-olds, from 50 percent to 75 percent of the adult minimum 
wage.  However, Pereira focuses only on 18-19 year-olds because there are few workers in this age range and few 
firms employing them in her data.  One year later, the subminimum for workers aged 16 and under was increased 
as well (Portugal and Cardoso, 2006).  
102 Note that Krueger’s question about the role of variation in labor demand elasticities applies here as well.  - 97 - 
from the most-affected firms.  In addition, the evidence indicates that the effects are stronger one or two 
years after the minimum wage increase than in the first year of the increase, consistent with other 
evidence on lagged effects.  Pereira also estimates similar models for total hours and finds even larger 
effects, suggesting that employers reduced the average workweeks of their teenage employees as well. 
Curiously, Portugal and Cardoso (2006) study the same minimum wage change but reach a 
different conclusion.  Using the same data set, although sometimes a different sample, their aggregate 
employment figures (i.e., without any regression controls) indicate faster employment growth for 
teenagers relative to older groups of workers, except for the comparison with those in their early 20’s in 
the year encompassing the minimum wage increase.
103  Unfortunately, they do not adequately reconcile 
the differences.  Although they claim that Pereira’s sample is nonrandom and “severely biased with 
respect to the actual trend in employment for the affected group of workers” (p. 995), they offer no 
explanation or evidence regarding this claim.  Moreover, they note that even when they tried to replicate 
Pereira’s sample, they found opposite results from hers, which suggests that the use of different samples 
is not the explanation for the difference in results.  A potential difference they do not explore is the 
inclusion of control variables in Pereira’s analysis.  Thus, in the end, we are left with an incomplete 
analysis that does not establish which results are correct.  At this point, however, the evidence on 
employment effects from this particular episode in Portugal has to be viewed as inconclusive.
104   
Greece.  The only evidence we have uncovered for Greece comes from a time-series study that 
uses annual data from 1974-2001 (Karageorgiou, 2004).  This paper focuses on teens (ages 15-19) and 
young adults (ages 20-24).  Greece had different minimum wages for these groups, but although their 
levels were different, their relative movements were quite similar over much of the period, with the 
exception of an increase in the teen minimum relative to the young adult minimum in the early 1980s.   
                                                 
103 They also present employment figures from another household level dataset, but report only that employment of 
teenagers grew (and unemployment fell) from 1986 to 1989 rather than the difference in employment growth 
between teenagers and older workers.  Given that this period was characterized by an economic expansion, these 
calculations are not especially informative.     
104 Portugal and Cardoso then move on to the more ambitious aspect of their research, which is to examine how the 
underlying flows of worker separations and accessions and firm entry and exit responded to the minimum wage 
increase.  Their main results are that the minimum wage appeared to lead to a reduction in the share of teens 
separating from their jobs, but also a reduction in the share of teens among newly-hired workers.      - 98 - 
Estimating separate models for these two age groups, and paying attention to the specification 
issues raised in Williams and Mills (2001), Karageorgiou finds evidence of negative employment effects 
of the minimum wage for young adults, with elasticities (from the log specification) ranging from −0.05 
to −0.12, although never significant.  For teens, in contrast, the estimates are large and positive, with 
elasticities ranging from 0.22 to 0.63, with the larger estimates significant.   
There are a few reasons to be skeptical of the results.  First, minimum wages in Greece vary by 
age, education, tenure, occupation, and marital status.  As a result, it is not clear that we necessarily want 
to focus solely on young or unskilled workers—in contrast to the more common case where there is a 
single wage floor that is presumably most binding on the least skilled.  Second, there is relatively little 
real variation in minimum wages, especially after the late 1990s, because the minimum wage was indexed 
to inflation.  Third, for young adults the estimated effect of the aggregate unemployment rate on young 
adult employment is positive and significant, which is suggestive of model misspecification.  Third, the 
author does not really try to explain the extraordinarily large positive minimum wage effects for 
teenagers.  Although he suggests that part of the explanation may be that teens and youths are very close 
substitutes, so that a higher minimum wage causes strong substitution toward teenagers, this would seem 
to require large negative effects for young adults as well.  Moreover, testing this hypothesis requires 
estimates of how teen (and young adult) employment responds to the minimum wages for both groups, 
which the author does not provide since the employment equation for each group contains only that 
group’s minimum wage relative to an adult average; as noted above, there seems to be little variation in 
the two groups’ relative minimum wages, so it may not be possible to test this conjecture.  Finally, there 
are some institutional details left unexplained, such as “incentives to employers who particularly employ 
teenage trainee workers in certain periods of the year” (p. 61).  These problems, coupled with the 
difficulty of interpreting the evidence in the case where many other workers are also bound by minimum 
wages, leads us to regard the evidence from Greece as inconclusive one way or the other.   
Developing Countries - 99 - 
The analysis of minimum wage effects in developing countries is complicated by a number of 
factors.  First, there is often a large informal sector in which minimum wages (and other labor laws) do 
not apply or are not enforced, and to which there can be substantial spillovers from the formal sector.  
Second, even in the formal sector, there are serious concerns about the enforcement of and compliance 
with minimum wage laws.  Third, for some countries, confounding factors such as anti-sweatshop 
campaigns have also created upward pressure on wages of low-skilled workers.  Fourth, in some cases 
minimum wage increases have occurred in the context of high inflation, in which case legislated 
minimum wage increases may convey little more than extraordinarily short-term changes in relative 
prices of different kinds of labor.  And fifth, in some countries the minimum wage also directly influences 
the value of other government benefits.  Because of these complications, the results from developing 
countries are more difficult to interpret and are less likely to be applicable to other countries.  In addition, 
after reviewing the literature, it seemed to use that many of the complexities involved in thinking about 
the evidence for each country were better left to scholars of those particular countries’ economies.
105  We 
therefore provide a much briefer overview of this evidence, more as a guide to the literature than as a 
critical review.   
Latin America and the Caribbean  
Brazil.  The effects of minimum wages in Brazil have attracted interest for a number of reasons, 
including this country’s long reliance on the minimum wage, the extreme inequality in the country, the 
role of the minimum wage in coordinating centralized wage bargaining as part of the anti-inflationary 
efforts in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, and recent efforts to increase the minimum wage substantially.  
Although minimum wages were originally set at the regional level, the government switched to a national 
minimum wage in 1984.  Since then, there have been periods in which the nominal minimum wage has 
increased sharply, periods in which it was frozen, and periods in which it has been indexed to inflation.  
In general, however, the real value of the minimum wage has tended to decline over time.  In addition, 
                                                 
105 A significant portion of this literature is also written in languages other than English. - 100 - 
although all workers are legally covered by the minimum wage in Brazil, there is a sizable informal sector 
for which compliance is relatively low.     
Fajnzylber (2001) takes an indirect approach to estimating the employment effects of the 
minimum wage in Brazil.  Using matched data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey—a CPS-
type data set—for the period 1982-1997, he applies the same methods as in Neumark et al. (2004) to 
estimate minimum wage effects at different points of the wage distribution.  However, he only estimates 
the effect of the minimum wage on income, and then backs out the employment effects by comparing the 
estimated effects on income for a sample working at both observations and a sample that also includes 
those not working.  Given that he still has to condition on initial employment to use this strategy, it is not 
clear why he did not estimate employment effects directly.  Nonetheless, his indirect approach implies 
that for formal sector workers earning below or very near the minimum, the employment elasticity is 
around −0.10 in the first year, and −0.05 to −0.08 after allowing for lagged effects, with the moderation 
attributable, he argues, to some giveback in the wage effects.  For the informal sector, the implied 
employment elasticities for those below or near the minimum range from −0.25 to −0.35 in the short-run 
and from −0.05 to −0.15 in the longer-run.  He suggests that the stronger effects for the informal sector 
may reflect individuals leaving informal sector employment to queue for formal sector jobs, although 
there is some question as to whether this is a real phenomenon that can account for the differences.  In 
addition, the implied disemployment effects are stronger for women and teenagers.
106   
Sara Lemos has written a sequence of closely-related papers that use the same dataset as 
Fajnzylber, but with observations that extend through 2000.  Lemos (2004) considers a variety of 
measures of the minimum wage, and presents strong evidence that increases in the minimum wage 
generally compressed wages over the 1982-2000 period.  The increases generated by the minimum wage 
were largest at the bottom of the wage distribution, but the data also suggests that a rise in the minimum 
wage led to increases for wages up to about the median wage.  Part of the effects higher up in the wage 
distribution may be attributable to the hyper-inflationary period when wages were often set at “multiples” 
                                                 
106 These estimates do not take account of possible hours effects, however.   - 101 - 
of the minimum wage (e.g., Fajnzylber, 2001).  As evidence, similar regressions for the post-hyper-
inflation period do not find effects of the minimum wage above the 30
th percentile (Neumark et al. 2006).  
Evidence of a spike at the minimum in the informal sector is also suggestive of these “numeraire” effects.        
Based on these results, Lemos then estimates the effects of the minimum wage on employment 
and hours from a cross-section time-series panel of regional data.  She uses a standard panel specification 
that includes region and time fixed effects, as well as lagged employment terms to capture shorter-run and 
longer-run effects in some specifications.  Because the nominal minimum wage is uniform across the 
country, the regional variation comes either from differences in regional price indexes (when the real 
minimum wage is used) or from differences across regions in the share of workers at or below the 
minimum.  Nevertheless, wage and price levels vary substantially across regions, and so the “bite” of the 
national minimum wage may vary considerably by location.  The estimates of the employment and hours 
effects are sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but rarely statistically significant.  In addition, 
many of the estimated elasticities are near zero, although there are some outliers (both positive and 
negative).   
Lemos does not address the question of why she obtains much smaller employment effects than 
Fajnzylber.  His estimates, however, make clear that the (implied) employment effects are concentrated in 
the lower part of the wage distribution.  Given these prior results, it is not entirely clear why Lemos 
focuses on overall employment effects rather than effects on those most likely to bear any employment 
impact.  Some of her results discussed below try to get closer to lower-skill groups, but none build on 
Fajnzylber’s work by focusing on those with wages near the minimum.  More attention to this issue 
would clarify the extent to which her results differ because they are more aggregate, or because of her use 
of alternative minimum wage measures, a longer sample period, and other differences in her analyses.   
In two subsequent studies, Lemos considers whether the evidence of negative employment effects 
is more compelling for labor markets in which we might expect them to be stronger.  In Lemos 
(forthcoming), for example, she estimates minimum wage effects separately for the private and public 
sectors.  In particular, she speculates that public sector labor demand is more inelastic than in the private - 102 - 
sector—either because the state can raise revenues to cover higher costs, or because of the necessity of 
providing public services.  Lemos finds that the wage effects in the two sectors are roughly comparable.  
Her evidence on employment and hours effects suggests no impact or a slight (and insignificant) positive 
impact in the private sector (with long-run elasticities of zero to 0.011).  For the public sector, she finds a 
weak positive effect on employment but a stronger (although still insignificant) negative effect on hours, 
resulting in an overall long-run elasticity of total hours of −0.07.  
Lemos (2006) examines the formal and informal sectors separately to see whether the minimum 
wage causes wages to rise and employment to decline in the formal sector (where the minimum wage 
should be more binding), but wages to fall and employment to rise in the informal sector (where 
compliance is lower), as would be predicted by the standard two-sector model of the minimum wage.  In 
contrast to the predictions of this model, she finds that the minimum wage compresses the wage 
distribution in both sectors (although the positive effects of minimum wages on wages in the informal 
sector reach higher up into the wage distribution), and no significant evidence of either positive or 
negative effects of the minimum wage on employment or hours in either sector; and in all cases the 
estimates are small.   
Echoing concerns raised in Neumark et al. (2006) about the extent to which employers would 
respond to an increase in the nominal minimum wage in an environment of hyperinflation, Lemos (2006) 
also reports evidence on the effects of the minimum wage in high versus low inflation periods.  In the low 
inflation periods, when minimum wage increases are more likely to be perceived as longer-lasting 
increases in the cost of low-wage labor, the estimated effect of the minimum wage on employment in the 
formal sector is more negative, although still not statistically significant.  Lemos also restricts the sample 
to less-educated (four years of schooling or less) workers to see if the adverse effects of the minimum 
wage show through more clearly for workers whose wages are most likely to be boosted by an increase.  
The estimated disemployment effects in the formal sector are larger for this subsample, although once 
again the estimates are insignificant.     - 103 - 
Finally, Lemos (2005) extends her analysis of aggregate employment effects to attempt to 
account for the endogeneity of minimum wage changes, noting that if minimum wages are increased in 
times of stronger economic growth, the estimated coefficients on the minimum wage variable will be 
biased upward.  Lemos uses a variety of political measures as instruments for minimum wages, which she 
argues meet the standard criteria for validity.  She then compares IV and OLS estimates for a number of 
different estimation approaches and disaggregations of the sample (e.g., looking at teenagers or those with 
less education).  We read her evidence as suggesting that the estimated disemployment effects tend to be 
somewhat more negative when the political instruments are used, although the standard errors increase 
enough that these estimates are never significant (Table 3).   
We have some doubts about the validity of these instruments, which, as Lemos notes, need to 
affect minimum wages but not be correlated with the error term in the employment equation.  A natural 
source of such a correlation, however, is the influence of these political variables on other labor market 
policies that may have differential effects on employment across the regions of Brazil.
107  Thus, while 
Lemos concludes that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that endogeneity of the minimum 
wage biases the estimated employment effect upward, we view the evidence as less informative.   
Neumark et al. (2006) focus on the distributional effects of minimum wages in Brazil, but they 
also report some employment effects for the 1996-2001 period, following the end of the hyper-inflation.  
Using the same dataset as Lemos, they first estimate an employment effect for household heads, yielding 
a significant elasticity of −0.07 when lags of the minimum wage are included.  In contrast, the estimates 
imply positive effects of the minimum wage on employment and hours of other family members, which 
may reflect labor supply increases for these individuals (who are more likely to work in the informal 
sector) in response to the employment declines for household heads (who are more likely to work in the 
formal sector). 
                                                 
107 Of course, one could also argue that other studies of minimum wages omit variation in other labor market 
policies, and that the problem in this paper is no different than in most others.   - 104 - 
Overall, our sense is that the evidence for Brazil suggests that the effects of the minimum wage 
on employment are small in the aggregate.  However, the evidence sometimes points to disemployment 
effects where we are more likely to find them—in low-inflation environments, and for less-skilled 
individuals and particularly lower-wage individuals.
108     
Mexico and Colombia.  These countries provide an interesting contrast in minimum wage policy, 
with the minimum wage in Mexico falling sharply in real terms between 1981 and 1987, and the 
minimum wage in Colombia increasing sharply over this period.  As a result, the relative value of the 
minimum wage was quite low in Mexico at the end of that decade and relatively high in Colombia.  Bell 
(1997) exploits this divergence in minimum wage policy to examine whether the employment effects of 
the minimum wage show through more clearly in the country where the minimum wage is higher.  She 
first presents standard time-series regressions using annual manufacturing data for Mexico and Colombia 
over a relatively long sample period.  For Mexico, she finds a small positive minimum wage elasticity 
(0.17) for wages and a small negative elasticity (−0.18) for employment; neither estimate is statistically 
significant.  For Colombia, the estimated effects of the minimum wage are larger and statistically 
significant in both the wage and employment equations, with elasticities of 0.44 for wages and −0.34 for 
employment.   
She then turns to firm-level panel datasets that allow her to focus on the 1980s period, when the 
divergence between the minimum wage changes in the two countries was especially large.  For Mexico, 
specifications that include firm fixed effects yield elasticities of employment ranging from −0.03 to 0.03 
for unskilled workers and −0.01 to 0.05 for skilled workers, with all of the estimated minimum wage 
effects insignificant.  Similar models estimated for Colombia generate different results, with statistically 
significant elasticities ranging from −0.15 to −0.33 for unskilled and −0.03 to −0.24 for skilled workers.  
Bell attributes the differing results between Mexico and Colombia to the minimum wage being binding on 
                                                 
108 An earlier review of minimum wage effects on employment in Brazil (Carneiro, 2001), which covers many 
unpublished papers circulating in Brazil (and written in Portuguese), argues that the evidence tends to point to 
disemployment effects.   - 105 - 
firms in Colombia but not in Mexico, as suggested by distributions of average firm-level wages in both 
countries.   
In contrast, Feliciano (1998) studies minimum wage effects for Mexico using data on all workers 
rather than just manufacturing workers.  Her study uses data from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Mexican 
Census of Population coupled with other sources.  As a result, her sample period includes the 1980s 
when, as noted above, the minimum wage in Mexico declined sharply.  But minimum wages also fell 
noticeably over the longer period she studies and became more uniform across states and regions within 
states as well.
109  Feliciano uses a standard panel data specification with a relative minimum wage 
variable, controls for the business cycle, and state and year fixed effects; the model is estimate at the state 
level, using the average minimum wage for regions within a state in cases when there was minimum wage 
variation within states.
110  She finds no minimum wage effects for males, with estimated elasticities 
typically close to and centered on zero, and generally insignificant.  The one exception is for males aged 
55 to 64, for which she find a small but significant positive effect, which she suggests could reflect 
substitution towards these worker rather than direct effects of the minimum wage.  For females, however, 
there is consistent evidence of disemployment effects for all age groups, with elasticities ranging from 
−0.41 to −0.76.  Feliciano speculates that the differences between her results and Bell’s arise because Bell 
focuses only on the manufacturing sector.  She presumably could have checked this with her data, but did 
not.  Nonetheless, this study seems to provide reliable evidence that the reductions in the minimum wage 
in Mexico increased employment of women and had little impact on men, consistent with overall 
disemployment effects.  
In a related paper, Maloney and Nuñez Mendez (2004) examine the impact of minimum wages on 
wage distributions in 1998 for eight Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
                                                 
109 The number of geographic areas with a separately-determined minimum wage declined from 111 in 1970 to 
two in 1990. 
110 She also presents estimates from a specification that instruments for the relative minimum wage variable with a 
real minimum wage variable (i.e., divided by a price index rather than an average wage measure) to correct for the 
possible endogeneity from unmeasured factors that positively affect both the average wage and employment.  
However, her IV estimates are almost always more strongly negative, contrary to expectations.  The discussion 
therefore focuses on the OLS estimates.   - 106 - 
Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay).  Because the data reveal an especially pronounced impact of 
the minimum wage on the wage distribution in Colombia, paralleling Bell’s findings, they narrow their 
focus to study the employment effects of minimum wages in that country.  Using a rotating household 
panel dataset with matched individual data across two quarters, they estimate the effects of two minimum 
wage increases during the 1997-1999 period covered by their data.  Their sample consists only of men 
working 30 to 50 hours per week; it would be desirable to see evidence for other groups as well.  As in 
much of the existing research using individual longitudinal data, they calculate transition rates from 
employment to non-employment for individuals who were employed as of the first observation and 
estimate how the minimum wage increases affected these transition probabilities.  In this particular study, 
the authors use the self-employed as a control group because they are not subject to the minimum wage.  
Because of the minimum wage is often used as a numeraire for other wages (as discussed in the context of 
Brazil), the specification also controls for each individual’s initial position in the wage distribution, and 
separate estimates of the minimum wage effects on employment are reported at various wage levels (as in 
Neumark et al., 2004).  The models also include individual characteristics, quarterly and regional dummy 
variables, and, in some specifications, lagged values of the minimum wage changes. 
The estimated employment effects reported by the authors are large, negative, and statistically 
significant.  In addition, these negative effects are evident in some of the higher locations in the wage 
distribution, suggesting that the function of the minimum wage also causes employment losses, although 
it is difficult to understand why this wage rigidity would persist.  The lagged effects are also negative and 
significant, suggesting a period of adjustment.  The authors repeat the analysis excluding the dummies for 
location in the wage distribution to get average effects and calculate an elasticity of employment with 
respect to the minimum of −0.15.  Overall, this research appears to confirm Bell’s previous finding that 
minimum wages have negative consequences for employment in Colombia, albeit for a select group of 
workers.   
Chile.  Montenegro and Pagés (2004) estimate effects of job security provisions and minimum 
wages on the relative employment of different groups, using a time-series of cross-sectional data sets for - 107 - 
Santiago from 1960-1998.  They estimate a model for employment at the individual level and include a 
set of variables to capture age, skill level, and sex, as well as these variables interacted with real minimum 
wage indexes (differentiating the minimum for those under age 18 and those aged 18 and over).  Because 
the minimum wage varies by age, it is possible, in principle, to include year effects and still estimate an 
overall minimum wage effect on the level of employment.  However, they indicate that the coefficient on 
the minimum wage variable was not robust in this specification, so they instead included only the 
interaction terms and the year dummy variables, and thus estimate relative employment effects.
111  Of 
course this research design does not control for possible differences in trends for different demographic 
and skill groups.   
For the most part, the authors’ estimates are consistent with the competitive model, with the 
evidence indicating that a higher minimum wage reduces the employment of young workers and unskilled 
workers relative to that for older male skilled workers, with the disemployment effects particularly strong 
for workers who are both young and unskilled.  Curiously, though, even though women earn lower 
wages, minimum wages appear to increase their employment relative to that for older males.   
Costa Rica.  As pointed out by Gindling and Terrell (2004), Costa Rica provides fertile ground 
for studying minimum wages in a developing country context.  In the period they study, the country 
moved from a system of over 500 minimum wages based on occupation and skill categories to a system 
of only 19 different levels.  This sharp consolidation of the number of separate minimum wages generated 
a great deal of exogenous variation in minimum wages by occupation and skill category.  Gindling and 
Terrell exploit this variation to study the effects of minimum wage changes on employment and hours, 
using individual-level data covering 1988-2000.   
Specifically, they create a pooled time-series cross-sectional data set on about 10,000 individuals 
per year, and estimate models for employment in the covered sector and hours worked by workers in each 
sector (as well as for wages and earnings).  The models include the real value of the minimum wage 
                                                 
111 At the end of their paper, they attempt to estimate overall employment effects on older skilled male workers and 
to use these estimates to back out total effects on each age-sex-skill group.  However, we do not see how this 
approach circumvents the problem just discussed.   - 108 - 
applicable to each individual, a set of human capital controls, and dummy variables for year and for each 
occupation-skill category that was used in the determination of minimum wages in 1988.  Because of the 
need for information on occupation, the sample for the employment analysis is restricted to those who 
have worked before.   
The analysis first establishes that minimum wages affect wages, via inspection of histograms and 
estimates of similar regression models for wages.  The estimates from the employment and hours 
regressions indicate significant negative effects in the covered sector.  The employment elasticity is 
−0.11, and the hours elasticity is −0.06, with the effects concentrated toward the bottom deciles of the 
skill distribution.  There is also a reduction in uncovered sector hours, although this estimate, unlike the 
others, is not significant.  While the employment elasticity is of a similar magnitude to those estimated for 
teenagers in the United States, the implied employment effects are much bigger because far more workers 
are affected by the minimum wage in Costa Rica.  Given the significant variation in minimum wages in 
Costa Rica and the authors’ ability to assign minimum wages to individuals, we regard this as one of the 
more convincing developing country studies.   
Trinidad and Tobago.  Strobl and Walsh (2003) examine the effects of the introduction of a 
national minimum wage in April of 1998 in Trinidad and Tobago.  They use a rotational household 
survey administered quarterly, which lets them construct short panels on individuals.  Because their 
dataset is limited to the 1996-1998 period, they can estimate only relatively short-run effects (at most 8 
months) of the minimum wage’s introduction.  Given the problem of large informal sectors in developing 
countries (and likely low enforcement), Strobl and Walsh focus mainly on compliance, and more 
tangentially on employment.  Their evidence suggests substantial non-compliance, but also that the 
minimum wage is binding on some workers, and led to wage increases in large firms.   
Strobl and Walsh estimate employment effects by asking whether workers initially employed 
below the new minimum wage were less likely to be employed after its introduction.  They find that, for - 109 - 
males, being “caught” by the minimum wage increases the probability of job loss by 0.09.
112  
Additionally, the larger the gap between the individual’s initial wage and the minimum wage, the higher 
the probability of job loss.  In contrast, the estimated effects for females are close to zero and insignificant 
(0.023 for being caught by the minimum), although large firms were more likely to lay off females than 
small firms in response to the minimum wage.  The introduction of a new minimum wage in Trinidad and 
Tobago provides a nice—although rare—instance in which to study minimum wage effects, paralleling 
that for the United Kingdom.  However, a valid control group is still necessary to control for aggregate 
trends.  In the probit for job loss, the authors use all workers whose initial wage was above the new 
minimum wage as the control group.  However, it might have been preferable to use a narrower group of 
workers who are relatively low wage but not bound by the minimum, although even in this case, 
aggregate trends that differ by skill level can invalidate estimated effects of introducing a national 
minimum wage. 
Puerto Rico.  Although a U.S. territory, Puerto Rico shares some similarities with the countries 
covered in this section because of its low wage levels.  In 1938, when the FLSA was passed, the federal 
minimum applied as in the mainland.  Recognizing that market wages were considerably lower in Puerto 
Rico than in the rest of the United States, the Congress passed subsequent amendments that allowed 
industry committees (including representatives from employers, labor, and the public) to set lower 
minimum wages and to leave some important industries (like trade and services) uncovered.  However, in 
1974, the Congress reversed itself and enacted automatic increases to make the minimum uniform across 
industries, bring it to mainland levels, and extend coverage as in the mainland; these objectives were 
accomplished by 1983.  As a result, with average wages in Puerto Rico about half the average for the 
remainder of the United States, the minimum wage now has much more “bite” in Puerto Rico than in the 
United States.  As shown by Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992), wage distributions using Puerto 
Rican Census data on workers working over 20 hours per week clearly show the sharp impact of the 
federal minimum wage on wages in Puerto Rico.   
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The authors use this variation to study the effects of the U.S. federal minimum wage in Puerto 
Rico.  In particular, they estimate time-series regressions for the log of the employment-to-population 
ratio for the period 1956-1987.  Using two different measures of the ratio of the minimum wage to the 
average wage, they estimate minimum wage elasticities for aggregate employment of −0.11 and −0.15, 
both of which are statistically significant.  In addition to this aggregate time-series approach, they 
implement a cross-section time-series analysis for 37 manufacturing industries in order to exploit the 
variation in minimum wages by industry, estimating a model that includes fixed year and industry effects.  
For the entire sample period, they report a statistically significant employment elasticity of −0.54.
113  
They then estimate the model separately for the 1956-1973 and 1974-1987 subperiods.  The estimated 
elasticities are 0.20 and −0.91 respectively, indicating that all of the effect occurred after Congress 
mandated that the minimum wage in Puerto be realigned with the U.S. federal minimum.  The contrast 
between the pre- and post-1974 estimates may also suggest that the industry committees that set minimum 
wages in Puerto Rico prior to 1974 took local labor market conditions into account in deciding on the 
appropriate levels of the minimum.     
Krueger (1995) reexamined the evidence for Puerto Rico using the same data as in the original 
study.  His findings generally indicate that the conclusions reached by Castillo-Freeman and Freeman are 
quite fragile, with different answers (especially for the cross-industry analysis) emerging from 
specifications that differ in terms of weighting or functional form.  Krueger also suggests, as noted earlier, 
that labor demand elasticities could vary across industries in such a way as to generate spurious 
disemployment effects, although the force of this argument would be stronger were it accompanied by 
evidence that this is responsible for the results that Castillo-Freeman and Freeman report.  Nevertheless, 
we are left with somewhat inconclusive evidence for Puerto Rico. 
Indonesia 
                                                 
113 Note that these cross-industry elasticities should be larger than those from the time-series analysis, as 
employment may shift among industries with less of a change in overall employment.   - 111 - 
In the early 1990s, international pressure led Indonesia to increase minimum wages sharply, and 
they tripled in nominal terms (and doubled in real terms) over the first half of the decade.  Two papers 
(Rama, 2001; and Suryahadi et al., 2003) exploit this sudden and arguably exogenous increase to study 
the effects of minimum wages in a developing country context, and other papers followed.     
Rama (2001) exploits province-level differences in minimum wage increases in the early 1990s 
that stemmed from the fact that minimum wages varied considerably across provinces prior to 1989, but 
converged during the early 1990s in response to legislation passed in 1989.
114  In particular, he uses data 
for the years 1988 to 1994 to estimate a standard panel data regression of the urban employment rate on a 
minimum wage variable, province and year fixed effects, and other controls.  The minimum wage 
variable is measured in a variety of ways, although most of the specifications use the ratio of the 
minimum to measures of average or aggregate wages or labor productivity.  The estimated elasticity of 
aggregate urban employment with respect to the minimum wage is small, ranging from zero to −0.04.  
The range is larger for 15-24 year-olds, extending from 0.02 to −0.25.  However, the estimates are all 
insignificant.  Rama also presents results disaggregated by firm size, on the idea that small firms (without 
providing a definition of the size cutoff) would be expected to conform more to the competitive model, 
while larger firms could exhibit monopsony power.  His evidence is consistent with positive (but 
insignificant) elasticities for large manufacturing firms, and negative, much larger, and sometimes 
significant elasticities (ranging from −0.77 to −1.30) for small firms. 
  Suryahadi et al. (2003) extend this analysis through 2000.  They also present results for various 
subgroups of workers among the urban, formal-sector workforce, including men and women, adults and 
youths, more- and less-educated workers, full-time and part-time workers, and white-collar and blue-
collar workers.
115  The estimates in this paper provide stronger evidence of disemployment effects than 
does Rama’s analysis, and evidence from wage distributions suggests that the larger negative employment 
                                                 
114 There is some question as to how much real variation in minimum wages across provinces was generated by this 
change, given that—as Rama notes, “minimum wages were not enforced in practice” (p. 866).   
115 In some specifications they include the share of workers earning above the minimum wage as a measure of 
compliance.  This is potentially problematic because it is endogenous with respect to employment.  However, the 
authors also report results without this control variable (in Table 3), and we emphasize those for comparability.   - 112 - 
effects occur among individuals more likely to be bound by the minimum wage.  In particular, for overall 
employment, the authors estimate a significant negative employment elasticity of −0.06.  For females, the 
estimated elasticity is −0.16, and for less-educated workers −0.09; in both cases these estimates are 
significant.  The point estimates are negative, but insignificant and generally smaller for males, adults, 
youths, those with more education, blue-collar workers, and both full-time and part-time workers.
116  The 
one exception to the evidence of negative employment effects is for white-collar workers, for whom the 
authors find a large positive elasticity.  They interpret this result as evidence that employers substitute 
away from blue-collar labor in response to minimum wage increases.  Regardless of whether this 
interpretation is correct, white-collar wages are much higher and are not directly influenced by the 
minimum wage.
117   
Other studies for Indonesia attempt use more compelling information to identify the effects of 
minimum wages.  Harrison and Scorse (2005), for example, analyze both the effects of increases in the 
minimum wage and the effects of the U.S.-driven anti-sweatshop campaigns on wages and employment in 
Indonesia, using firm-level data from the Annual Manufacturing Survey of Indonesia over the years 1990-
1996.  In contrast to the above studies, they exploit variation in minimum wages by districts within 
provinces.
118  In addition, the authors are able to separate the effects of the minimum wage from those 
stemming from anti-sweatshop activism by recognizing that the latter effects should be limited to the 
textiles, apparel, and footwear industries that were the target of this activism and that these industries are 
located in a narrower geographic area.   
                                                 
116 The estimated disemployment effects are considerably larger and significant for youths and both part-time and 
full-time workers when the compliance measure is included.   
117 Islam and Nazara (2000) also revisit Rama’s evidence using data through 1998.  Their reporting of results is 
rather unclear, but it appears that they find negative and significant employment effects for overall formal 
employment in models that include region and period dummy variables, but positive effects if the region and 
period dummy variables are dropped.  They describe the negative estimates, therefore, as “model-specific.”  
However, as this review makes clear, it is very standard to include some version of region and period effects, and 
it is well-understood that models without these effects may be misspecified.  The case for including these effects 
in Indonesia is particularly strong, as economic conditions differ considerably across regions and the East Asian 
financial crisis struck in the latter part of the sample period.   
118 Rama (2001) acknowledges this variation, but claims that “minimum wage variance across districts within the 
same province was low” (p. 866).   - 113 - 
Using long-difference regressions for the change in log employment from 1990 to 1996, the 
authors report estimates of the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage ranging from 
−0.118 to −0.184; the estimates are generally statistically significant and robust to a variety of 
specifications changes.  Only in small firms were the estimated effects insignificant (and smaller), which 
the authors suggest may be the result of lower compliance among small firms.  Using annual differences 
instead, they find smaller elasticities of −0.05.  They also examine the effects of the minimum wage on 
firm closings and find weak evidence that the minimum wage increased the probability of exit, although 
they note that the effect of the minimum wage on exit rates could be larger over a longer time period.  
Finally, Alatas and Cameron (2003) also try to use a sharper identification strategy.  They focus 
on manufacturing firms in Greater Jakarta, which includes the province of Jakarta and three districts of 
the province of West Java; this three-district area is known as Botabek.  Although Jakarta and Botabek are 
adjacent and both urban, the provincial minimum wage was considerably higher in Jakarta than in West 
Java, resulting in a 36 percent differential in the legal minimum wage between Jakarta and Botabek in 
1990.  Recognizing this discrepancy, the provincial government of West Java subsequently legislated 
separate minimum wages for Botabek and the rest of West Java, resulting in a convergence of minimum 
wages in Jakarta and Botabek by 1994.  Alatas and Cameron also provide evidence that, in these 
provinces, improved enforcement throughout the 1990s coupled with the large minimum wage changes 
led to detectable shifts in the wage distributions.   
Using a panel of all Indonesian manufacturing firms with 20 or more employees, the authors 
implement a matched difference-in-differences approach to estimate employment effects for production 
workers, who are typically less skilled, identifying the minimum wage effect from changes in otherwise 
similar firms in Botabek relative to Jakarta.  The authors estimate the model separately for small (20-150 
workers) domestic, large domestic, and large foreign firms because they believe that different cost 
structures across these categories may result in different minimum wage effects.  For large firms, all of 
the estimates are insignificant.  The point estimate for large foreign firms is negative, while the evidence 
for large domestic firms is inconclusive, with some negative and some positive estimates.  For small - 114 - 
firms, the estimated employment effects is negative overall, indicating significantly faster employment 
growth in Jakarta in this period, but it becomes insignificant when the control group is narrowed to a 
small strip just along the border (to hold economic conditions more similar) or when a higher-wage 
control group from Botabek is used.  The authors conclude that the disemployment effects of the 
minimum wage increases in Indonesia were, overall, not very large.  Other evidence reported in the paper 
suggests that minimum wages did not increase exit rates.   
  Overall, the evidence for Indonesia is mixed, with the results dependent upon research design and 
firm size.  As a result, we do not think one can draw firm conclusions, although the Harrison and Scorse 
study seems to us to provide the most compelling evidence, both because of its careful research design 
and because the data cover a wider swath of employment.  Either way, the changes and availability of 
data in Indonesia suggest that further research on the effects of the minimum wage in this country could 
be especially informative in a developing country context.   
VII.  Conclusions and Discussion 
 
  What is likely most striking to the reader who has managed to wade through our lengthy review is 
the wide range of estimates of the effects of the minimum wage on employment, especially when 
compared to the review by Brown et al. in 1982.  For example, few of the studies in BGK’s survey were 
outside of the consensus range of −0.1 to −0.3 for the elasticity of teenage employment with respect to the 
minimum wage.  In contrast, even limiting the sample of studies to those focused on the effects of the 
minimum wage of teenagers in the United States, the range of studies comprising the new minimum wage 
research extends from well below −1 to well above zero.  This wider range for the United States 
undoubtedly reflects both the new sources of variation used to identify minimum wage effects—notably 
increased state-level variation in minimum wages—and the new approaches and methods used to perform 
the relevant hypothesis tests.  And, the range would be considerably wider if we were to include estimates 
for narrower subsets of workers and industries or estimates from other countries. 
  This wide range of estimates makes it difficult for us to draw broad generalizations about the 
implications of the new minimum wage research.  Clearly, no consensus now exists about the overall - 115 - 
effects on low-wage employment of an increase in the minimum wage.  However, the oft-stated assertion 
that this recent research fails to support the traditional view that the minimum wage reduces the 
employment of low-wage workers is clearly incorrect.  The studies surveyed in this paper lead to 91 
entries in our summary tables (in some cases covering more than one paper).  Of these, by our reckoning 
nearly two-thirds give a relatively consistent (although by no means always statistically significant) 
indication of negative employment effects of minimum wages—where we sometimes focus on results for 
the least-skilled—and fewer than 10 give a relatively consistent indication of positive employment 
effects.  In addition, we have highlighted in the tables 20 studies that we view as providing more credible 
evidence, and 16 (80 percent) of these point to negative employment effects.  Correspondingly, we have 
indicated in our narrative review that, in our view, many of the studies that find zero or positive effects 
suffer from various shortcomings.   
Moreover, as the summary table suggests, the evidence tends to point to disemployment effects of 
minimum wages for many other countries as well, either based on a single study or two, or what we view 
as the more compelling evidence when there are many studies.  There are, of course, important 
exceptions—cases where a convincing study fails to find disemployment effects even when other studies 
for the same country find such evidence.   
Finally, two potentially more important conclusions emerge from our review.  First, we see very 
few—if any—cases where a study provides convincing evidence of positive employment effects of 
minimum wages, especially from studies that focus on broader groups (rather than a narrow industry) for 
which the competitive model predicts disemployment effects.  Second, and related, when researchers 
focus on the least-skilled groups most likely to be adversely affected by minimum wages, we regard the 
evidence as relatively overwhelming that there are stronger disemployment effects for these groups, even 
if they are not always statistically significant (which we would not expect).   
Some broader themes that emerge from our review also help to highlight some of the important 
considerations that economists and policymakers should keep in mind when assessing the empirical - 116 - 
evidence from studies of the disemployment effects of minimum wages that—if recent experience is any 
guide—are likely to continue to be produced.   
First, longer panel studies that incorporate both state and time variation in minimum wages tend, 
on the whole, to find negative and statistically significant employment effects from minimum wage 
increases.  In contrast, the majority of the U.S. studies that have found zero or positive effects of the 
minimum wage on low-skill employment were either short panel data studies or case studies of a specific 
change in the minimum wage in a particular state.  This raises the question, highlighted in the reviews of 
Myth and Measurement by both Brown (1995) and Hamermesh (1995), of whether the latter analyses 
encompass too short of a time period with which to capture the full effects of minimum wage changes.  
Indeed, when they are considered, the inclusion of lagged effects seems to help in reconciling alternative 
estimates of minimum wage effects, and, in our view, the need to allow for sufficient time to observe the 
consequences of a minimum wage change is an important lesson for researchers and policymakers. 
  Second, the concerns raised in the literature about the case study approach seem especially 
problematic.  Even aside from the question of whether the authors’ own surveys provide accurate 
estimates of employment and other indicators, the doubts expressed about the adequacy of the “natural 
experiments” used in the case study approach, along with the fact that the standard competitive model 
provides little guidance as to the expected sign of the employment effects of the minimum wage in the 
narrow industries usually considered in these studies, makes the results from them difficult to interpret.  
As a result, it is not clear to us that these studies have much to say about the adequacy of the neoclassical 
model or about the broader implications of changes in either the federal minimum wage or state minimum 
wages.   
   Third, even aside from the estimates of the effects on the minimum wage on low-wage workers as 
a whole, there seems to be substantial evidence of labor-labor substitution within low-skill groups.  
Although the choice of the aggregate teenage employment rate as the dependent variable in much of this 
literature largely reflects the fact that a sizable portion of this group consists of low-wage workers, not all 
teenagers are low-wage workers and not all low-wage workers are teenagers, and, from a policy - 117 - 
standpoint, the effect of the minimum wage on teenage employment is probably of less interest than its 
effect on other less-skilled individuals.  As a result, some of the more recent literature has attempted to 
identify these substitution effects more directly or has focused more specifically on those individuals 
whose wage and employment opportunities are most likely to be affected by the minimum wage, and the 
estimates from this line of research tend to support the notion that employers replace their lowest-skilled 
labor with close substitutes in response to an increase in the wage floor.  Thus, minimum wages may 
harm the least-skilled workers more than is suggested by the net disemployment effects estimated in 
many studies. 
  Finally, our review of the literature leads us to suggest a number of areas where additional 
research may prove to be especially fruitful.  First, a question that is relevant to much of the literature is 
how to address the potential endogeneity of minimum wage policy to economic conditions and other 
policy choices.  To date, most studies have largely ignored this issue, with the result that many of the 
estimates reported in the literature may be biased, to some degree.  A principal difficulty is that in 
specifications that include cross-sectional fixed effects, the researcher needs a set of instrumental 
variables that vary over time.  Second, it will be useful to bring more direct evidence to bear on whether 
the monopsony model or the competitive model better characterizes the low-wage labor market.  The 
evidence presented in much of the existing research is indirect in nature, and given the ambiguous 
predictions of the competitive model in specific circumstances, more structural approaches to this 
question may ultimately prove more informative.  Third, although much of the literature has focused on 
the employment effects of the minimum wage, the predictions of theory tend to be about overall labor 
input rather than employment per se.  A few studies have attempted to disentangle the implications for 
aggregate hours from those for employment, and the differences in results reported in rather similar 
studies suggests that this remains an area for further research.  Finally, given the variation of estimates 
across studies, a systematic assessment of the sources of differences in the estimates across studies using 
meta-analysis techniques focused on this question (rather than simply combining estimates across studies - 118 - 
to obtain one “meta” estimate) could provide complementary evidence to this survey and improve our 
understanding of how to interpret the literature.    
In the end, our view is that the weight of the empirical evidence is generally consistent with the 
view of traditional economists that the low-wage labor market can be reasonably approximated by the 
neoclassical competitive model.  As a result, we also believe that raising the minimum wage leads to 
economic distortions and often has unintended adverse consequences for the employment opportunities of 
low-skilled workers.  Of course, as we have argued elsewhere, the effects of the minimum wage on 
employment represents only one piece of the analysis necessary to assess whether minimum wages are a 
useful policy tool for improving the economic position of those at the bottom of the income distribution—
which we believe is the ultimate goal of minimum wage policy.  In particular, a more comprehensive 
review that includes the implications of the minimum wage for the levels and distributions of wages, 
employment, incomes, and human capital accumulation, as well as consideration of alternative policies, is 
ultimately needed to assess whether raising the minimum wage is good economic policy. 
Of course, if minimum wages do not generate disemployment effects among low-skilled workers, 
it is far more likely that they have beneficial effects at the bottom of the income distribution.  But given 
that the weight of the evidence points to disemployment effects, the wisdom of pursuing higher minimum 
wages hinges in potentially complex ways on the tradeoffs between the effects of minimum wages on 
different workers and other economic agents, and whether other policies present more favorable tradeoffs.    
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Table 1: Studies of General Minimum Wage Employment Effects in the United States 
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 










Teenagers CPS,  1989-1990  −.06 to +.19; not significant  No allowance for 
lagged effects 
Deere, Murphy, 
and Welch (1995) 






Teens and adult high 
school dropouts by sex 
and race 
CPS, 1985-1992  Teens: −.27 to −.56 
Adult high school dropouts: −.11 
to −.33 
Largest elasticities for blacks 
 
Indicator variables may 
pick up other influences 






Wage gap  Workers with initial 
wage between old and 
new minimum 
NLS, 1979-1987  −.19 to −.24; significant  Control group includes 






Teens and young adult 
high school dropouts 
CPS ORG’s, 1995-
1998 
Many estimates, roughly 
centered on zero; large positive 
elasticities for minority females, 
sometimes significant  
Ignores state variation 
in minimum wages 
Bernstein and 
Schmitt (1998) 








Teens CPS  ORG’s,  1993-
1998 
Male teens: −.45 to −.61; 
estimates sometimes significant 
Female teens: .32 to .86 
Ignores state variation 
in minimum wages; 
differences from Deere, 
et al., results not 
explored 
Abowd et al. 
(1999) 
Change in real 
federal 
minimum wage 
Real wage gap  Low-wage workers 
(ages 16-60) freed by 
decline in real 
minimum wage 
relative to those 
marginally above 
Matched CPS, 1981-
82 to 1986-87 
Varies by age. 
Male average: −.42 
Female average: −1.57 
(Conditional on employment in 
t+1) 
No actual change in 
minimum wage 
Abowd et al. 
(2000a) 
Change in real 
federal 
minimum wage 
Real wage gap  Low-wage young 
workers (ages 16-30) 
freed by decline in real 
minimum wage 
relative to those 
marginally above 
Matched CPS, 1981-
82 to 1986-87 
Varies by age. 
Male average: −2.23 
Female average: −1.87 
(Conditional on employment in 
t+1) 
No actual change in 
minimum wage  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method  Group  Data  Estimated elasticities (or other 
effects) 
Criticisms 
Neumark (2001)  Cross-state 
variation 
generated by 










Teens, young adults 
(16-24), non-enrolled 
young adults and 20-24 
year-olds with  high 
school education or 
less, and with less than 
a high school education 
October-December 
CPS files, 1995-1998 
Teenagers: centered on zero  
16-24 year-olds: −.02 to −.22; 
insignificant 
Non-enrolled, 16-24, high 
school or less: −.11 to −.53; 
significant  
Non-enrolled, 20-24, high 
school or less: −.09 to −.15; 
sometimes significant 
Non-enrolled, 16-24, less than 
high school: −.21; significant 
Non-enrolled, 20-24, less than 
high school: −.11 to −.12; 
insignificant 
Limited period and 
small number of 
minimum wage 
increases  
Chapman (2004)  Cross-state 
variation in 
share between 






Total workforce  Payroll Survey  N/A; estimated effect of −.01,  
insignificant  
Regression does not test 
effect of minimum 
wage on employment; 
focuses on total 












and employment in 
retail, in small 
businesses, and in 
small retail businesses 
Payroll Survey,  
County Business 
Patterns 
N/A; higher growth for all four 
measures in states that raised 
their minimums, but not for 
retail, small business, or small 
retail employment growth 
relative to total employment 
growth, for which simple 
difference-in-difference 
estimates are centered on 0  
Ignores variation in 
timing of state 
minimum wage 
increases; no controls 





most evidence of 
positive effects 
Aggregate Time-Series Studies 
Wellington 
(1991) 
Federal  Kaitz Index  Teenagers and 20-24 
year olds 
1954-1986 Teenagers:  −.052 to −.089 
20-24 year olds: +.002 to −.017 
 
Card and Krueger 
(1995a) 





Federal  Kaitz Index  Teenagers  Data from Card and 
Krueger (1995), 1954 
-1993, updated 
through 2001:Q1 
Teenagers: −.001 to −.061 
 
  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 





Federal Kaitz  Index, 
relative minimum 
wage, and real 
minimum wage 
Teenagers  Data from Card and 
Krueger (1995), 1954-
1993 






Federal  Kaitz Index, and 
separate minimum 
wage and real 
wage 
Teenagers  Data from Card and 
Krueger (1995), 1954-
1993, updated through 
1999:Q2 
Teenagers: −.11 (short-run), 
−.266 (long-run), significant, 
and similar estimates for 
subperiods 
 








Teenagers and young 
adults 
CPS, 1973-1989  Teenagers: −.1 to −.2 
Young adults: −.15 to −.2 
For teens, significant 
negative effects only 
when enrollment is 
included.  Enrollment 
rate too narrow 

















Index; IV for 
enrollment 
Teenagers and 16-24 
year olds 
CPS, 1973-1989  Teenagers: −.17 to −.25 
Youth: −.12 to −.16 
 







Teenagers and 16-24 
year olds 




employment data with 









Teenagers   CPS, 1977-1989  Non-employed and enrolled: 
−.13 
Employed and enrolled: −.40 











Teenagers Matched  CPS,  1979-
1992 
Increase in probability that teens 
leave school to work 
Increase in probability that teens 
leave school to become idle 
Increase in probability that 
employed low-wage teens 
become idle 
  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 















Young adults: −.14; 
significant 
 
Abowd et al. 
(2000b) 
Change in real 
federal  and 
state minimum 
wages 
Real wage gap  Low-wage workers 
affected by a change in 
the real minimum wage 
relative to those 
marginally above them 
Matched CPS, 1981-
82 to 1990-91 
Many results reported for exit 
and entry elasticities. 
Generally small (of both signs) 
and not significant 
 









Teenagers CPS,  1979-1997; 
monthly data 
1979-1997: −.2 to −.6 
1996-1997: −.17 to −.27 
Estimates generally significant 
Excludes year effects 







Teenagers and young 





Teens: −.3 to −.6 
Youths: −.20 to −.25 
Black youths: −.85 
Nonblack youths: −.18 
High school dropouts (20-24): 
−.85 
High school grads (20-24): −.16 
Excludes year effects 
Zavodny (2000)  Federal and 
state 
Panel data 
analysis; real or 
relative minimum 
wage; wage gap 
Teenagers CPS,  1979-1993 
Matched CPS, 1979-
80 to 1992-93 
Aggregate results 
Employment: −.02 to −.12; 
Total hours: +.24 to −.11 
Individual results 
Employment: −.08 to −.10 











Teenagers CPS,  1979-1992  Employment:  −.44 to −.58 
Total hours: −.51 to −.59 
Estimates significant 














Teenagers by race and 
location (city vs. non-
city) 
CPS, Jan-Apr. 1991 to 
Jan-Apr. 1992 
Increase in overall teen 
employment.  Sizable negative 
effects for black and Hispanic 
teens and for teens in a central 
city 
 






Aggregate and youth 
employment (not 
defined) 
CPS, 1977-1995   Aggregate: −.11 (short-run); 
−.19 (long-run) 
Youths: −.37 (short-run); −.69 
(long-run) 
  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method  Group  Data  Estimated elasticities (or other 
effects) 
Criticisms 
Pabilonia (2002)  State  Cross-section 
probit analysis  













16-24 year olds in the 
binding regime 









Teenagers October  CPS,  1980-
1998 
Non-employed and enrolled: 
−.11 
Employed and enrolled: −.09 













Workers at different 
points in the wage 
distribution  
Matched CPS, 1979-
80 to 1996-97 
Employment: −.12 to −.17 for 
workers between 1 and 1.3 
times the old minimum wage 
Hours: −.3 for workers 
between 1 and 1.3 times the old 
minimum wage 
 







Teenagers  CPS; 1984-1992 and 
1992-1998 
0 to −0.45; significant effects 
only evident for federal 
minimum wage increases 
Excludes year effects in 
specifications showing 
significant negative 
effects.  No test of 
lagged effects 
The Bernstein and Schmitt papers also look at young adults aged 20-54 with less than a high school education, but the results are not reported here 
because they fail to find any effects of minimum wages on wages for this group.  Results from studies we regard as more reliable tests of employment 
effects of minimum wages are highlighted.    
Table 2: Studies of Minimum Wage Employment Effects in Specific Sectors in the United States 
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method  Group  Data  Estimated elasticities (or other 
effects) 
Criticisms 
Studies of Specific Sectors 














Dec. 1990 and 
July 1991 
+1.7 to +2.65; significant  Potentially large amount of 
measurement error 






Teen employment and retail 
trade employment 
CPS  Teens: +.15; significant 














Fast-food employment in 




March 1991 and 
April 1991 
Estimates centered on zero, not 
significant 
Potentially large amount of 
measurement error; short 
period over which to 
observe effects 
Card and Krueger 
(1994) 








Fast-food employment in 
New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania 
Survey of 
restaurants in Feb. 
1992 and Nov. 
1992 
FTEs: +.63 to +.73; some 
estimates significant 
Potentially large amount of 
measurement error 








Retail trade employment  QCEW  −.4 to −.9; some estimates 
significant 












Retail: −.08 to −.25 
Eating and drinking: −.05 to −.2 










Fast-food employment in 


















Fast-food employment in 





FTEs: +.005 to +.15; not 
significant 
 






Fast-food employment in 









Total hours: −.018 
Hours per worker: −.062 
Small sample  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 


















Employment: −.06 to −.12; 
mostly significant 
Firm level 
Employment:  −.22 to −.85 
Hours: −1.01 to −1.50 
All estimates significant 
 
Sabia (2006)  State  Panel data  
analysis  
Teen employment and hours 
in retail and at small 








Share of 16-64 year-olds 
employed in retail: −.09 to −.29 
Share of 16-64 year-olds 
employed in small businesses: 
−.08 to −.12 
Share of teens employed in retail 
sector: −.27 to −.43 
Average retail hours worked by 
teens: −.53 
Average retail hours worked by 
employed teens: −.05 to −.28 
Share of teens employed in 
small businesses: −.46 to −.89 
Average small business hours 
worked by teens: −.48 to −.88 
Average small business hours 
worked by employed teens: −.54 
to −.70 
Teen employment: −.19 to −.33 
Average hours worked by teens: 
−.37 to −.45 
Average hours worked by 
employed teens: −.01 to −.29; 
almost all estimates significant 
Focus on teen employment 
in low-wage sectors 
generates ambiguous 
results; declines imply 
neither overall declines in 
these sectors, nor overall 











Eating and drinking 







Eating and drinking 
employment: −.2; significant 
Hotel and lodging 
employment: .15 to .16, 
significant 
Want-ads: negative and 
significant for all restaurant 




Hotel and lodging 
employment could be 
sensitive to variation in 
tourism; want-ad 
specifications different 
from industry employment 
specifications  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method  Group  Data  Estimated elasticities (or other 
effects) 
Criticisms 
Time-series Studies of Industries 
Wolfson and 
Belman (2001) 
Federal  Time-series   Low-wage industries and 
industries employment large 





Preponderance of employment 
elasticities are negative, 
although more often than not 
insignificant; including 
minimum wage in time-series 
models generally does not 
improve one-step ahead 
employment forecasts, even in 
lower-wage industries or 
industries with larger share of 
young workers 
Theory does not predict 
employment declines in all 
industries, or even all low-
wage industries.  Unclear 
why one-step ahead 
forecasts provide right 
criterion.   
Wolfson and 
Belman (2004) 
Federal  Time-series  Low-wage industries and 
industries employment large 





Employment elasticities vary 
across industries, with many 
insignificant; of significant 
estimates of effects of legislated 
increases, most are negative; 
effects of real declines in 
minimum are of unexpected sign 
in one-half of cases; no more 
evidence of disemployment 
effects in industries where 
minimum wages increased 
average wages more 
Theory does not predict 
employment declines in all 
industries, or even all low-
wage industries.  Industries 
with larger wage increases 
may be those with less 
ability to substitute away 
from low-wage labor, or 
greater ability to substitute 
towards more-skilled labor, 
and in either case 
disemployment effects 
would be smaller, not 
larger.     
Results from studies we regard as more reliable tests of employment effects of minimum wages within a sector are highlighted.   
Table 3: Studies of Minimum Wage Effects on the Distribution of Employment in the United States 
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method Group  Data  Results  Criticisms 
Lang and Kahn 
(1998) 
State and federal  Difference-
in-
differences 
Workers in food service 
occupations in eating and 
drinking establishments 
CPS, 1988-1992  Shift in employment from adults 
to teenagers and students 
 





High school dropouts and 
high school graduates 
SIPP, 1986-1996  Increase in minimum raises 
share of minimum wage workers 
with less than high school 
degree, interpreted as 
substitution toward less-
educated workers; but results for 
transitions indicate that 
minimum wage increases 
associated with relatively more 
transitions from minimum wage 
jobs to higher wage jobs for 
male high school graduates 
versus high school dropouts, and 
relatively fewer transitions from 
higher wage jobs into minimum 
wage jobs  
Results do not establish 
substitution towards less-
educated workers 
Results from studies we regard as more reliable tests of employment effects of minimum wages for subset of workers are highlighted.  
Table 4: International Studies of Minimum Wage Employment Effects, Industrialized Countries 
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 













National sources  Teens: −.07 to −.41 
20-24: −.03 to −.10 
25-54: .0 to +.01 













OECD and various 
sources, mid-1970s 
through 2000 (varies by 
country) 
Employment 
Standard models: Teens, −.18 
to −.24 to; youths, −.13 to 
−.16 
Less negative with youth 
subminimum, with bargained 
minimum, with greater 
employment protection, and 
with more active labor 
market policies.  More 
negative with stronger labor 
standards (working time 
rules, less flexible contracts) 





Dickens, et al. 
(1999) 
Wages Councils  Panel data 
analysis 




New Earnings Survey, 
Employment Gazette, 
1978-1992 
.05 to .43  Change in institutional 
setting of minimum wages 
in 1986 is ignored; 
questions about exogeneity 
of minimum wages 










Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey Micro Data 
Relative increases in hiring rate 
and employment in Council 
sector after Councils abolished 
(i.e., evidence consistent with 
disemployment effects of 
minimum wages) 
Questions about exogeneity 
of minimum wage Increases 
chosen by Wages Councils, 
and hence of variation 
created by abolition of 
Wages Councils  











Labor Force Survey, 
1994-2001, and 
authors’ survey of 
residential care homes 
Employment and hours fell 
more where initial proportion 
of minimum wage workers or 
wage gap higher: implied 
elasticities for employment: 
−.08 to −.38; for hours: −.15 
to −.39 
  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method  Group  Data  Estimated elasticities (or other 
effects) 
Criticisms 
Stewart (2002)  Variation across 












New Earnings Survey, 
1998, 2000; Labour 
Force Survey Local 
Areas Data, Annual 
Business Inquiry, 1998-
1999  
Wide variety of estimates, and 
not easily translated into 
elasticities given that estimates 
are for introduction of new 
minimum wage.  Many positive 
and many negative estimates, 
none significant 
Ignores possible workings 
of youth subminimums; 
many estimates for all 
workers rather than young 
workers; analysis of less-
skilled individuals does not 
provide information on 
wage effects 
Stewart (2004a)  Variation across 
workers at 
different points 




Adult men and 
women (aged 
22 and over), 
and young men 
and women 
aged (18-21)  
Matched Labor Force 
Survey, March 1997-
March 2000; British 
Household Panel 
Survey, Fall 1994-Fall 
1999; New Earnings 
Survey, April 1994-
April 1999 
Elasticities for transitions to 
non-employment almost always 
insignificant, more likely 
positive than negative 
Focus is on short-run 
effects, and no evidence on 










Adult men and 
women  
Matched Labor Force 
Survey, March 1997-
September 2000; New 
Earnings Survey, April 
1994-April 2000 
Weekly hours of employed 
workers decline by 1 to 2 
hours, with the reduction 
occurring at a lag of 
approximately one year 
No parallel evidence on 
employment, despite 
suggestion of lagged hours 
reductions 
Canada 
Baker, et al. 
(1999) 
Across provinces 








from Statistics Canada, 
1979-1993 
Within-group: −.267 (−.471 
with one lag) 
First difference: .074 (−.227 
with one lag) 
Second difference: −.127 
Third difference: −.306 
Fourth difference: −.398 
Within-group estimates and 
longer-difference estimates 
significant; similar result 
reflected in lower-frequency 
filters 
  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method  Group  Data  Estimated elasticities (or other 
effects) 
Criticisms 
Yuen (2003)  Across provinces  




19) and young 
adults (20-24) 
Labor Market Activity 
Survey, 1988-1990 
“Permanent” low-wage teen 
workers: −0.86 (significant) 
“Permanent” low-wage young 
adult workers: −1.15 
(significant) 
“Transitory” low-wage teen 
workers: 1.18 (insignificant) 
“Transitory” low-wage young 
adult workers: 0.31 
(insignificant) 
   
 
Campolieti, et al. 
(2005a) 
Provincial Multinomial  logit 
analysis; Relative 
minimum wage 
Teenagers  Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics 
(1993-1999) 
−0.12 to −0.50 
No effects on schooling 
 






Youths (16-24)  Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics 
(1993-1999) 
−0.33 to −0.54  
Campolieti, et al. 
(2006) 








April Labor Force 
Surveys, 1981-1997 
Teens: −.17 to −.44 
20-24 year-olds: −.14 to −.43 
16-24 year-olds: −.17 to −.44 
 
Australia 










by age and sex 
Labour Force Survey, 
1994-2001 
Aggregate: −.25 to −.40 
15-24: −1.01 
15-24, male: −.68 
15-24, female: −1.44 
Older groups: −.03 to −.14 
(mostly insignificant) 
Very large elasticities for 
aggregate employment and 









2003  −0.2  Employer attributions of 
employment changes to 
minimum wage increases 












15-19 year-olds  Panel analysis: 
Australian Bureau of 
Statistics annual data, 
1980-1995 
Cross-section analysis: 
unit record census data, 
year unspecified 
Panel analysis: −.21 to .08, 
almost all estimates negative, 
none significant 
Cross-section analysis: full-
time, −.05 to −.31, generally 
significant 
Source of minimum wage 
variation unclear; model 
should include non-teen 
minimum wage  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method  Group  Data  Estimated elasticities (or other 
effects) 
Criticisms 








industry, age, and 
sex 
16-20 year-olds  Quarterly data, 1987-
1997 (source 
unspecified) 
Effects insignificant and often 
positive, except for retail where 
there is some evidence of 
disemployment effects; 
elasticities range from −1.6 to 
−23.1 
Absurdly large elasticity 
estimates; likely weak 
identification given short 
time-series; model should 







for workers 20 









Force Survey (HLFS), 
1985-1996 
Effect of adult minimum: 20-
24: −.1 to −.4 
15-19: −.1 to .4 
No effect of introduction of 
teen minimum on teen 
employment 
 
Teen minimum omitted 
from young adult equation, 
could bias estimates of teen 
and young adult effects 
Chapple (1997)  National 
minimum wage 










Gazette and Statistics 




20-24: −.17 to −.34 
Cross-industry: −.06 to −.10 
Separate time-series by 
industry: estimates centered on 
zero 
Ignores introduction of teen 
minimum wage in time-
series analysis.  In cross-
industry analysis year 
effects omitted, and effects 
very sensitive.  Separate 
time-series by industry have 






16-17 and 18-19 
year-olds 
 Teens,  20-21, 
and 20-25 year-
olds 
HLSF, 1997-2003   Employment of 16-17 and 18-
19 year-olds rose relative to 20-
25 year-olds, but fell relative to 
20-21 year-olds  in years 
corresponding to largest 
minimum wage increases  
Inspection of graphs and 
regressions give some 
suggestion of negative 
employment effects 
France 





increases in early 




All Enquête  Emploi,  1981-
1989  
No evidence that low-wage 
groups suffered larger 
employment losses in period 
when national minimum 
increased more sharply 
No wage impact, so no 
employment impact 
expected  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method  Group  Data  Estimated elasticities (or other 
effects) 
Criticisms 










All Declaration  Annuelle 
de Salaires, 1967-1992 
Regions with low initial wages 
experienced greater 
employment growth 
Labor demand variation 
could explain results; not 















age 25)  
French Labor Force 
Survey, 1980-1984 
Youth employment fell more in 
sectors where minimum wage 
was more binding 
Does not address overall 
changes in youth 

















Various ages  Enquête Emploi, 1982-
1989 
Large disemployment effects 
for workers newly 
constrained by minimum 
relative to those with 
marginally higher wages, 
especially those just above 
age 24 not protected by 
employment promotion 
contracts: 
Men, 25-29: −4.6 
Women, 25-29: −1.38 
Men, 20-24: −.77 
Women, 20-24: −1.21 
Men, 16-19: −.08 
Men, 16-19: .46 
Elasticities larger than 
conventional estimates 
because based on 
comparison to those with 
slightly higher wages 
Netherlands  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method  Group  Data  Estimated elasticities (or other 
effects) 
Criticisms 





relative to adult 
minimum in 











Youths (17-22)  Labor Market Survey, 
1979-1985 
Youth employment fell by less 
or rose over this period in 
occupations most intensive in 
use of young, unskilled 
workers, relative to overall 
changes in youth employment 
 
Spain 












Teens (16-19)  Contalilidad Nacional 
Sectorial 
Teens: −.15, stronger in 
industries where minimum 
wage more binding 
Specifications exclude year 
effects 
 2.  Sharp 
increases in 
minimum for 16 
year-olds and 
more modest 






regions in share 
initially low-paid 
Teens (16-19)  Contalilidad Nacional 
Sectorial 
Negative relationship 
between change in teenage 
employment rate and share 




Pereira (2003)  Abolition of 
teenage 
subminimum 





Quadros de Pessoal, 
1986-1989 
Teen employment (and hours) 
declined relative to 
employment of 30-35 year-
olds, with elasticity of −.2 to 
−.4; substitution towards 20-25 
year-olds 
Firm size controls may be 
inappropriate  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 








wage in 1987 
Comparisons of 
aggregate changes 




Teen employment grew faster 
than employment of 20-25 
year-olds or older workers 
following minimum wage 
increase 
No controls; no 





Variation in teen 





Time-series 15-19  and  20-
24 
Labor Force Survey, 
Statistical Yearbooks of 
National Statistical 




Organization, OECD:  
1974-2001 for young 
adults; 1981-2000 for 
teens 
Teens: .22 to .63 (larger 
estimates significant) 
Young adults: −.05 to −.12 
(insignificant) 
Little real time-series 
variation, unexpected results 
for other controls, failure to 
account for minimum wages 
for other groups 
Sweden 
Skedinger (2006)  Union negotiated 
minimum wages 








Job separations in response to 
minimum wage increases:  
elasticity .58 overall; .36 to 
1.00 for 20-65 year-olds; .77 to 
.80 for teenagers (although 
−.12 to −.14 and insignificant 
for the 1993-1998 subperiod).  
Job accessions in response to 
minimum wage decreases: .84 
overall; .45 to .55 for teenagers, 
 
Results from studies we regard as more reliable tests of employment effects of minimum wages for subset of workers are highlighted.  Effects are 
sometimes long-run effects from dynamic models, depending on which were emphasized by authors.    
Table 5: International Studies of Minimum Wage Employment Effects, Developing Countries 
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 




Fajnzylber (2001) Largely  time-
series variation 







All, but effects 
differ based on 




Formal sector, below and near 
minimum wage: −.05 to −.08 
Informal sector, below and near 
minimum wage: −.05 to −.15 
Stronger results for informal 
sector unexpected 


























centered on zero for hours and 
employment 
Employment, formal sector: 0 
Hours, formal sector: −.02  
Employment, informal sector: 
−.02 
Hours, informal sector: .02 
Employment, private sector: 0 
Hours, private sector: .01 
Employment, public sector: .03 
Hours, public sector: −0.09 
Some estimates difficult to 
explain or reconcile 














All ages  Brazilian Monthly 
Employment Survey, 
1982-2000 
OLS: −.12 to .02 (most 
negative) 
IV: large number of estimates, 
ranging from −.29 to .12 (most 
negative)  
 
Political variables may 
influence other labor market 
policies as well 
Mexico/Colombia  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 
Method  Group  Data  Estimated elasticities (or other 
effects) 
Criticisms 
Bell (1997)  Mexico:  
minimum wages 







cities until 1984, 
then a national 
minimum wage 
implemented 
Time series and 
panel data 
analyses 















(1984-1990);  Mexican 
Ecuesta Nationale de 
Empleo (1988 only); 








Time series: (insignificant) 
for Mexico, −.18, and 
(significant) for Colombia, 
−.34. Panel data: OLS 
(insignificant) for Mexico 
skilled, −1.08, and unskilled, 
−1.52; (significant) for 
Colombia skilled, −2.93, and 
unskilled, −2.29. FE 
(insignificant) for Mexico 
skilled, −.01 to .05 , and 
unskilled, −.03 to .03; 
(significant) for Colombia 
skilled, −.03 to −.24, and 
unskilled, −.15 to −.33  
 
Mexico 












Mexican Census of 
Population, 1970,1980, 




Nacional de Empleo 
Urbana  
Males: .005 to .014 (−.002 to 
.037 by age group)  
Females: −.426 to −.575 
(−.406 to −.764 by age group) 
 
Colombia 









employed as a 
control group   
Men working 
30-50 hours 
per week   
National Household 
Survey, 1997-1999 
Employment elasticity: −.15.  
Stronger effects near minimum 
wage but effects also present 






variation in real 
minimum wage, 
and variation in 











by age, sex, 
and skill 
Household survey for 
Santiago, Chile, 1960-
1998 
Minimum wages reduce 
relative employment of young, 
unskilled workers, but increase 
relative employment of women 
Tenuous evidence on 
overall employment effects  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 














All   Household Surveys for 
Multiple Purposes, 
industry data from 




Covered-sector hours of 
employed: −.06 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 







differences in job 
loss between 
those bound and 





in small (fewer 
than 10 
employees) 
and large firms 
 
Continuous Sample 
Survey of Population 
(CSSP) 1996-1998 
Males bound by new minimum 
more likely to lose job by 9 
percentage points; females by 
2.3 percentage points 
(insignificant), although more 
in large firms 
Short time horizon after 
minimum wage increase and 
potential difficulties 
controlling for aggregate 




and Freeman (1992) 
U.S. federal 
minimum wage 
as applied to 










20 hours per 
week. 
Puerto Rican Census, 
and the Puerto Rican 
Survey of 
Manufacturing, 
supplemented by data 
from the Departmento 
del Trabajo and 
Recursos Humanos, 
U.S. Department of 
Labor and U.S. 
Department of 
Commerce  
Elasticities of employment, 
time-series: −0.11 to −0.15; 
panel: −0.54 for full sample 
period, 0.20 1974; −.91 after 
1974 (when U.S. law generated 
increases) 
Krueger (1995) shows that 
results are fragile. 
Indonesia  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 













Urban workers  Indonesia’s 1993 Labor 
Force Survey; data for 
years 1988-1994 from 
multiple sources: 
national accounts, the 
labor force survey, the 
wage survey, the survey 
of large manufacturing 
establishments and the 
survey of small scale 
manufacturing 
industries 
Elasticity for aggregate urban 
employment using the log of 
the minimum wage, −.035; 
using the minimum over labor 
productivity measures, −.038 to 
.000. For ages 15-24: using log 
of the minimum wage, .015; 
using the minimum over labor 
productivity measures, −.25 to 
.086. All insignificant. Large 
firms: log of minimum, .197; 
minimum over productivity 
measures, .018 to .132. All 
insignificant. Small firms: log 
of the minimum −1.302 
(significant); minimum over 
labor productivity measures, 
−.767 to −.821 (insignificant) 
Strength of identifying 
information is unclear, 
given apparent lack of 
enforcement of provincial 
minimum wages as of 1989 










Urban workers  Indonesia’s 1993 Labor 
Force Survey; data for 
years 1988-2000 
Elasticity for aggregate urban 
employment, −.06 (significant); 
males, −.047; females, −.155 
(significant); adults, −.044; 
youths, −.123; educated, −.025; 
less-educated, −.087 
(significant); white-collar, 1.00; 
blue-collar, −.073; full-time, 






differences in the 
minimum wage, 















Diff-in-diffs, elasticity for 
manufacturing employment, 
−.047 for all firms; −.051 for 
balanced panel. Other 
specifications, −.118 to −.184 
(all significant);  insignificant 
only when done separately 
for small firms, −.021.   
  
Study Minimum  wage 
variation 


























Indonesian Labor Force 
Survey (1990-1996) 
Significant negative 
employment effect only for 
small domestic firms: 41%  
(16%) relative employment 
loss from 1991 (1992) to 1996 
in Botabek, which 
experienced sharper 
minimum wage increase; 
effect no longer significant 
when restricted to a narrow 
strip along the border Large 
foreign firms show 
insignificant negative effects. 
Large domestic firm 
estimates are insignificant 
and inconclusive.  
 
Results from studies we regard as more reliable tests of employment effects of minimum wages for subset of workers are highlighted. 
 